Masked torsion point supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman : A technique for preventing Castryck-Decru attack against SIDH
R. Krishnaprabha
Collision-resistant hashing and key exchange are two significant Post Quantum cryptography challenges based on isogeny. The challenge in isogeny-based encryption is to identify an isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2, between two given supersingular elliptic curves defined over a finite field Fq. Finding End(E1) and End(E2) is the analogous problem to this one. Supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) key exchange is designed to be quantum secure. In this instance, we take advantage of the endomorphism ring’s non-commutative property. In SIDH, both the initiator and the response contribute equally to the shared secret. Here, we create both public and private keys and send them through an unsecured channel. Finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves is the fundamentally challenging problem. The needed isogeny is calculated using the torsion point information and the degree of the secret isogeny.In July 2022, Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru devised a successful key recovery attack on SIDH/ SIKE. The attack heavily depends on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob communicate during the protocol and is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves. We shall present a successful technique to prevent the aforementioned attack in this paper.
AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations