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IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)

Secret Key Capacity of Wiretapped Polytree-PIN

Alireza Poostindouz, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini

Published Oct 17, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In secret key agreement (SKA) in multiterminal channel model, terminals are connected by a noisy discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with multiple input and multiple outputs. Terminals can use the DMC to obtain correlated randomness, and communicate over a noiseless public channel to establish a shared secret key among a designated subset of terminals. We focus on a special class of multiterminal channel models, called wiretapped Polytree-PIN, in which the noisy channel consists of a set of independent point-to-point channels whose underlying undirected connectivity graph forms a tree. We consider a wiretap setting, where the output of each point-to-point channel is partially leaked to a passive wiretapper adversary, Eve, through a second independent noisy channel. A secure SKA protocol generates a group secret key such that Eve has no information about it. In this paper, we derive the wiretap secret key capacity, which is the largest achievable secret key rate, of the wiretapped PolytreePIN model. Our result also implies the key capacity of the non-wiretapped Polytree-PIN model, that is the case when there is no leakage from point-to-point channels to Eve.

DOI
10.1109/itw48936.2021.9611419

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In secret key agreement (SKA) in multiterminal channel model, terminals are connected by a noisy discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with multiple input and multiple outputs. Terminals can use the DMC to obtain correlated randomness, and communicate over a noiseless public channel to establish a shared secret key among a designated subset of terminals. We focus on a special class of multiterminal channel models, called wiretapped Polytree-PIN, in which the noisy channel consists of a set of independent point-to-point channels whose underlying undirected connectivity graph forms a tree. We consider a wiretap setting, where the output of each point-to-point channel is partially leaked to a passive wiretapper adversary, Eve, through a second independent noisy channel. A secure SKA protocol generates a group secret key such that Eve has no information about it. In this paper, we derive the wiretap secret key capacity, which is the largest achievable secret key rate, of the wiretapped PolytreePIN model. Our result also implies the key capacity of the non-wiretapped Polytree-PIN model, that is the case when there is no leakage from point-to-point channels to Eve.
Secret key agreement (SKA) is an essential primitive in cryptography and information security. In a multiterminal key agreement problem, there are a set of terminals each having access to a component of a vector random variable, and the goal of the terminals is to establish a shared key among a designated subset of terminals. This problem has been studied under different assumptions about the adversary. In the most general model, the adversary has access to a random variable Z, that is correlated with all terminals' variables. The single-letter characterization of the secret key capacity of this model, known as the wiretap secret key capacity, is not known for an arbitrary Z. In this paper, we calculate the wiretap secret key capacity of a Tree-PIN, when Z consists of noisy version of terminals' variables. We also derive an upper bound and a lower bound for the wiretap secret key capacity of a PIN, and prove their tightness for some special cases.
A new model for the two-user multiple-access wiretap channel is considered. In this model, the legitimate (main) channel is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC), and the wiretapper chooses a fixed-length subset of the channel uses where she has perfect access to the transmitted symbols of the both users, while observing the remainder of the transmitted codewords through a second DMC. As such, it generalizes the existing multiple-access wiretap channel models and extends the recently proposed new wiretap channel model to a multiple access setting. An achievable strong secrecy rate region for the model is derived. The achievability is established by solving a dual multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in the source model, where two independent sources are communicating confidential keys to a common decoder over a public channel in the presence of a compound wiretapping source. The secrecy of the two keys in the dual source model is established by deriving a lemma which provides a doubly exponential convergence rate for the probability of the keys being uniform and independent from the public discussion and the wiretapping source observation.
This is the second part of a two-part paper on information-theoretically secure secret key agreement. This part covers the secret key capacity under the channel model. In this model, multiple terminals wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from an eavesdropper with unlimited computational resources. The terminals are all connected to a noiseless and authenticated but insecure channel, called the “public channel.” Furthermore, the terminals have access to a secure but noisy discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DMBC). The first terminal can choose a sequence of inputs to the DMBC, which has outputs at the other terminals and at the eavesdropper. After each channel use, the terminals can engage in arbitrarily many rounds of interactive authenticated communication over the public channel. At the end, each legitimate terminal should be able to generate the secret key. In this paper, we derive new lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity. In each case, an example is provided to show that the new bound represents a strict improvement over the previously best known bound. This part of the paper is not standalone, and is written under the assumption that the reader has access to Part I, which is published in the same issue.
We derive single-letter characterizations of (strong) secrecy capacities for models with an arbitrary number of terminals, each of which observes a distinct component of a discrete memoryless multiple source, with unrestricted and interactive public communication permitted between the terminals. A subset of these terminals can serve as helpers for the remaining terminals in generating secrecy. According to the extent of an eavesdropper's knowledge, three kinds of secrecy capacity are considered: secret key (SK), private key (PK), and wiretap secret key (WSK) capacity. The characterizations of the SK and PK capacities highlight the innate connections between secrecy generation and multiterminal source coding without secrecy requirements. A general upper bound for WSK capacity is derived which is tight in the case when the eavesdropper can wiretap noisy versions of the components of the underlying multiple source, provided randomization is permitted at the terminals. These secrecy capacities are seen to be achievable with noninteractive communication between the terminals. The achievability results are also shown to be universal.
Information theoretic secret key agreement is impossible without making initial assumptions. One type of initial assumption is correlated random variables that are generated by using a noisy channel that connects the terminals. Terminals use the correlated random variables and communication over a reliable public channel to arrive at a shared secret key. Previous channel models assume that each terminal either controls one input to the channel, or receives one output variable of the channel. In this paper, we propose a new channel model of transceivers where each terminal simultaneously controls an input variable and observes an output variable of the (noisy) channel. We give upper and lower bounds for the secret key capacity (i.e., highest achievable key rate) of this transceiver model, and prove the secret key capacity under the conditions that the public communication is noninteractive and input variables of the noisy channel are independent.
Shannon-theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with one input terminal and multiple output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a setAAAof terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter characterizations of secrecy capacities are obtained for models in which secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint fromAAA. These capacities are shown to be achievable with noninteractive public communication, the channel input terminal sending no public message and each output terminal sending at most one public message, not using randomization. Moreover, when the input terminal belongs to the setAAA, it can generate the secret key at the outset and transmit it over the noisy channel, suitably encoded, whereupon the output terminals inAAAsecurely recover this key using public communication as above. For models in which the eavesdropper also possesses side information that is not available to any of the terminals cooperating in secrecy generation, an upper bound for the secrecy capacity and a sufficient condition for its tightness are given.