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Springer eBooks

Holism

Abner Shimony

Published Jan 1, 1999• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-011-4581-7_12

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In slogan form, holism is the obscure thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Physics has been taken to exhibit holism of various kinds, associated with different ways of trying to make this thesis clear. On a more metaphysical approach, holism is the view that the existence or features of some physical whole are not determined by the existence and features of its constituent parts. This chapter discusses methodological holism in physics and considers whether the physical theories imply such metaphysical holism. While some form of ontological holism has occasionally been considered, the variety of metaphysical holism most clearly at issue in quantum mechanics is property holism. One may try to avoid the conclusion that experimental violations of Bell inequalities manifest a failure of Local Action by invoking ontological holism for events.

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Holism and Time Symmetry

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Quantum mechanics is often taken to entail holism. I examine the arguments for this claim, and find that although there is no general argument from the structure of quantum mechanics to holism, there are specific arguments for holism available within the three main realist interpretations (Bohm, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and many-worlds). However, Evans, Price and Wharton's sideways Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell example challenges the holistic conclusion. I show how the symmetry between the sideways and standard Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell set-ups can be used to argue against holism. I evaluate the prospects for extending this insight to more general quantum systems, with a view to producing a genuinely time-symmetric hidden variable theory. I conclude that, although this extension undermines the analogy between the sideways and standard cases, quantum mechanics without holism remains a live possibility. Quanta 2016; 5: 85–92.

Quanta•Nov 16, 2016•2 citations
In slogan form, holism is the obscure thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Physics has been taken to exhibit holism of various kinds, associated with different ways of trying to make this thesis clear. On a more metaphysical approach, holism is the view that the existence or features of some physical whole are not determined by the existence and features of its constituent parts. This chapter discusses methodological holism in physics and considers whether the physical theories imply such metaphysical holism. While some form of ontological holism has occasionally been considered, the variety of metaphysical holism most clearly at issue in quantum mechanics is property holism. One may try to avoid the conclusion that experimental violations of Bell inequalities manifest a failure of Local Action by invoking ontological holism for events.
Quantum mechanics is often taken to entail holism. I examine the arguments for this claim, and find that although there is no general argument from the structure of quantum mechanics to holism, there are specific arguments for holism available within the three main realist interpretations (Bohm, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and many-worlds). However, Evans, Price and Wharton's sideways Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell example challenges the holistic conclusion. I show how the symmetry between the sideways and standard Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell set-ups can be used to argue against holism. I evaluate the prospects for extending this insight to more general quantum systems, with a view to producing a genuinely time-symmetric hidden variable theory. I conclude that, although this extension undermines the analogy between the sideways and standard cases, quantum mechanics without holism remains a live possibility. Quanta 2016; 5: 85–92.