Abstract. We consider generic Garbled Circuit (GC)-based techniques for Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the semi-honest model. We describe efficient GC constructions for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and comparison functions. Our circuits for subtraction and comparison are approximately two times smaller (in terms of garbled tables) than previous constructions. This implies corresponding computation and communication improvements in SFE of functions using our efficient building blocks. The techniques rely on recently proposed “free XOR ” GC technique. Further, we present concrete and detailed improved GC protocols for the problem of secure integer comparison, and related problems of auctions, minimum selection, and minimal distance. Performance improvement comes both from building on our efficient basic blocks and several problemspecific GC optimizations. We provide precise cost evaluation of our constructions, which serves as a baseline for future protocols.
Abstract. We consider generic Garbled Circuit (GC)-based techniques for Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the semi-honest model. We describe efficient GC constructions for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and comparison functions. Our circuits for subtraction and comparison are approximately two times smaller (in terms of garbled tables) than previous constructions. This implies corresponding computation and communication improvements in SFE of functions using our efficient building blocks. The techniques rely on recently proposed “free XOR ” GC technique. Further, we present concrete and detailed improved GC protocols for the problem of secure integer comparison, and related problems of auctions, minimum selection, and minimal distance. Performance improvement comes both from building on our efficient basic blocks and several problemspecific GC optimizations. We provide precise cost evaluation of our constructions, which serves as a baseline for future protocols.
Abstract. We show how two existing paradigms for two-party secure function evaluation (SFE) in the semi-honest model can be combined securely and efficiently – those based on additively homomorphic encryption (HE) with those based on garbled circuits (GC) and vice versa. Additionally, we propose new GC constructions for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and comparison functions. Our circuits are approximately two times smaller (in terms of garbled tables) than previous constructions. This implies corresponding computation and communication improvements in SFE of functions using the above building blocks (including the protocols for combining HE and GC). Based on these results, we present efficient constant-round protocols for secure integer comparison, and the related problems of minimum selection and minimum distance, which are crucial building blocks of many cryptographic schemes such as privacy preserving biometric authentication (e.g., face recognition, fingerprint matching, etc).
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) is a classical problem in theoretical security. In a SMC problem, two or more parties must compute correctly a function f on their respective inputs x and y, while preserving the privacy of their inputs and additional security properties. One of the approaches proposed for addressing the SMC problem relies on the design of Garbled Circuit (GC). In Garbled Circuits (GCs), the function to be computed is represented as a Boolean circuit composed of binary gates. The input and output wire of each gate is masked such that the party evaluating the Garbled Boolean Circuits (GBC) cannot gain any information about the inputs or the intermediate results that appear during the function evaluation. The complexity of today's most efficient GC protocol depends linearly on the size of the Boolean circuit representation of the evaluated function. The total cost and run-time interaction between parties increase linearly with the number of gates and can be huge for complex GBCs. Actually, interest has grown in the efficiency of this technique and in its applications to computation outsourcing in untrusted environments. A recent work shows that XOR gates in a Boolean circuit have no cost for the secure computation protocol. Therefore, circuits with a reduced number of non-XOR gates are more convenient and one of the possible ways to reduce the complexity of the computation is to reduce the number of non-XOR gates in the Boolean circuit. Recalling that, the main aim of this work is to reduce the number of non-XOR gates, which directly results in a reduced number of interactions between the parties and transfer complexity at runtime, we present different approaches for reducing the communication cost of Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) and improving the overall computation time and efficiency of the execution of SMC.
Garbled Circuit (GC) is the main practical 2PC technique, yet despite great interest in its performance, GC notoriously resists improvement. Essentially, we only know how to evaluate GC functions gate-by-gate using encrypted truth tables; given input labels, the GC evaluator decrypts the corresponding output label. Interactive protocols enjoy more sophisticated techniques. For example, we can expose to a party a (masked) private value. The party can then perform useful local computation and feed the resulting cleartext value back into the MPC. Such techniques are not known to work for GC. We show that it is, in fact, possible to improve GC efficiency, while keeping its round complexity, by exposing masked private values to the evaluator. %without introducing rounds of communication. Our improvements use garbled one-hot encodings of values. By using this encoding we improve a number of interesting functions, e.g., matrix multiplication, integer multiplication, field element multiplication, field inverses and AES S-Boxes, integer exponents, and more. We systematize our approach by providing a framework for designing such GC modules. Our constructions are concretely efficient. E.g., we improve binary matrix multiplication inside GC by more than 6x in terms of communication and by more than 4x in terms of WAN wall-clock time. Our improvement circumvents an important GC lower bound and may open GC to further improvement.
Abstract : We introduce a new technique, component-based garbled circuits, for increasing the efficiency of secure two-party computation in the offline/online semi-honest setting. We observe that real-world functions are generally constructed in a modular way, comprising many standard components such as arithmetic operations and other common tasks. Our technique allows circuits for these common tasks to be garbled and shared during an offline phase; once the function to compute is specified, these pre-shared components can be chained together to create a larger garbled circuit. We stress that we do not assume that the function is known during the offline phase only that it uses some common, predictable components. We give an implementation, Comp GC, of this technique and measure the efficiency gains for various examples. We find that our technique results in roughly an order of magnitude performance improvement over standard garbled circuit-based secure two-party computation.
Two-party Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) is a classical problem in theoretical security. The Garbled Circuit (GC) approach has been proposed as a method for solving SMC using Boolean circuits. Actually, interest has grown in the efficiency of this technique and in its applications to computation outsourcing in untrusted environments. A recent work shows that EXOR gates in a Boolean circuit have no cost for the secure computation protocol. Therefore, circuits with a reduced number of non-EXOR gates are more convenient. In this work, we discuss Garbled Circuit construction for two-party secure function evaluation using quantum gates (QG). We observe that, in some cases, the quantum GC involves a lower number of non-EXOR gates than the corresponding classical GC implementations, resulting in a reduced cost in terms of Oblivious Transfer (OT) communication at runtime.
Abstract. We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two parties wish to securely evaluate the same circuit multiple times. We design efficient garbled-circuit-based two-party protocols secure against malicious adversaries. Recent works by Lindell (Crypto 2013) and Huang-Katz-Evans (Crypto 2013) have obtained op-timal complexity for cut-and-choose performed over garbled circuits in the single execution setting. We show that it is possible to obtain much lower amortized overhead for cut-and-choose in the multiple-execution setting. Our efficiency improvements result from a novel way to combine a recent technique of Lindell (Crypto 2013) with LEGO-based cut-and-choose techniques (TCC 2009, Eurocrypt 2013). In concrete terms, for 40-bit statistical security we obtain a 2 × improvement (per execution) in com-munication and computation for as few as 7 executions, and require only 8 garbled circuits (i.e., a 5 × improvement) per execution for as low as 3500 executions. Our results suggest the exciting possibility that secure two-party computation in the malicious setting can be less than an order of magnitude more expensive than in the semi-honest setting. 1