Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Understanding Quantum Raffles: Quantum Mechanics on an Informational Approach: Structure and Interpretation

Michael Janas, Michael E. Cuffaro, Michel Janssen B

Published Dec 3, 2021• 45 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-85939-8

Related papers

Foreword to Understanding Quantum Raffles, by Michael Janas, Michael E. Cuffaro, Michel Janssen

Jeffrey Bub

Foreword to Michael Janas, Michael E. Cuffaro, Michel Janssen, Understanding Quantum Raffles. Quantum Mechanics on an Informational Approach: Structure and Theory (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 340) (Springer, 2022).

arXiv:2301.12266•Jan 28, 2023•2 citations

The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Robert K. Clifton

Philosophical Books•Jul 1, 1991•16 citations

The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Jerrold L. Aronson

International Studies in Philosophy•Jan 1, 1992•5 citations

Quantum Mechanics Needs Interpretation

Louis Marchildon

Abstract—Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, per-haps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and which has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. The epistemic view provides no answer to what constitutes the main question of interpretation: How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? I will then review three different approaches to understanding quan-tum mechanics, namely, Bohmian mechanics, Everett’s relative states, and Cramer’s transactional interpretation. I will show that these approaches answer the above question, as well as other foundational ones. This paper is written from the perspective that different logically consistent interpretations, far from leading to confusion, in fact contribute to increased understanding of the theory. I.

•Dec 1, 2009•2 citations

The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

Richard Healey, R. I. G. Hughes

The Philosophical Review•Jul 1, 1992•40 citations

The Categorial Error: Towards a Structural Operative Understanding of Quantum Mechanics. A Critique from Scientific Fruitfulness

Iguiniz, Gabriel

Quantum mechanics exhibits a singular contrast: it is the most precise and technologically potent physical theory ever constructed, yet it continues to generate the most profound interpretative controversy in the history of science. This article argues that this persistent tension does not reveal a deficiency in the theory, but a profound categorial error in our epistemological expectations: the demand for a classical ontological narrative that translates quantum formalism into intuitive, spatiotemporal images. We trace this demand to a contingent historical isomorphism between classical physics, our mesoscopic cognition, and a mechanistic ideal of explanation. Evaluating leading narrative interpretations (Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation) through the Lakatosian criterion of integrated scientific fruitfulness, we demonstrate that while logically consistent, they exhibit marginal theoretical productivity and engage in non-binding ontological inflation. In contrast, we identify and champion the structural-operative understanding already driving progress in fields like quantum information and decoherence. This program—prefigured in the works of Fine, Mermin, and Bitbol, and aligned with ontological structuralism—redefines “understanding” as: (1) architectural mastery of the formalism, (2) predictive-technological competence, and (3) the investigation of constitutive phenomena (e.g., entanglement) as guides to structure. We conclude that quantum mechanics demands epistemological maturity: deep scientific comprehension can be non-narrative, residing in our successful interaction with the theory’s formal architecture and its empirical prowess.

•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations
Abstract—Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, per-haps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and which has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. The epistemic view provides no answer to what constitutes the main question of interpretation: How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? I will then review three different approaches to understanding quan-tum mechanics, namely, Bohmian mechanics, Everett’s relative states, and Cramer’s transactional interpretation. I will show that these approaches answer the above question, as well as other foundational ones. This paper is written from the perspective that different logically consistent interpretations, far from leading to confusion, in fact contribute to increased understanding of the theory. I.
Quantum mechanics exhibits a singular contrast: it is the most precise and technologically potent physical theory ever constructed, yet it continues to generate the most profound interpretative controversy in the history of science. This article argues that this persistent tension does not reveal a deficiency in the theory, but a profound categorial error in our epistemological expectations: the demand for a classical ontological narrative that translates quantum formalism into intuitive, spatiotemporal images. We trace this demand to a contingent historical isomorphism between classical physics, our mesoscopic cognition, and a mechanistic ideal of explanation. Evaluating leading narrative interpretations (Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation) through the Lakatosian criterion of integrated scientific fruitfulness, we demonstrate that while logically consistent, they exhibit marginal theoretical productivity and engage in non-binding ontological inflation. In contrast, we identify and champion the structural-operative understanding already driving progress in fields like quantum information and decoherence. This program—prefigured in the works of Fine, Mermin, and Bitbol, and aligned with ontological structuralism—redefines “understanding” as: (1) architectural mastery of the formalism, (2) predictive-technological competence, and (3) the investigation of constitutive phenomena (e.g., entanglement) as guides to structure. We conclude that quantum mechanics demands epistemological maturity: deep scientific comprehension can be non-narrative, residing in our successful interaction with the theory’s formal architecture and its empirical prowess.