Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Cambridge University Press eBooks

An exchange on local beables

Michael Horne, John F. Clauser

Published Feb 26, 1993• 50 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Dr. Bell's paper, “The Theory of Local Beables”, performs a valuable service in clarifying two fundamental concepts: namely, locality and physical reality. His clarification leads him to a fundamental and highly reasonable assumption, expressed in equation (2) of Sect. 2. He then attempts in Sect. 4 to prove inequality (16) as a consequence of his equation (2). Unfortunately, we believe that his proof is not correct. A counter-example shows that (16) does not follow from (2) alone. Our objections are not given in a spirit of skepticism, since (16) does follow from other reasonable assumptions of locality and physical reality. These assumptions were discussed in an earlier paper and will be reconsidered in this letter.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781139172196.012

Related papers

An Exchange on Local Beables

John S. Bell

a) Bell tries to formulate more explicitly a notion of “local causality”: correlations between physical events in different space-time regions should be explicable in terms of physical events in the overlap of the backward light cones. It is shown that ordinary relativistic quantum field theory is not locally causal in this sense, and cannot be embedded in a locally causal theory. b) Clauser, Home and Shimony criticize several steps in Bell's argument that any theory of local “beables” is incompatible with quantum mechanics. It is contended that the Clauser-Horne derivation of a Bell-type inequality circumvents his weak steps. The Clauser-Horne derivation must assume that there are no undetected correlations between choices of controllable variables in two space-like separated regions. Methodological considerations support this assumption. c) In response to criticism by Shimony, Home, and Clauser, Bell tries to clarify the argument of “The theory of local beables”, and to defend as permissible the hypothesis of free variables. d) Bell's reply to an earlier criticism by Shimony, Clauser, and Home is answered. The convergence of Bell's position towards theirs is noted.

dialectica•Jan 1, 1985•102 citations

Einstein-Local Counter-Arguments and Counter-Examples to Bell-Type Proofs

K. Hess

J. S. Bell’s well-known proofs of inequalities (and related work) are shown to be invalidated by two counter-arguments (-examples) that are based on Einstein-local propositions: Bell-type inequalities of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments must include, as virtually all physical theories do, elements of physical reality and their mathematical representations that relate to continua as opposed to exclusively finite numbers. Furthermore, Bell-type inequalities must be valid for all possible experimental geometries that lead to the quantum result. Based on these propositions, violations of Bell-type inequalities are demonstrated without violating Einstein locality, without conspiracy type theories and even for the case that all known “loopholes” are closed.

Journal of Modern Physics•Jan 1, 2023•2 citations

Einstein vs Bell? Bell's Inequality Refuted, Bell's Error Corrected.

Gordon Watson

Bell's inequality is widely regarded as a profound proof that nature is nonlocal, not Einstein-local. Against this, and supporting Einstein, we refute Bell's inequality and correct his error. We thus advance the principle of true-local-realism (TLR); the union of true-locality (no beables move superluminally, after Einstein) and true-realism (some beables change interactively, after Bohr). Importantly, for STEM teachers: we believe our commonsense results require no knowledge of quantum mechanics. Let us see.

•Sep 1, 2019•0 citations

Non-locality Reconsidered

Simon Friederich

Adopting a non-ontic account of quantum states does not address all the challenges raised in the literature concerning the alleged incompatibility between quantum theory and special relativity. According to Bell, for instance, there is ‘an apparent incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two fundamental pillars of contemporary theory’ (Bell [2004], p. 172) (where by the ‘two fundamental pillars’ he means quantum theory and relativity theory), which is not merely due to the difficulty of reconciling collapse with relativity. This difficulty, as Bell acknowledges, is rather easily avoided by ‘not grant[ing] beable status to the wave function’ (Bell [2004], p. 53; for more on Bell’s notion ‘beable’ see Section 10.2), or, in other words, by adopting a non-ontic account of quantum states. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks•Nov 7, 2014•0 citations

Logical Conflict between Bell’s Locality and Probability Theory

K. Hess

Based on “locality” considerations, John Stuart Bell and his followers have derived inequalities and theorems that, when taken together with actual experiments that have been performed by Aspect and others, appear to contradict physical reality as defined by Einstein. However, their specifically applied concept of locality is in conflict with the Fundamental Model of probability theory and the set theoretic definition of conditional probabilities. Bell-type inequalities are, therefore, not adequate to decide ponderous questions regarding physical reality.

Journal of Modern Physics•Jan 1, 2023•2 citations

Establishing J. von Neumann’s result of the incompatibility between hidden variables and quantum mechanics

C. S. Unnikrishnan

The impossibility of making quantum mechanics deterministic by adding ‘hidden variables’ was discussed by J. von Neumann in 1932. His proof of the impossibility of dispersion-free ensembles was criticized as being logically circular, by Grete Hermann soon after, and as fundamentally flawed, by John Bell in 1964. Bell’s severe criticism and an explicit counter-example are generally considered as the definitive demonstration that J. von Neumann’s proof is inadequate. I show, without using the formalism of quantum mechanics, that J. von Neumann’s central assumption of the linear additivity of the expectation values, even for incompatible (noncommuting) observables, is a necessary consequence that follows directly from the fundamental conservation laws of physical quantities, applicable universally. With this result, J. von Neumann’s result is fully resurrected. I identify the physical reason why dispersion-free ensembles cannot exist. After discussing the conflict of Bell’s counter-example with the factual mechanics, I highlight the result that the local hidden variable theories, for which the Bell’s inequalities were derived, are grossly incompatible with the fundamental conservation laws. In a scrutiny of the vital difference between the ‘causal incompleteness’ of quantum mechanics, discussed by J. von Neumann, and the ‘representational incompleteness’ discussed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, I prove the striking demarcating result that a multi-particle system that is considered causally completed can remain EPR-incomplete. I identify the wave nature of the action as the reason behind the irreducible quantum dispersion and the impossibility of dispersion-free ensembles.

