Interpreting Entangled States: 1926-1936
Rasmus Jaksland
This paper traces the interpretation of entangled states from their discovery in 1926 to the culmination of this first round of interpretation in Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen’s thought experiment of 1935. While some adopted a holist interpretation of entangled states, others believed that entangled states were really disguised mixtures of product states, a view this paper denotes entanglement exceptionalism. This paper argues that entanglement exceptionalism might have been the predominant view pre‑1935. This, in turn, offers a new framing of EPR as arguing that entanglement exceptionalism is an unstable view that, under reasonable assumptions, must result in the conclusion that quantum mechanics is incomplete. Furthermore, this paper speculates that it was well known that one could not adopt EPR’s assumptions and reject entanglement exceptionalism. Consequently, only entanglement exceptionalists would have been inclined to adopt EPR’s assumptions, and they may therefore have been EPR’s main audience. The paper ends by recounting how Wendell Furry, in the aftermath of the EPR paper, showed that entanglement exceptionalism does not reproduce the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics, so that, independently of EPR’s assumptions, entanglement exceptionalism had to be abandoned. The paper argues that Furry, John von Neumann, and Niels Bohr, likely among many others, took these properties of entangled states as yet another reason to adopt a form of anti‑realism with respect to quantum mechanics. This, finally, provides a corrective to the story that entanglement was ignored between 1935 and the 1960s. Entanglement was well known in this period, but Bohr and those following him were convinced that it was unproblematic for their various versions of anti‑realist interpretations.
•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations