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A Theory of Ether, Particles Andatoms: Introduction to the Reform of Modern Physics

Igor S. Makarov

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This work is the result of the research which I started independently late in the 60s in Russia and since August 1992 have proceeded with abroad. The subject of the research was initially chosen to be Systems Theory, because it seemed rather close to the theory of communications, the then field of my occupation, on the one hand, and because it sounded intriguing enough and worth attempting at, on the other. But there was no idea of how and where to start the research, and it was decided to begin with the simplest type of system – a linear system. The first step proved rather successful: there was found quite an elegant solution of the problem, imagined by myself, of determining the functional complexity of linear systems by their characteristics. That work was published in the 1969, No.2, issue of the Transactions of the Research Institute of Radio (Moscow) where I worked then. Although it was unclear how to proceed with that result, there was a vague indication in it to some connection between the abstract theory of linear systems and statistical physics, which seemed promising. To make that puzzle out, I set off to supplement my knowledge of theoretical physics, and soon the above indication became more articulate: there is indeed some deep connection between the problem of the synthesis of linear systems and quantum mechanics. Intrigued by that clue, I attempted for several years to apply the solutions of Schroedinger’s-like equations, with the potential determined by characteristics of the system, to its synthesis. However, the results were unsatisfactory: something essential was missing in comprehending both the objects of theoretical physic and linear systems. The solution came suddenly from where nobody could have expected it - from philosophy. Looking once through Hegel’s works, I was struck by a strangely close analogy between the conceptions of duality in dialectical logic and particle physics. That revelation triggered another stage of self-education, this time in dialectical philosophy. As a result, there arose conviction that Hegel's dialectical logic is actually the general theory of systems sought for, but the philosopher’s peculiar way of thinking and the extremely abstract language of that his work made its interpretation in scientific terms almost impossible, with the exception of some most simple cases. So I had no choice but to endeavor my own interpretation of the dialectical logic, on the one hand, and, simultaneously, a revision of some theories and principles of theoretical physics in accordance with that logic, on the other hand, which eventually resulted in the theory expounded in this book. The first rough results, such as the existence of ether, its composition and the phenomenon of spontaneous generation of neutrons in it, were achieved early in the 80s, but it took me about fifteen years more to complete this research in a sufficiently adequate and convincing form.

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From Physics to Philosophy

Stig Stenholm

The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .

European Journal of Physics•Mar 1, 2000•0 citations

Logic and Probability in Physics

C. G. DARWIN

ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.

Science•Aug 19, 1938•2 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory

David J. Toms

It is very likely that most readers and authors of articles appearing in Classical and Quantum Gravity are interested in what might loosely be termed the philosophy of science. It is equally likely, with perhaps a few exceptions, that the research of these same readers and authors has not been influenced in the least by the work of professional philosophers of science. This is certainly the case for those of us who work in quantum field theory. One must therefore ask who the intended audience is for a book which purports to discuss the philosophical implications of quantum field theory. In the preface, the author states that there are two intended audiences for his book. The first is `other interested interpreters of physics' who wish to learn something about quantum field theory in as painless a way as possible. The second is for students of physics who are bogged down in the details of learning quantum field theory and cannot see the overall picture. I am not convinced that either audience will find this book to be of much use. There are two basic problems with this book. The first is that the quantum field theory in it is of the old-fashioned kind, and is not really representative of the way the subject is either taught or thought of today. The second is that there is not sufficient background material present to make this book suitable for a novice reader. For example, I wonder how much a reader who has not studied quantum mechanics in any depth will get out of a treatment which launches into Hilbert space and a discussion of states without much in the way of proper introduction. Any reader who is familiar with the workings of quantum field theory will find much to disagree with in this book. For example, the author tries to make a case that a Fock space description is better than talking about particle labels and restricting to symmetric or antisymmetric states. The reason claimed for this is that there are states in Fock space which are neither symmetric nor antisymmetric under particle interchange which must be discarded. (In the author's words, this introduces `surplus formal structure'.) However, in Fock space an equally arbitrary choice is made by focusing on relations among the creation and annihilation operators which involve only commutation or anticommutation relations. Although this is acknowledged by Teller, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why one procedure is any less arbitrary than the other. The book is incomplete in many ways, with many interesting points mentioned just in passing. For example, the discussion around the Newton--Wigner position operator would have been greatly enhanced by including more details, such as an explanation as to why quanta described by Newton--Wigner states seem to propagate at superluminal speeds. It is hard to believe that a reader who has not met the Rindler vacuum before would find Teller's discussion to be very informative. After being so critical of this book, I should mention a part which I did enjoy and would recommend to students of physics. This is the last chapter of the book which contains a discussion of renormalization theory. It is my experience that students often find renormalization theory confusing, and may find Teller's semiqualitative discussion illuminating.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Jul 1, 1996•12 citations

