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IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)

Recent Progress in Private Simultaneous Messages Protocols

Akinori Kawachi

Published Oct 17, 2021• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The private simultaneous messages (PSM) model is a simple variant of the secure multiparty computation (MPC). In the k-party PSM model, each party $P_{\imath}$ has a private input $x_{i}$ for $i=1, \ldots, k$. For a function f, each $\lt p\gt P_{i}$ encrypts $x_{i}$ into a message $m_{i}$ with a random string r shared among $\lt p\gt P_{1}, \ldots, P_{k}$, and sends $m_{i}$ to the referee $R. R$ computes $f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}\right)$ from their respective messages $m_{1}, \ldots, m_{k}$. Then, R learns nothing from $m_{1}, \ldots, m_{k}$ except for the output value $f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}\right)$. This simple model provides interesting cryptographic applications and is essential for understanding the intrinsic costs (e.g., of communication $\left|m_{1}\right|+\ldots+\left|m_{k}\right|$ and randomness $|r|$) to achieve MPC. This study surveys recent results associated with the PSM and closely related models.

DOI
10.1109/itw48936.2021.9611477

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It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.

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The private simultaneous messages (PSM) model is a simple variant of the secure multiparty computation (MPC). In the k-party PSM model, each party PıP_{\imath}P​ has a private input xix_{i}xi​ for i=1,…,ki=1, \ldots, ki=1,…,k. For a function f, each <p>Pi\lt p\gt P_{i}<p>Pi​ encrypts xix_{i}xi​ into a message mim_{i}mi​ with a random string r shared among <p>P1,…,Pk\lt p\gt P_{1}, \ldots, P_{k}<p>P1​,…,Pk​, and sends mim_{i}mi​ to the referee R.RR. RR.R computes f(x1,…,xk)f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}\right)f(x1​,…,xk​) from their respective messages m1,…,mkm_{1}, \ldots, m_{k}m1​,…,mk​. Then, R learns nothing from m1,…,mkm_{1}, \ldots, m_{k}m1​,…,mk​ except for the output value f(x1,…,xk)f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}\right)f(x1​,…,xk​). This simple model provides interesting cryptographic applications and is essential for understanding the intrinsic costs (e.g., of communication ∣m1∣+…+∣mk∣\left|m_{1}\right|+\ldots+\left|m_{k}\right|∣m1​∣+…+∣mk​∣ and randomness ∣r∣|r|∣r∣) to achieve MPC. This study surveys recent results associated with the PSM and closely related models.
The private simultaneous messages model is a non-interactive version of the multiparty secure computation, which has been intensively studied to examine the communication cost of the secure computation. We consider its quantum counterpart, the private simultaneous quantum messages (PSQM) model, and examine the advantages of quantum communication and prior entanglement of this model. In the PSQM model, kkk parties P1,…,PkP_1,\ldots,P_kP1​,…,Pk​ initially share a common random string (or entangled states in a stronger setting), and they have private classical inputs x1,…,xkx_1,\ldots, x_kx1​,…,xk​. Every PiP_iPi​ generates a quantum message from the private input xix_ixi​ and the shared random string (entangled states), and then sends it to the referee RRR. Receiving the messages, RRR computes F(x1,…,xk)F(x_1,\ldots,x_k)F(x1​,…,xk​). Then, RRR learns nothing except for F(x1,…,xk)F(x_1,\ldots,x_k)F(x1​,…,xk​) as the privacy condition. We obtain the following results for this PSQM model. (1) We demonstrate that the privacy condition inevitably increases the communication cost in the two-party PSQM model as well as in the classical case presented by Applebaum, Holenstein, Mishra, and Shayevitz. In particular, we prove a lower bound (3−o(1))n(3-o(1))n(3−o(1))n of the communication complexity in two-party PSQM protocols with a shared random string for random Boolean functions of 2n2n2n-bit input, which is larger than the trivial upper bound 2n2n2n of the communication complexity without the privacy condition. (2) We demonstrate a factor two gap between the communication complexity of PSQM protocols with shared entangled states and with shared random strings by designing a multiparty PSQM protocol with shared entangled states for a total function that extends the two-party equality function. (3) We demonstrate an exponential gap between the communication complexity of PSQM protocols with shared entangled states and with shared random strings for a two-party partial function.
