Shor’s algorithm is a well-known probabilistic method for factoring large composite integers in polynomial-time on a quantum computer. The method computes the order r of a random element x in the group Z∗N and uses that information for splitting N with an application of the greatest common divisor algorithm. However, being probabilistic, the success of Shor’s algorithm relies on some special properties of N. If r is even and xr/2 £ -1 mod N, then gcd(xr/2 - 1, N) reveals a nontrivial factor of N and the method succeeds. But even assuming that r is even and being given the complete prime factorization of N it is not obvious whether xr/2 £ -1 mod N and, therefore, it is not easy to assert whether Shor’s algorithm would split N without running it and looking at its answer. We present a strategy for detecting whether the splitting occurs without any need for running the quantum order-finding algorithm, but we must be given the prime factorization of N. This has allowed us to produce the first direct evidence of the probability of success of Shor’s method. The composites chosen were the product of two randomly-generated probable primes of similar sizes that pass the Miller-Rabin test.
Abstract It’s well known that Shor[1] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for prime factorization by using quantum computers. For a given number n, he gave an algorithm for finding the order r of an element x (mod n) instead of giving an algorithm for factoring n directly. The indirect algorithm is feasible because factor-ization can be reduced to finding the order of an element by using randomization[2]. But a point should be stressed that the order of the number must be even. Actually, the restriction can be removed in a particular case. In this paper, we show that factoring RSA modulus (a product of two primes) only needs to find the order of 2, whether it is even or not. Keywords Shor’s quantum algorithm, RSA modulus. 1
Let N be a (large positive integer, let b > 1 be an integer relatively prime to N, and let r be the order of b modulo N. Finally, let QC be a quantum computer whose input register has the size specified in Shor's original description of his order-finding algorithm. We prove that when Shor's algorithm is implemented on QC, then the probability P of obtaining a (nontrivial) divisor of r exceeds 0.7 whenever N exceeds 2^{11}-1 and r exceeds 39, and we establish that 0.7736 is an asymptotic lower bound for P. When N is not a power of an odd prime, Gerjuoy has shown that P exceeds 90 percent for N and r sufficiently large. We give easily checked conditions on N and r for this 90 percent threshold to hold, and we establish an asymptotic lower bound for P of (2/Pi) Si(4Pi), about .9499, in this situation. More generally, for any nonnegative integer q, we show that when QC(q) is a quantum computer whose input register has q more qubits than does QC, and Shor's algorithm is run on QC(q), then an asymptotic lower bound on P is (2/Pi) Si(2^(q+2) Pi) (if N is not a power of an odd prime). Our arguments are elementary and our lower bounds on P are carefully justified.
Let N be a (large) positive integer, let b be an integer satisfying 1< b < N that is relatively prime to N, and let r be the order of b modulo N. Finally, let QC be a quantum computer whose input register has the size specified in Shor's original description of his order-finding algorithm. In this paper, we analyze the probability that a single run of the quantum component of the algorithm yields useful information---a nontrivial divisor of the order sought. We prove that when Shor's algorithm is implemented on QC, then the probability P of obtaining a (nontrivial) divisor of
r exceeds
.7 whenever N \ge 2^{11} and r\ge 40, and we establish that
.7736 is an asymptotic lower bound for
P. When
N is not a power of an odd prime, Gerjuoy has shown that
P exceeds 90 percent for
N and
r sufficiently large. We give easily checked conditions on N and r for this 90 percent threshold to hold, and we establish an asymptotic lower bound for
P of 2\Si(4\pi)/\pi ~0.9499 in this situation. More generally, for any nonnegative integer
q, we show that when QC(q) is a quantum computer whose input register has
q more qubits than does QC, and Shor's algorithm is run on QC(q), then an asymptotic lower bound on P is 2\Si(2^{q+2}\pi)/\pi (if N is not a power of an odd prime). Our arguments are elementary and our lower bounds on P are carefully justified.
In this world of massive communication networks, data security and confidentiality are of crucial importance for maintaining secured private communication and protecting information against eavesdropping attacks. Existing cryptosystems provide data security and confidentiality by the use of encryption and signature algorithms for secured communication. Classical computers use cryptographic algorithms that use the product of two large prime numbers for generating public and private keys. These classical algorithms are based on the fact that integer factorization is a non-deterministic polynomial-time (NP) problem and requires super-polynomial time making it impossible for large enough integers. Shor’s algorithm is a well-known algorithm for factoring large integers in polynomial time and takes only O(b3) time and O(b) space on b-bit number inputs. Shor’s algorithm poses a potential threat to the current security system with the ongoing advancements of Quantum computers. This paper discusses how Shor’s algorithm will be able to break integer factorization-based cryptographic algorithms, for example, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Rabin Algorithms. As a proof of concept, experimental analysis of Quantum Shor’s algorithm on existing public-key cryptosystems using IBM Quantum Experience is performed for factorizing integers of moderate length (seven bits) due to limitations of thirty-two qubits in present IBM quantum computers. In a nutshell, this work will demonstrate how Shor’s algorithm poses threat to confidentiality and authentication services.
Abstract We show that given the order of a single element selected uniformly at random from
ZN∗ Z N ∗ , we can with very high probability, and for any integer N, efficiently find the complete factorization of N in polynomial time. This implies that a single run of the quantum part of Shor’s factoring algorithm is usually sufficient. All prime factors of N can then be recovered with negligible computational cost in a classical post-processing step. The classical algorithm required for this step is essentially due to Miller.
One of the most well known mathematically hard problems in number theory is the integer factorization problem, roughly stated that decomposition of a composite number into its prime factors. In modern cryptography, RSA encryption algorithm whose security is based on integer factorization problem is highly practical, widespread and up to date no classical algorithm having polynomial running time for the factorization of large numbers is known. In 1994, Peter Shor proposed an efficient algorithm on quantum computer. In this paper, we mention about the fundamentals of Shor's quantum algorithm illustrating a concrete example.