PHILOSOPHY AND QUANTUM PHYSICS

Rom Harr

THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative

•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations

About Carlo Rovelli's unbelievalbe similarities (February 2018)

Gabriel Vacarìu

Somebody indicated me that Rovelli’s book has very similar idea to my ideas of entities and their “interactions”. I took a look at the book and, indeed, I saw some quite similar ideas in Rovelli’s book. For me, it seems as if Rovelli had read my works before writing his book. This would not mean he plagiarized my ideas. However, some ideas are quite similar to my ideas and mainly the “framework of working” (“reality is interactions”) is very similar! My question is what does it mean “reality”? Does not “reality” presupposes some entities? Than we get: reality is entities that interact”. But what exactly is “reality” in this case? If we replace “reality” with EDWs, we reach exactly my framework of thinking! carlo rovelli introduces many of my ideas: ‘interactions’ is my main notion of articles and books published in 2002. 2004. 2005, 2008 etc. carlo rovelli claims that space and time do not exist! My brother and I wrote a book about exactly this idea in 2016! He also indicates the role of philosophy in science. Amazing, a scientist who has never written something about philosophy in the past, have started to strongly emphasize the role of philosophy just in the last one year or so! I indicated the same idea in my books 2008, 2010, etc.! It seems carlo rovelli moves very fast, publishing many of my ideas (not those about quantum mechanics, but also other ideas) after I published them and posted on various sites on Internet!

