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Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

A Difficulty of Local Truth-Value Assignment in Contextual Approach(Issues in the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (2))

Katsuaki Higashi

Published Jan 1, 2009• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In order to deal with Kochen and Specker's no-go result, van Fraassen invoked 'splitting' of non-maximal observable depending on 'context'. In his contextual approach there are different physical quantities corresponding to a non-maximal operator. Such physical quantities are different, so those values are not required to coincide. However, Heywood and Redhead showed the impossibility of local truth-value assignment in contextual approach. Their argument is restricted to finite dimensional and non-relativistic case. In this paper we shall show a similar no-go result in more general framework (von Neumann algebra). Also, our result will be applied to Algebraic quantum field theory.

DOI
10.4288/jafpos.18.0_45

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In order to deal with Kochen and Specker's no-go result, van Fraassen invoked 'splitting' of non-maximal observable depending on 'context'. In his contextual approach there are different physical quantities corresponding to a non-maximal operator. Such physical quantities are different, so those values are not required to coincide. However, Heywood and Redhead showed the impossibility of local truth-value assignment in contextual approach. Their argument is restricted to finite dimensional and non-relativistic case. In this paper we shall show a similar no-go result in more general framework (von Neumann algebra). Also, our result will be applied to Algebraic quantum field theory.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.
What if Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were right that quantum mechanics is incomplete, and there do exist ‘‘elements-of-reality’’ corresponding to all observables whether or not they are compatible? The implications are surprising. Not only must the values of these elements-of-reality depend upon what measurements are actually performed on the system, but also upon measurements performed at spacelike separation from it! The former dependence has been dubbed ‘‘contextualism,’’ and the latter ‘‘nonlocality.’’ It is important for students to understand the necessity of these two features, if only to reinforce the point that a straightforward classical recasting of quantum theory in terms of pre-existing measurement independent elements-of-reality is not feasible. Unfortunately the argument for contextualism, in particular, is daunting due to its reliance on an elaborate geometrical argument. I aim here to minimize the geometry needed to argue for contextualism by using some ideas inspired by the original arguments of Bell and of Kochen and Specker. Using similar methods, I simplify the closely related geometrical argument for nonlocality due to Heywood and Redhead and to Stairs.
The Kochen–Specker theorem shows that it is impossible to assign sharp values to all dynamical variables in quantum mechanics in such a way that the algebraic relations among the values of dynamical variables whose self-adjoint operators commute are the same as those among the operators themselves. We point out that, for quantum theories obtained by quantizing some classical theory, this condition – Kochen–Specker non-contextuality – is implausible from the start because quantization usually changes algebraic relations. We explain why this is so, using the formalism of deformation quantization and its conception of star products , and we illustrate the relevance of this point using various examples of dynamical variables quantized via Weyl quantization and coherent state quantization. Our observations suggest that the relevance of the Kochen–Specker theorem to the question of whether one can assign sharp values to all dynamical variables is rather limited.
According to various no-go results in the foundations of quantum mechanics, for any system associated to a Hilbert space of dimension higher than two, it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to the system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton uniqueness theorem is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. On this basis, a perspectivist/contextual account of truth valuation in the quantum domain is produced that satisfies Tarski's criterion of material adequacy for a theory of truth. In light of the latter, perspectivist truth conforms to perspective or context-bound correspondence of a de re nature, designating locally an objectively existing state of affairs. Such an account derives by virtue of the microphysical nature of physical reality in displaying a context-dependence of facts; thus, it essentially opposes a non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference, or a panoptical standpoint from which to state all facts of nature.
There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.
One of the recent no-go theorems on Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum proves that there are no 'maximally epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory. The proof utilises similar arrangements to Clifton's quantum contextuality proof and has parallels to Harrigan and Rudolph's quantum deficiency no-go theorem, itself based on the Kochen-Specker quantum contextuality proof. This paper shows how the Kochen-Specker theorem can also be turned into a no 'maximally epistemic' theorem, but of a more limited kind.