Academia quantum.•Apr 23, 2025•3 citations
Dr. Bell's paper, “The Theory of Local Beables”, performs a valuable service in clarifying two fundamental concepts: namely, locality and physical reality. His clarification leads him to a fundamental and highly reasonable assumption, expressed in equation (2) of Sect. 2. He then attempts in Sect. 4 to prove inequality (16) as a consequence of his equation (2). Unfortunately, we believe that his proof is not correct. A counter-example shows that (16) does not follow from (2) alone. Our objections are not given in a spirit of skepticism, since (16) does follow from other reasonable assumptions of locality and physical reality. These assumptions were discussed in an earlier paper and will be reconsidered in this letter.
a) Bell tries to formulate more explicitly a notion of “local causality”: correlations between physical events in different space-time regions should be explicable in terms of physical events in the overlap of the backward light cones. It is shown that ordinary relativistic quantum field theory is not locally causal in this sense, and cannot be embedded in a locally causal theory. b) Clauser, Home and Shimony criticize several steps in Bell's argument that any theory of local “beables” is incompatible with quantum mechanics. It is contended that the Clauser-Horne derivation of a Bell-type inequality circumvents his weak steps. The Clauser-Horne derivation must assume that there are no undetected correlations between choices of controllable variables in two space-like separated regions. Methodological considerations support this assumption. c) In response to criticism by Shimony, Home, and Clauser, Bell tries to clarify the argument of “The theory of local beables”, and to defend as permissible the hypothesis of free variables. d) Bell's reply to an earlier criticism by Shimony, Clauser, and Home is answered. The convergence of Bell's position towards theirs is noted.
J. S. Bell’s well-known proofs of inequalities (and related work) are shown to be invalidated by two counter-arguments (-examples) that are based on Einstein-local propositions: Bell-type inequalities of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments must include, as virtually all physical theories do, elements of physical reality and their mathematical representations that relate to continua as opposed to exclusively finite numbers. Furthermore, Bell-type inequalities must be valid for all possible experimental geometries that lead to the quantum result. Based on these propositions, violations of Bell-type inequalities are demonstrated without violating Einstein locality, without conspiracy type theories and even for the case that all known “loopholes” are closed.
Bell's inequality is widely regarded as a profound proof that nature is nonlocal, not Einstein-local. Against this, and supporting Einstein, we refute Bell's inequality and correct his error. We thus advance the principle of true-local-realism (TLR); the union of true-locality (no beables move superluminally, after Einstein) and true-realism (some beables change interactively, after Bohr). Importantly, for STEM teachers: we believe our commonsense results require no knowledge of quantum mechanics. Let us see.
Adopting a non-ontic account of quantum states does not address all the challenges raised in the literature concerning the alleged incompatibility between quantum theory and special relativity. According to Bell, for instance, there is ‘an apparent incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two fundamental pillars of contemporary theory’ (Bell [2004], p. 172) (where by the ‘two fundamental pillars’ he means quantum theory and relativity theory), which is not merely due to the difficulty of reconciling collapse with relativity. This difficulty, as Bell acknowledges, is rather easily avoided by ‘not grant[ing] beable status to the wave function’ (Bell [2004], p. 53; for more on Bell’s notion ‘beable’ see Section 10.2), or, in other words, by adopting a non-ontic account of quantum states. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Based on “locality” considerations, John Stuart Bell and his followers have derived inequalities and theorems that, when taken together with actual experiments that have been performed by Aspect and others, appear to contradict physical reality as defined by Einstein. However, their specifically applied concept of locality is in conflict with the Fundamental Model of probability theory and the set theoretic definition of conditional probabilities. Bell-type inequalities are, therefore, not adequate to decide ponderous questions regarding physical reality.
The impossibility of making quantum mechanics deterministic by adding ‘hidden variables’ was discussed by J. von Neumann in 1932. His proof of the impossibility of dispersion-free ensembles was criticized as being logically circular, by Grete Hermann soon after, and as fundamentally flawed, by John Bell in 1964. Bell’s severe criticism and an explicit counter-example are generally considered as the definitive demonstration that J. von Neumann’s proof is inadequate. I show, without using the formalism of quantum mechanics, that J. von Neumann’s central assumption of the linear additivity of the expectation values, even for incompatible (noncommuting) observables, is a necessary consequence that follows directly from the fundamental conservation laws of physical quantities, applicable universally. With this result, J. von Neumann’s result is fully resurrected. I identify the physical reason why dispersion-free ensembles cannot exist. After discussing the conflict of Bell’s counter-example with the factual mechanics, I highlight the result that the local hidden variable theories, for which the Bell’s inequalities were derived, are grossly incompatible with the fundamental conservation laws. In a scrutiny of the vital difference between the ‘causal incompleteness’ of quantum mechanics, discussed by J. von Neumann, and the ‘representational incompleteness’ discussed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, I prove the striking demarcating result that a multi-particle system that is considered causally completed can remain EPR-incomplete. I identify the wave nature of the action as the reason behind the irreducible quantum dispersion and the impossibility of dispersion-free ensembles.