In The Conceptual Development of Quantum Physics, Max Jammer observes that “certain philosophical ideas of the late nineteenth century not only prepared the intellectual climate for, but contributed decisively to, the formation of the new conceptions of the modern quantum theory”—specifically, “contingentism, existentialism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism,” which, argues Jammer “united in rejecting causality though on different grounds” and “prepared, so to speak, the philosophical background for modern quantum mechanics.” Regarding this same rejection of causality in physics in Weimar Germany—a rejection central to the quantum interpretation—Paul Forman argues that “substantive problems in atomic physics played only a secondary role in the genesis of this acausal persuasion, [and] that the most important factor was the social-intellectual pressure exerted upon the physicists as members of the German academic community.” Along these same lines, in an interview with Einstein in 1932, James Gardner Murphy said, “scientists live in the world just like other people…. They cannot escape the influence of the milieu in which they live. And that milieu at the present time is characterized largely by a struggle to get rid of the causal chain in which the world has entangled itself.” In all of these cases, the development of quantum physics is attributed to the zeitgeist of the time, with the critics adopting a “hypodermic” model wherein intellectual currents have a direct influence on scientific discovery.
In The Conceptual Development of Quantum Physics, Max Jammer observes that “certain philosophical ideas of the late nineteenth century not only prepared the intellectual climate for, but contributed decisively to, the formation of the new conceptions of the modern quantum theory”—specifically, “contingentism, existentialism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism,” which, argues Jammer “united in rejecting causality though on different grounds” and “prepared, so to speak, the philosophical background for modern quantum mechanics.” Regarding this same rejection of causality in physics in Weimar Germany—a rejection central to the quantum interpretation—Paul Forman argues that “substantive problems in atomic physics played only a secondary role in the genesis of this acausal persuasion, [and] that the most important factor was the social-intellectual pressure exerted upon the physicists as members of the German academic community.” Along these same lines, in an interview with Einstein in 1932, James Gardner Murphy said, “scientists live in the world just like other people…. They cannot escape the influence of the milieu in which they live. And that milieu at the present time is characterized largely by a struggle to get rid of the causal chain in which the world has entangled itself.” In all of these cases, the development of quantum physics is attributed to the zeitgeist of the time, with the critics adopting a “hypodermic” model wherein intellectual currents have a direct influence on scientific discovery.
For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.
In this magisterial work, Roland Omnès takes us from the academies of ancient Greece to the laboratories of modern science as he seeks to do no less than rebuild the foundations of the philosophy of knowledge. One of the world's leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations? Omnès addresses these profound questions with vigorous arguments and clear, colorful writing, aiming not just to advance scholarship but to enlighten readers with no background in science or philosophy. The book opens with an insightful and sweeping account of the main developments in science and the philosophy of knowledge from the pre-Socratic era to the nineteenth century. Omnès then traces the emergence in modern thought of a fracture between our intuitive, commonsense views of the world and the abstract and--for most people--incomprehensible world portrayed by advanced physics, math, and logic. He argues that the fracture appeared because the insights of Einstein and Bohr, the logical advances of Frege, Russell, and Gödel, and the necessary mathematics of infinity of Cantor and Hilbert cannot be fully expressed by words or images only. Quantum mechanics played an important role in this development, as it seemed to undermine intuitive notions of intelligibility, locality, and causality. However, Omnès argues that common sense and quantum mechanics are not as incompatible as many have thought. In fact, he makes the provocative argument that the "consistent-histories" approach to quantum mechanics, developed over the past fifteen years, places common sense (slightly reappraised and circumscribed) on a firm scientific and philosophical footing for the first time. In doing so, it provides what philosophers have sought through the ages: a sure foundation for human knowledge. Quantum Philosophy is a profound work of contemporary science and philosophy and an eloquent history of the long struggle to understand the nature of the world and of knowledge itself.
No scientific theory has caused more puzzlement and confusion than quantum theory. Beginning in 1900, the theory developed in fits and starts and found a consistent mathematical framing only when John von Neumann published his Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik in 1932 [12]. But even today, we struggle to understand the world as pictured by quantum theory. Physics is supposed to help us to understand the world, and yet quantum theory makes it seem a very strange place. One might be tempted to push aside our puzzlement as the result of our clinging to a primitive worldview. But our puzzlement is not merely a psychological obstacle; it is also an obstacle to the development of physics itself. This obstacle is encountered primarily in our attempts to unify quantum theory and the general theory of relativity. As argued persuasively by Chris Isham (who is represented in this volume), Lee Smolin [10], and others, the primary obstacle between us and future physics is our own failure to understand the conceptual foundations of current physical theories. How, then, are we to make conceptual progress? What is the process by which we find a new perspective, a perspective in which previously puzzling phenomena find a place in an intelligible—and perhaps beautiful—structure? I do not wish to make prescriptions or to claim that conceptual progress can be achieved in only one way. But this book begins with the Ansatz that conceptual progress might be achieved through free creations of the human intellect.
