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IEEE Transactions on Computers

Alternative Tower Field Construction for Quantum Implementation of the AES S-Box

Doyoung Chung, Seungkwang Lee, Dooho Choi, Jooyoung Lee

Published Dec 15, 2021• 23 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Grover’s search algorithm allows a quantum adversary to find a$k$-bit secret key of a block cipher by making O($2^{k/2}$) block cipher queries. Resistance of a block cipher to such an attack is evaluated by quantum resources required to implement Grover’s oracle for the target cipher. The quantum resources are typically estimated by the$\textit {T}$-depth of its circuit implementation and the number of qubits used by the circuit (width). Since the AES S-box is the only component which requires$\textit {T}$-gates in a quantum implementation of AES, recent research has put its focus on efficient implementation of the AES S-box. However, any efficient implementation with low$\textit {T}$-depth will not be practical in the real world without considering qubit consumption of the implementation. In this work, we propose three methods of trade-off between time and space for the quantum implementation of the AES S-box. In particular, one of our methods turns out to use the smallest number of qubits among the existing methods, significantly reducing its$\textit {T}$-depth.

DOI
10.1109/tc.2021.3135759

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Grover’s search algorithm allows a quantum adversary to find akkk-bit secret key of a block cipher by making O(2k/22^{k/2}2k/2) block cipher queries. Resistance of a block cipher to such an attack is evaluated by quantum resources required to implement Grover’s oracle for the target cipher. The quantum resources are typically estimated by theT\textit {T}T-depth of its circuit implementation and the number of qubits used by the circuit (width). Since the AES S-box is the only component which requiresT\textit {T}T-gates in a quantum implementation of AES, recent research has put its focus on efficient implementation of the AES S-box. However, any efficient implementation with lowT\textit {T}T-depth will not be practical in the real world without considering qubit consumption of the implementation. In this work, we propose three methods of trade-off between time and space for the quantum implementation of the AES S-box. In particular, one of our methods turns out to use the smallest number of qubits among the existing methods, significantly reducing itsT\textit {T}T-depth.
An efficient quantum implementation of the advanced encryption standard (AES) is crucial for reducing the complexity of implementing an exhaustive key search through Grover’s algorithm. In this paper, we study how to construct resource-efficient quantum circuits for AES. We consider the product of T-gates depth and width (TDW) and the product of full depth and width (FDW) as optimization targets. We propose a generic method, called the controlled control qubit cascade (CCQC) technique, to construct quantum circuits for nonlinear components with reduced TDW and FDW. Using this, we construct a quantum circuit for the AES S-box. Compared with recent work presented at ASIACRYPT 2023, our S-box quantum circuit achieves reductions of 2.3% in TDW and 45.2% in FDW. Additionally, we propose a new key schedule strategy to reduce the full depth of the AES quantum circuit. Finally, the trade-offs between T-gates depth and width and the parallel numbers of S-box and TDW are analyzed.
Grover search algorithm is the most representative quantum attack method that threatens the security of symmetric key cryptography. If the Grover search algorithm is applied to symmetric key cryptography, the security level of target symmetric key cryptography can be lowered from n-bit to n2-bit. When applying Grover’s search algorithm to the block cipher that is the target of potential quantum attacks, the target block cipher must be implemented as quantum circuits. Starting with the AES block cipher, a number of works have been conducted to optimize and implement target block ciphers into quantum circuits. Recently, many studies have been published to implement lightweight block ciphers as quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimal quantum circuit designs of symmetric key cryptography, including PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers. The proposed method optimized PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers by minimizing qubits, quantum gates, and circuit depth. We compare proposed PRESENT and GIFT quantum circuits with other results of lightweight block cipher implementations in quantum circuits. Finally, quantum resources of PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers required for the oracle of the Grover search algorithm were estimated.
