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Why Bell's Everett (?) theory is wrong

Shan Gao

Published Sep 27, 2021• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Bell's Everett (?) theory, or the pilot-wave theory without trajectories, is Bell's interpretation of Everett's theory, aiming to remove the picture of many worlds from the theory. In this paper, I argue that Bell's attempt is not successful, since his Everett (?) theory contradicts quantum mechanics and experiments.

Related papers

The measurement theory of Everett and de Broglie's pilot wave

James S. Bell

In 1957 H. Everett published a paper setting out what seemed to be a radically new interpretation of quantum mechanics. His approach has recently received increasing attention. He did not refer to the ideas of de Broglie of thirty years before nor to the intervening elaboration of those ideas by Bohm. Yet it will be argued here that the elimination of arbitrary and inessential elements from Everett's theory leads back to, and throws new light on, the concepts of de Broglie.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 3, 2004•5 citations

De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?

Antony Valentini

Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.

arXiv:0811.0810•Oxford University Press eBooks•Jun 24, 2010•67 citations

Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Simon W. Saunders

Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.

•Jun 24, 2010•362 citations

Testing the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics with Cosmology

Aurélien Barrau

In this brief note, we argue that contrarily to what is still often stated, the Everett many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is not in principle impossible to test. It is actually not more difficult (but not easier either) to test than most other kinds of multiverse theories. We also remind why multiverse scenarios can be falsified.

arXiv:1412.7352•Electronic journal of theoretical physics•Dec 23, 2014•3 citations

Comment on Valentini, "De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?"

Harvey R. Brown

Valentini has recently defended the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave version of quantum theory from the claim that it is essentially Everett theory encumbered with the redundant postulation of point particles. In this note, Valentini’s central arguments are questioned. 1

•Jan 1, 2009•8 citations

Collapse of the many-worlds interpretation: Why Everett's theory is typically wrong

Aurélien Drezet

We analyze the objective meaning of probabilities in the context of the many-worlds interpretation of Everett. For this purpose we study in details the weak law of large numbers and the role of typicality and universally negligible probabilities (through the works of Cournot and Borel). We demonstrate that Everett's theory doesn't provide any clue for fixing a probability rule and therefore contradicts irrevocably empirical facts and Born's law.

arXiv:2109.10646•Sep 22, 2021•1 citation
Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.