We study the Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) model which is a variant of the model proposed in Feige et. al., (1994). In the PSM model there are n players P/sub 1/, ..., P/sub n/, each player P/sub i/ holding a secret input x/sub i/ (say, a bit), and all having access to a common random string. Each player sends a single message to a special player, Carol, depending an its own input and the random string (and independently of all other messages). Based on these messages, Carol should be able to compute f(x/sub 1/, ..., x/sub n/) (for some predetermined function f) but should learn no additional information on the values of x/sub 1/, ..., x/sub n/. Our results go in two directions. First, we present efficient PSM protocols, which improve the efficiency of previous solutions, and extend their scope to several function classes for which no such solutions were known before. These classes include most of the important linear algebraic functions; as a result, we get efficient constant-round private protocols (in the standard model) for these classes. Second, we present reductions that allow transforming PSM protocols into solutions for some other problems, thereby demonstrating the power of this model. An interesting reduction of this sort shows how to construct, based on a standard (/sub 1//sup 2/)-OT (Oblivious Transfer) primitive, generalized-OT (GOT) primitives that, we believe, might be useful for the design of cryptographic protocols.
Abstract Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) model is a minimal model for secure multiparty computation. Feige, Kilian, and Naor (STOC 1994) and Ishai (Cryptology and Information Security Series 2013) constructed PSM protocols based on quadratic residues. In this paper, we define QR-PSM protocols as a generalization of these protocols. A QR-PSM protocol is a PSM protocol whose decoding function outputs the quadratic residuosity modulo p of what is computed from messages. We design a QR-PSM protocol for any symmetric function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1} f : { 0 , 1 } n → { 0 , 1 } of communication complexity O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) O ( n 2 ) . As far as we know, it is the most efficient PSM protocol for symmetric functions since the previously known best PSM protocol was of O(n2log⁡n)O(n^2\log n)O(n2logn) O ( n 2 log n ) (Beimel et al., CRYPTO 2014). We also study the sizes of the underlying finite fields Fp\mathbb {F}_pFp​ F p in the protocols since the communication complexity of a QR-PSM protocol is proportional to the bit length of the prime p. We show that there is a prime p≤(1+o(1))N222N−2p \le (1+o(1))N^22^{2N-2}p≤(1+o(1))N222N−2 p ≤ ( 1 + o ( 1 ) ) N 2 2 2 N - 2 such that any length-N pattern of quadratic (non)residues appears modulo p (and hence it can be used for general QR-PSM protocols), which improves the Peralta’s known result (Mathematics of Computation 1992) by a constant factor (1+2)2(1+\sqrt{2})^2(1+2​)2 ( 1 + 2 ) 2 .
The aim of this paper is to present some of the recent progress in efficient secure multiparty computation (MPC). In MPC we have a set of parties owning a set of private inputs. The par ties want to compute a function of their inputs, but they do not trust each other, therefore they need a cryptographic protocol to perform the computation in a way that 1) the output is correct and 2) cheating parties will not be able to learn any information about the honest parties inputs. Even though this problem has been formulated and essentially solved almost 30 years ago, practical solutions that can be relevant for real-world applications have been discovered only in the last few years. We will present some of these advances, trying to explain to a non-specialized audience the significance of the several existing security notions.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic framework that enables multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private. MPC has found applications in privacy-preserving data analytics, secure voting, private machine learning, and secure financial transactions. This article provides a comprehensive survey of recent advances in MPC protocols, including fully homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and oblivious transfer. It also explores the challenges in efficiency, scalability, and real-world deployment of MPC and discusses future research directions to enhance its practicality and security.
It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.