In simple terms and with little scientific or philosophical jargon, this is an examination of some of the philosophical implications of quantum theory. In particular, the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg is systematically explored revealing its neo-Kantian and anti-realist features. As Bohr said: “Natural Science is not nature itself but part of a relation between man and nature, and therefore is dependant on man.” In addition, the physical theories of de Broglie and Bohm are contextualized within the philosophical ideas of Bergson, Deleuze, Kant and Whitehead. In particular, Whitehead’s idea of the “Melodic Metaphor” as an embrace of the matter wave model is seen as a new “Music of the Spheres.” Finally, the notion of aesthetic beauty in scientific theory is examined in some depth, revealing it to be an important criterion for judging the validity of theoretical constructs.
My thesis investigates a debate between Vienna and Berlin about the view that the basic laws of nature are genuinely indeterministic that started long before the advent of quantum mechanics. It involved two different readings of Ludwig Boltzmann's legacy statistical mechanics and two different answers to how causality and ontology ought to be combined. Having adopted Ernst Mach's weak notion of causality, the local Viennese tradition could more easily contemplate ontologies for irreducibly statistical laws that were different from classical physics, while the Berlin tradition departed from Planck's reading of the Kantian tradition, according to which strictly deterministic laws represented an indispensable basis even for probabilistic theories.\nVienna Indeterminism, as I shall call the first reading, became characteristic for a series of physicist-philosophers connected to the Institute of Physics at the University of Vienna, among them Franz Serafin Exner, Erwin Schrödinger, Philipp Frank and Richard von Mises. It involved the acceptance of the highly improbable events admitted by the second law of thermodynamics, an assent to Mach's definition of causality in terms of functional dependencies, an empiricist shift of the burden of proof on the determinist's shoulders, and the adoption of the relative frequency interpretation of probability. Planck and his student Moritz Schlick initially rejected all of these creeds.\nWhile the Viennese reading of Boltzmann's legacy made it possible to accept probabilistic laws as genuine laws years before the advent of quantum mechanics, Schlick had to take a strictly verificationist tack to reconcile his views on probability with the failure of a Kant-inspired notion of causality enforced by the changes in physics. Until his death however, Schlick remained committed to the Spielraum interpretation of Johannes von Kries, compensating his qualified acceptance of indeterminism with an emphasis on the limits of language that were enforced by Heisenberg's uncertainty relations.\nIn view of claims that scientists' abandonment of determinism and causality was triggered, or at least enhanced, by external factors, among them the anti-scientific Weimar milieu and Bohr's power politics, the reconstruction of the philosophical debates between Vienna and Berlin requires historical contextualization. To this end, I initially recapitulate the Forman thesis and the discussions ensuing from it. Most important among them are the recent books of Cushing and Beller that, rejecting Forman's strong claims, nevertheless deny any constructive influence of the scientific aspirations of German physicists on the philosophical debates about causality and indeterminism in the 1920s.\nAgainst this picture, I argue that the philosophical aspirations of physicist-philosophers were rather genuine and followed influential role models, among them Helmholtz and Mach. They represent a characteristic trait of the German-speaking scientific world and were expressed in academic addresses and in the publication of popular writings. After 1913, this philosophical discourse was conducted, to an increasing extent, on the pages of Die Naturwissenschaften. In a separate chapter, I study the role of philosophical and cultural matters in this journal, which can hardly be separated from the personality of its founding editor Arnold Berliner. At about 1930, this discourse among physicist-philosophers partly merged into scientific philosophy, as conducted by Logical Empiricists, and the newly founded Erkenntnis.\nOne of the characteristic features of the discourse among physicist-philosophers was that they were not strictly indebted to philosophical schools but rather willing to form strategic alliances. Such alliances emphasized one philosophical aspect that was considered pivotal at the time which other features, often expressing severe disagreements of content, were played down. This process can be witnessed at the end of the discussion between the Viennese and the Berliners in the 1930s, at a time when Schlick had already become the center of the Vienna Circle. Being confronted with a plethora of "metaphysical" misinterpretations and having taken the linguistic turn, Frank and Schlick formed a strategic alliance on the 1936 Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science. It brought them into opposition with Schrödinger's quest for a modification of quantum mechanics, although Schrödinger continued to be a staunch advocate of indeterminism. This year thus signifies the end of the coherence of Vienna Indeterminism, a tradition that reaches back to the publication of Boltzmann's Lectures of Gas Theory.
In his article entitled Weimar Culture; Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918- 1927: Adaptation by German Physicists to a Hostile Intellectual Environment, Paul Forman intended to depict a history of the old quantum mechanics according to which contemporary cultural influence turned out to be decisive in the introduction, acceptance and assimilation of acausality within the theory? These statements known as the Forman thesis are placed in historiographic perspective; i.e. their importance is shown using the framework provided by the characteristic tensions of historiography and philosophy of science. It is argued that the dilemma of determinism is essential in this discussion. Finally, a brief critical review of the Forman thesis is offered emphasizing some of its major weaknesses not previously discussed in the literature