•Jan 1, 2018•0 citations
This work is the result of the research which I started independently late in the 60s in Russia and since August 1992 have proceeded with abroad. The subject of the research was initially chosen to be Systems Theory, because it seemed rather close to the theory of communications, the then field of my occupation, on the one hand, and because it sounded intriguing enough and worth attempting at, on the other. But there was no idea of how and where to start the research, and it was decided to begin with the simplest type of system – a linear system.
The first step proved rather successful: there was found quite an elegant solution of the problem, imagined by myself, of determining the functional complexity of linear systems by their characteristics. That work was published in the 1969, No.2, issue of the Transactions of the Research Institute of Radio (Moscow) where I worked then. Although it was unclear how to proceed with that result, there was a vague indication in it to some connection between the abstract theory of linear systems and statistical physics, which seemed promising.
To make that puzzle out, I set off to supplement my knowledge of theoretical physics, and soon the above indication became more articulate: there is indeed some deep connection between the problem of the synthesis of linear systems and quantum mechanics. Intrigued by that clue, I attempted for several years to apply the solutions of Schroedinger’s-like equations, with the potential determined by characteristics of the system, to its synthesis. However, the results were unsatisfactory: something essential was missing in comprehending both the objects of theoretical physic and linear systems.
The solution came suddenly from where nobody could have expected it - from philosophy. Looking once through Hegel’s works, I was struck by a strangely close analogy between the conceptions of duality in dialectical logic and particle physics. That revelation triggered another stage of self-education, this time in dialectical philosophy. As a result, there arose conviction that Hegel's dialectical logic is actually the
general theory of systems sought for, but the philosopher’s peculiar way of thinking and the extremely abstract language of that his work made its interpretation in scientific terms almost impossible, with the exception of some most simple cases. So I had no choice but to endeavor my own interpretation of the dialectical logic, on the one hand, and, simultaneously, a revision of some theories and principles of theoretical physics in accordance with that logic, on the other hand, which eventually resulted in the theory expounded in this book. The first rough results, such as the existence of ether, its composition and the phenomenon of spontaneous generation of neutrons in it, were achieved early in the 80s, but it took me about fifteen years more to complete this research in a sufficiently adequate and convincing form.
The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .
ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
It is very likely that most readers and authors of articles appearing in Classical and Quantum Gravity are interested in what might loosely be termed the philosophy of science. It is equally likely, with perhaps a few exceptions, that the research of these same readers and authors has not been influenced in the least by the work of professional philosophers of science. This is certainly the case for those of us who work in quantum field theory. One must therefore ask who the intended audience is for a book which purports to discuss the philosophical implications of quantum field theory. In the preface, the author states that there are two intended audiences for his book. The first is `other interested interpreters of physics' who wish to learn something about quantum field theory in as painless a way as possible. The second is for students of physics who are bogged down in the details of learning quantum field theory and cannot see the overall picture. I am not convinced that either audience will find this book to be of much use. There are two basic problems with this book. The first is that the quantum field theory in it is of the old-fashioned kind, and is not really representative of the way the subject is either taught or thought of today. The second is that there is not sufficient background material present to make this book suitable for a novice reader. For example, I wonder how much a reader who has not studied quantum mechanics in any depth will get out of a treatment which launches into Hilbert space and a discussion of states without much in the way of proper introduction. Any reader who is familiar with the workings of quantum field theory will find much to disagree with in this book. For example, the author tries to make a case that a Fock space description is better than talking about particle labels and restricting to symmetric or antisymmetric states. The reason claimed for this is that there are states in Fock space which are neither symmetric nor antisymmetric under particle interchange which must be discarded. (In the author's words, this introduces `surplus formal structure'.) However, in Fock space an equally arbitrary choice is made by focusing on relations among the creation and annihilation operators which involve only commutation or anticommutation relations. Although this is acknowledged by Teller, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why one procedure is any less arbitrary than the other. The book is incomplete in many ways, with many interesting points mentioned just in passing. For example, the discussion around the Newton--Wigner position operator would have been greatly enhanced by including more details, such as an explanation as to why quanta described by Newton--Wigner states seem to propagate at superluminal speeds. It is hard to believe that a reader who has not met the Rindler vacuum before would find Teller's discussion to be very informative. After being so critical of this book, I should mention a part which I did enjoy and would recommend to students of physics. This is the last chapter of the book which contains a discussion of renormalization theory. It is my experience that students often find renormalization theory confusing, and may find Teller's semiqualitative discussion illuminating.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
Somebody indicated me that Rovelli’s book has very similar idea to my ideas of entities and their “interactions”. I took a look at the book and, indeed, I saw some quite similar ideas in Rovelli’s book. For me, it seems as if Rovelli had read my works before writing his book. This would not mean he plagiarized my ideas. However, some ideas are quite similar to my ideas and mainly the “framework of working” (“reality is interactions”) is very similar! My question is what does it mean “reality”? Does not “reality” presupposes some entities? Than we get: reality is entities that interact”. But what exactly is “reality” in this case? If we replace “reality” with EDWs, we reach exactly my framework of thinking! carlo rovelli introduces many of my ideas: ‘interactions’ is my main notion of articles and books published in 2002. 2004. 2005, 2008 etc. carlo rovelli claims that space and time do not exist! My brother and I wrote a book about exactly this idea in 2016! He also indicates the role of philosophy in science. Amazing, a scientist who has never written something about philosophy in the past, have started to strongly emphasize the role of philosophy just in the last one year or so! I indicated the same idea in my books 2008, 2010, etc.! It seems carlo rovelli moves very fast, publishing many of my ideas (not those about quantum mechanics, but also other ideas) after I published them and posted on various sites on Internet!