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Conjugate Logic.

Niklas Johansson, Felix Huber, Jan-Åke Larsson

Published Oct 14, 2021• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

We propose a conjugate logic that can capture the behavior of quantum and quantum-like systems. The proposal is similar to the more generic concept of epistemic logic: it encodes knowledge or perhaps more correctly, predictions about outcomes of future observations on some systems. For a quantum system, these predictions are statements about future outcomes of measurements performed on specific degrees of freedom of the system. The proposed logic will include propositions and their relations including connectives, but importantly also transformations between propositions on conjugate degrees of freedom of the systems. A key point is the addition of a transformation that allows to convert propositions about single systems into propositions about correlations between systems. We will see that subtle choices of the properties of the transformations lead to drastically different underlying mathematical models; one choice gives stabilizer quantum mechanics, while another choice gives Spekkens' toy theory. This points to a crucial basic property of quantum and quantum-like systems that can be handled within the present conjugate logic by adjusting the mentioned choice. It also enables a discussion on what behaviors are properly quantum or only quantum-like, relating to that choice and how it manifests in the system under scrutiny.

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quant-pharXiv:2608.25800•Aug 27, 2026•1 citation
We propose a conjugate logic that can capture the behavior of quantum and quantum-like systems. The proposal is similar to the more generic concept of epistemic logic: it encodes knowledge or perhaps more correctly, predictions about outcomes of future observations on some systems. For a quantum system, these predictions are statements about future outcomes of measurements performed on specific degrees of freedom of the system. The proposed logic will include propositions and their relations including connectives, but importantly also transformations between propositions on conjugate degrees of freedom of the systems. A key point is the addition of a transformation that allows to convert propositions about single systems into propositions about correlations between systems. We will see that subtle choices of the properties of the transformations lead to drastically different underlying mathematical models; one choice gives stabilizer quantum mechanics, while another choice gives Spekkens' toy theory. This points to a crucial basic property of quantum and quantum-like systems that can be handled within the present conjugate logic by adjusting the mentioned choice. It also enables a discussion on what behaviors are properly quantum or only quantum-like, relating to that choice and how it manifests in the system under scrutiny.
We propose a phase space logic that can capture the behavior of quantum and quantum-like systems. The proposal is similar to the more generic concept of epistemic logic: it encodes knowledge or perhaps more correctly, predictions about outcomes of future observations on some systems. For a quantum system, these predictions are statements about future outcomes of measurements performed on specific degrees of freedom of the system. The proposed logic will include propositions and their relations including connectives, but importantly also transformations between propositions on different degrees of freedom of the systems. A key point is the addition of a transformation that allows to convert propositions about single systems into propositions about correlations between systems. We will see that subtle choices of the properties of the transformations lead to drastically different underlying mathematical models; one choice gives stabilizer quantum mechanics, while another choice gives Spekkens' toy theory. This points to a crucial basic property of quantum and quantum-like systems that can be handled within the present phase space logic by adjusting the mentioned choice. It also enables a discussion on what behaviors are properly quantum or only quantum-like, relating to that choice and how it manifests in the system under scrutiny.
Statistical physical theories are frequently formulated in terms of probabilistic structures founded on a ’’logic of experimentally verifiable propositions.’’ It is argued that to each experimentally verifiable proposition there corresponds an experimental procedure which, in general, alters the state of the system, and is completely characterized by a ’’measurement transformation’’ or ’’operation.’’ An analysis of the relations among these experimental procedures leads us to a ’’logic of operations’’ which is quite different from the ’’lattice theoretic logics’’ that are often considered (albeit inadequate empirical justification), as models for the calculus of experimentally verifiable propositions of quantum theory. It is seen that the quantum probability theory based on the logic of operations provides the proper mathematical framework for discussing the statistics of successive observations in quantum theory. We also indicate how a theory of quantum stochastic processes can be formulated in a way similar to the Kolmogorov formulation of the classical theory.
The non-classical nature of quantum theory has led to a number of efforts to formalize the logic of statements whose universe of discourse is the subatomic (see, for example, [3], [6], [8], and [10]).It might be hoped that ideally the fruit of such efforts would be a formalism not totally divorced from the classical logic, but incorporating or incorporated in it in such a manner as to unify the logic of the micro-and the macro-worlds.Indeed, this has been the general direction taken by these efforts, including that which we principally examine and expand upon here.*Josef Jauch, [6], pp.67-89, developed a "propositional calculus of quantum mechanics".He objected to calling a system like his a "logic of quantum mechanics"; however, our use of 'logic' here is not, I think, the use to which Jauch objected.A logic, for our present purposes, is a mathematical formalism having a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction; its actual application as normative of argumentation in reality is a matter of empirical judgment.This seems close to the way Jauch wished to use "propositional calculus" but more general, allowing for extension to a quantification theory of quantum mechanics, for example.Although Jauch's presentation of a propositional calculus of quantum mechanics is mathematically interesting and suggestive, there are a number of problems connected with it.It is our purpose to engage some of these problems and to present a rigorously defined formalism intended to come close to doing the job intended by Jauch for his logic.The success or lack of success of this effort as related to actual application of this formalism in the foundations of quantum theory is, I think, a matter for the physicists to decide; the empirical judgment involved in this application is not in the scope of this paper.If a formalism is to have a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction, it seems clear that it must include a relation which, when it holds between two elements of the formalism, may be reasonably interpreted as expressing that one of the elements 'follows from' the other, in •The author wishes to thank Robert Piziak for advice and comments in the course of research for this paper.
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history.
Logical paradoxes and inconsistent information pose deep challenges in epistemology and the philosophy of logic. Classical systems typically handle contradictions only through external checks or by altering the logical framework, as in Tarski's hierarchy or paraconsistent logics. We propose a novel approach: a quantum circuit architecture that intrinsically enforces logical consistency during its unitary evolution. By encoding self-referential or contradictory propositions into a quantum state, the circuit uses interference effects to suppress inconsistent outcomes while preserving coherent ones. We demonstrate this with the Liar Paradox ("This statement is false"), showing that the quantum model naturally stabilizes truth values that would be paradoxical classically. The framework builds on orthomodular quantum logic treating logical propositions as subspace projectors and connects to belief revision and cognitive modeling by providing a physical mechanism for coherence restoration in epistemic states. This work bridges formal logic and quantum computation, suggesting that consistency can be embedded as a structural property of reasoning systems rather than imposed externally.
Physics is usually done from a third-person perspective, as if the world were described from outside. Yet, observers are themselves physical systems within the world they observe. Here, we investigate this tension using a toy model of classical particles. Observers are physical systems characterised by a choice of (i) a manifest variable, whose value constitutes their empirical record, and (ii) ready states, which provide initial information. We ask what such observers (subjects) can learn about the world through interactions that establish a correlation with another system (the object). For each combination of the three types of learning (about the past, the future, or both), manifest variables, and ready states, we determine what the subject can learn. This shows that many subjects face an epistemic horizon---a limitation to what they can learn about the world---even though the model is classical and deterministic. For example, a subject with a complete manifest variable---one whose ontic state is the empirical record---and partial initial information can learn at most half the object's variables, recovering Spekkens' knowledge-balance principle, i.e. an analogue of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. More generally, we find that subjects face more severe epistemic horizons when predicting than when retrodicting, and that learning by repeatable measurements can be more limited than either prediction or retrodiction alone. Our work provides language and tools to study how the first-person perspective can differ from the third-person perspective beyond the toy model studied here, and invites explanations of the inherent uncertainty in quantum theory from the standpoint of embedded observers.