In this work, a quantum design for the Simplified-Advanced Encryption Standard (S-AES) algorithm is presented. Also, a quantum Grover attack is modeled on the proposed quantum S-AES. First, quantum circuits for the main components of S-AES in the finite field F2[x]/(x4 + x + 1), are constructed. Then, the constructed circuits are put together to form a quantum version of S-AES. A C-NOT synthesis is used to decompose some of the functions to reduce the number of the needed qubits. The quantum S-AES is integrated into a black-box queried by Grover's algorithm. A new approach is proposed to uniquely recover the secret key when Grover attack is applied. The entire work is simulated and tested on a quantum mechanics simulator. The complexity analysis shows that a block cipher can be designed as a quantum circuit with a polynomial cost. In addition, the secret key is recovered in quadratic speedup as promised by Grover's algorithm.
Objective of the study: to study the possibility of reducing quantum resource requirements for Grover's algorithm attack on block ciphers. Simplified-AES is considered as an example. To investigate the possibilities of using a partial key leakage. To estimate the required resources and to simulate a quantum attack on S-AES with reduced requirements. Research methods: algebraic analysis, numerical simulation. Research results: we have demonstrated the possibility of significantly reducing the number of qubits required to attack Simplified-AES by optimizing Grover's oracle. The resource requirements are reduced sufficiently, allowing to study quantum attack on Simplified-AES using numerical simulation on a PC with 400 MB of RAM in about 30 minutes (depending on the CPU configuration). A numerical simulation of a quantum attack on S-AES has been carried out for the case of an ideal leakage configuration, taking into account the elementary quantum noises. Scientific novelty: a new quantum attack algorithm for Simplified-AES cipher with significantly reduced requirements for the qubits number is proposed. Numerical simulation of the attack using this algorithm is carried out, which was practically impossible for previously known approaches. The results illustrate that our ideas about the resource requirements for a quantum attack and, as a consequence, the possible time of its practical implementation can be significantly incorrect if an alternative method for implementing even an already known asymptotically unimprovable quantum attack algorithm is found.
Extensive research is currently underway to determine the security of existing ciphers in light of the advancements in quantum computing. Against symmetric key cryptography, Grover’s search algorithm is a prominent attack, capable of reducing search costs to the square root. For using Grover’s algorithm, it is imperative to embed the target cipher into a quantum circuit. Even so, this area of research is relatively new; it has garnered significant attention from the research community. In this study, we provide the first estimation of the cost of Grover’s key search attack against the AES-based AEAD schemes Rocca-S, AEGIS-128, and Tiaoxin-346. Our analysis considers circuit depth restrictions specified in NIST’s PQC standardization process. Considering NIST’s maximum depth constraints, We present the overall cost of these attacks using gate count and depth-times-width metrics. We observed that for MAXDEPTH=240\textsf{MAXDEPTH} = 2^{40}MAXDEPTH=240 , Rocca-S, AEGIS-128, and Tiaoxin-346 can be retrieved using Grover’s search algorithm with gate count of 1.09 × 2253, 1.14 × 2124, and 1.22 × 2124 respectively. Concerning the current updated values by NIST, these ciphers are secure in terms of the cost of implementing Grover’s attack for key recovery. The quantum circuits of these ciphers are implemented using QISKIT, an open-source software development kit (SDK) designed for working with quantum computers running on the IBM Quantum Experience platform.
We present quantum circuits to implement an exhaustive key search for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and analyze the quantum resources required to carry out such an attack. We consider the overall circuit size, the number of qubits, and the circuit depth as measures for the cost of the presented quantum algorithms. Throughout, we focus on Clifford+T+T+T gates as the underlying fault-tolerant logical quantum gate set. In particular, for all three variants of AES (key size 128, 192, and 256 bit) that are standardized in FIPS-PUB 197, we establish precise bounds for the number of qubits and the number of elementary logical quantum gates that are needed to implement Grover's quantum algorithm to extract the key from a small number of AES plaintext-ciphertext pairs.