The purpose is, first, to review the occurrences which led to the acceptance by the bulk of physicists of the instrumentalist approach to quantum mechanics (QM) as the only one worth considering as truly rendering nature at the atomic level. Formulated soon after the creation of QM it outright refused the local realist interpretation. Next, to bring out the successive waves of dissenting voices, which still go on unabated. Finally, to recall that – in spite of the pervading dominance of the Copenhagen reading of quantum phenomena – the manifold questions concerning the interpretation of QM continue to be the subject-matter of forceful interventions claiming that the foundational basis of QM is far from being definitely closed.
The purpose is, first, to review the occurrences which led to the acceptance by the bulk of physicists of the instrumentalist approach to quantum mechanics (QM) as the only one worth considering as truly rendering nature at the atomic level. Formulated soon after the creation of QM it outright refused the local realist interpretation. Next, to bring out the successive waves of dissenting voices, which still go on unabated. Finally, to recall that – in spite of the pervading dominance of the Copenhagen reading of quantum phenomena – the manifold questions concerning the interpretation of QM continue to be the subject-matter of forceful interventions claiming that the foundational basis of QM is far from being definitely closed.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
The problems of modern physics are man made. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics is formulated in a vague prosaic way, inconsistencies and paradoxes are the price. New interpretations try to solve the problem, however a reformulation rather than an interpretation is needed. In this manuscript I will point out, where the Copenhagen formulation of quantum mechanics is flawed and how one can make sense out of it. Then I will show, that it is possible to give a precise formulation of quantum mechanics without losing its compelling ability in describing experiments.
Laplacean determinism remains a popular theory among philosophers and scientists alike, in spite of the fact that the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, with which it is inconsistent, has been around for more than fifty years. There are a number of reasons for its continuing popularity. One, recently articulated by Honderich, is that there are too many possible interpretations of quantum mechanics, and the subject is too controversial even among physicists to be an adequate basis for overturning determinism. Nevertheless, quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory, considering the quantity and variety of its predictions which have been verified under conditions never dreamt of by its originators; and the Copenhagen Interpretation is the only widely accepted interpretation of it. Although a hidden variable theory consistent with the results of quantum mechanics is not impossible, one of its major advocates admits that it is highly speculative, and far from adequately developed. Yet such a theory would be needed to reconcile Laplacean determinism with quantum mechanics; most of the controversies alluded to by Honderich are irrelevant.
The problems of modern physics are man made.The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics is formulated in a vague prosaic way, inconsistencies and paradoxes are the price.New interpretations try to solve the problem, however a reformulation rather than an interpretation is needed.In this manuscript I will point out, where the Copenhagen formulation of quantum mechanics is flawed and how one can make sense out of it.Then I will show, that it is possible to give a precise formulation of quantum mechanics without losing its compelling ability in describing experiments.
Probably no theory in the history of science has produced such a profound cultural and scientific revolution as is determined by quantum mechanics. Founded around 1920 by illustrious physicists, all Nobel Prize winners, it has completely subverted the conception of matter and the universe. The theory that all matter is made up of atoms has already been formulated by Greek philosophers, starting with Democritus. Quantum mechanics provided a description based on a new conception of the elementary structure of atoms, and formulated the fundamental laws to which atoms obey. Quantum theory has obtained the unanimous and shared consent of the scientific world, although some aspects have not been definitively confirmed. Strengthened by the universal acceptance of his theories, quantum mechanics claims its intellectual primacy over all the other sciences, and the scientific world seems to grant it, so much so as to archive all the knowledge and achievements gathered in its thousand-year history. From the epistemological point of view all established theories are worthy of consideration and must be shared and accepted until proven groundless. Dating, quantum mechanics still enjoys the consent of many scientists, but this does not mean that it can claim to be the repository of all truth, based on an unacceptable and anti-scientific syllogism for which: A) all organic and inorganic matter is formed by atoms and molecules; B) quantum mechanics has founded theories and formulas to which atoms and molecules obey; C) accordingly quantum mechanics can control all universal matter. But the presumption of its predominance goes further than willing to dominate living matter. In this article we are going to examine with a sharp criticism, the aberrant and anti-scientific claim of this discipline to dominate not only science but also universal matter. We propose a more moderate and considered vision of the observable natural phenomena and consider them events in continuous evolution, and to adapt our hypotheses and theories with an equal evolutionary approach.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.