Functional encryption is an emerging paradigm for public-key encryption that enables finegrained control of access to encrypted data. In this work, we present new perspectives on security definitions for functional encryption, as well as new lower bounds on what can be achieved. Our main contributions are as follows: • We show a lower bound for functional encryption that satisfies a weak (non-adaptive) simulation-based security notion, via pseudo-random functions. This is the first lower bound that exploits unbounded collusions in an essential way. • We put forth and discuss a simulation-based notion of security for functional encryption, with an unbounded simulator (called USIM). We show that this notion interpolates indistinguishability and simulation-based security notions, and has strong correlations to results and barriers in the zero-knowledge and multi-party computation literature.
Functional encryption is an emerging paradigm for public-key encryption that enables finegrained control of access to encrypted data. In this work, we present new perspectives on security definitions for functional encryption, as well as new lower bounds on what can be achieved. Our main contributions are as follows: • We show a lower bound for functional encryption that satisfies a weak (non-adaptive) simulation-based security notion, via pseudo-random functions. This is the first lower bound that exploits unbounded collusions in an essential way. • We put forth and discuss a simulation-based notion of security for functional encryption, with an unbounded simulator (called USIM). We show that this notion interpolates indistinguishability and simulation-based security notions, and has strong correlations to results and barriers in the zero-knowledge and multi-party computation literature.
Functional encryption provides fine-grained access control for encrypted data, allowing each user to learn only specific functions of the encrypted data. We study the notion of hierarchical functional encryption, which augments functional encryption with delegation capabilities, offering significantly more expressive access control. We present a generic transformation that converts any general-purpose public-key functional encryption scheme into a hierarchical one without relying on any additional assumptions. This significantly refines our understanding of the power of functional encryption, showing that the existence of functional encryption is equivalent to that of its hierarchical generalization. Instantiating our transformation with the existing functional encryption schemes yields a variety of hierarchical schemes offering various trade-offs between their delegation capabilities (i.e., the depth and width of their hierarchical structures) and underlying assumptions. When starting with a scheme secure against an unbounded number of collusions, we can support arbitrary hierarchical structures. In addition, even when starting with schemes that are secure against a bounded number of collusions (which are known to exist under rather minimal assumptions such as the existence of public-key encryption and shallow pseudorandom generators), we can support hierarchical structures of bounded depth and width.
Functional encryption is a powerful cryptographic primitive that enables fine-grained access to encrypted data and underlies numerous applications. Although the ideal security notion for FE, simulation security, has been shown to be impossible in the plain classical setting, those impossibility results rely on inherently classical arguments. This raises a fundamental question: can simulation-secure FE be realized in the quantum regime or in alternative models?
We resolve both directions of this question. On the negative side, we show that the classical impossibility results largely extend to the quantum setting. When the adversary can submit an unbounded number of challenge messages, we establish an unconditional impossibility, matching the classical barrier. In the case where the adversary may obtain many functional keys, classical arguments only yield impossibility under the assumption of pseudorandom functions; we strengthen this by proving impossibility under the potentially weaker assumption of pseudorandom quantum states. We additionally give an independent impossibility based solely on public-key encryption with classical public-keys. Since public-key encryption is not known to imply pseudorandom states, this yields complementary evidence of the barrier and, in particular, establishes unconditional impossibility of public-key functional encryption with classical public-keys. A key technical ingredient in our proofs is a novel incompressibility property for pseudorandom states, which may be of independent interest.
On the positive side, we show how to circumvent these fundamental barriers in memory-restricted models, where the adversary's quantum or classical memory is bounded. In this setting, we obtain new feasibility results for simulation-secure FE that allow many challenge ciphertexts or many functional key queries.
Functional encryption (FE) is a versatile paradigm that enables fine-grained access control over encrypted data. Despite its potential, achieving the gold standard of simulation-based security for FE is impossible in full generality. Known impossibility results demonstrate that simulation security cannot be attained if an adversary in the security experiment is permitted either an unbounded number of functional key queries or an unbounded number of challenge ciphertexts. In this work, we circumvent these fundamental barriers by considering two distinct memory-restricted settings: the Bounded Quantum Storage Model and the Bounded Classical Storage Model. In these settings, the plain model impossibility results no longer apply, allowing us to obtain new positive results. Specifically, we construct two adaptively simulation-secure FE schemes in the Bounded Quantum Storage Model: 1) Many functional key scheme: A construction supporting many functional key queries and a single challenge ciphertext, assuming only the existence of one-way functions. 2) Many ciphertext scheme: An information-theoretic secure construction supporting a single non-adaptive functional key, many challenge ciphertexts, and many adaptive functional key queries. Furthermore, we demonstrate that both schemes can be ported to the Bounded Classical Storage Model, assuming the existence of disappearing grey-box obfuscation.
Functional encryption (FE) is an advanced form of traditional public-key encryption that enables complex computations to be performed directly on encrypted data, revealing only the final result of the computation. This thesis presents new constructions for two variants of FE, targeting specific limitations of the standard FE model. The proposed schemes advance the state of the art along (a subset of) the axes expressiveness, security, computational assumptions, and efficiency.First, standard FE requires encrypting the entire input in one shot. In practice, however, it may be desirable to encrypt portions of the data independently, for example at separate locations or by different parties. To address this, we study the multi-client extension of FE, focusing on attribute-based functionalities that provide fine-grained access control to data. Our constructions support a range of policy classes, including \NC0 and conjunction policies, and achieve varying levels of security assuming matrix DDH on pairings, LWE, or public-coin evasive LWE.Second, standard FE relies on a trusted authority to issue secret keys, which is often difficult to implement and undesirable in decentralized environments. To overcome this, we investigate the recently introduced primitive of registered functional encryption (RFE). In RFE, each user independently generates a public/secret key pair and registers their public key along with a function to an auditable key curator. We provide two types of results: constructions for restricted function classes under the standard matrix DDH assumption, and schemes supporting powerful function classes---including both unbounded depth circuits and Turing machines---under a nonstandard lattice-based assumption. Notably, we study RFE for uniform models of computation for the first time in the literature.
Computational security in cryptography has a risk that computational assumptions underlying the security are broken in the future. One solution is to construct information-theoretically-secure protocols, but many cryptographic primitives are known to be impossible (or unlikely) to have information-theoretical security even in the quantum world. A nice compromise (intrinsic to quantum) is certified everlasting security, which roughly means the following. A receiver with possession of quantum encrypted data can issue a certificate that shows that the receiver has deleted the encrypted data. If the certificate is valid, the security is guaranteed even if the receiver becomes computationally unbounded. Although several cryptographic primitives, such as commitments and zero-knowledge, have been made certified everlasting secure, there are many other important primitives that are not known to be certified everlasting secure. In this paper, we introduce certified everlasting FE. In this primitive, the receiver with the ciphertext of a message m and the functional decryption key of a function f can obtain f(m) and nothing else. The security holds even if the adversary becomes computationally unbounded after issuing a valid certificate. We, first, construct certified everlasting FE for P/poly circuits where only a single key query is allowed for the adversary. We, then, extend it to q-bounded one for NC1 circuits where q-bounded means that q key queries are allowed for the adversary with an a priori bounded polynomial q. For the construction of certified everlasting FE, we introduce and construct certified everlasting versions of secret-key encryption, public-key encryption, receiver non-committing encryption, and a garbling scheme, which are of independent interest.
In recent years there has been a fantastic boom of increasingly sophisticated “cryptographic objects ” — identity-based encryption, fully-homomorphic encryption, functional encryption, and most recently, various forms of obfuscation. These objects often come in various flavors of security, and as these constructions have grown in number, complexity and inter-connectedness, the relationships between them have become increasingly confusing. We provide a new framework of cryptographic agents that unifies various cryptographic objects and security definitions, similar to how the Universal Composition framework unifies various multi-party computation tasks like commitment, coin-tossing and zero-knowledge proofs. Our contributions can be summarized as follows. • Our main contribution is a new model of cryptographic computation, that unifies and extends cryptographic primitives such as Obfuscation, Functional Encryption, Fully Homomorphic En-cryption, Witness encryption, Property Preserving Encryption and the like, all of which can be cleanly modeled as “schemata ” in our framework. We provide a new indistinguishability preserving (IND-PRE) definition of security that interpolates indistinguishability and simulation