Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Efficient Information-Theoretic Multi-party Computation over Non-commutative Rings

Daniel E. Escudero, Eduardo Soria-Vázquez

Published Jan 1, 2021• 13 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We construct the first efficient, unconditionally secure MPC protocol that only requires black-box access to a non-commutative ring R. Previous results in the same setting were efficient only either for a constant number of corruptions or when computing branching programs and formulas. Our techniques are based on a generalization of Shamir’s secret sharing to non-commutative rings, which we derive from the work on Reed Solomon codes by Quintin, Barbier and Chabot (IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2013). When the center of the ring contains a set $$A = \{\alpha _0, \ldots , \alpha _n\}$$ such that $$\forall i \ne j, \alpha _i \,-\, \alpha _j \in R^*$$ , the resulting secret sharing scheme is strongly multiplicative and we can generalize existing constructions over finite fields without much trouble. Most of our work is devoted to the case where the elements of A do not commute with all of R, but they just commute with each other. For such rings, the secret sharing scheme cannot be linear “on both sides” and furthermore it is not multiplicative. Nevertheless, we are still able to build MPC protocols with a concretely efficient online phase and black-box access to R. As an example we consider the ring $$\mathcal {M}_{m\times m}(\mathbb {Z}/2^k\mathbb {Z})$$ , for which when $$m > \log (n+1)$$ , we obtain protocols that require around $$\lceil \log (n+1)\rceil /2$$ less communication and $$2\lceil \log (n+1)\rceil $$ less computation than the state of the art protocol based on Circuit Amortization Friendly Encodings (Dalskov, Lee and Soria-Vazquez, ASIACRYPT 2020). In this setting with a “less commutative” A, our black-box preprocessing phase has a less practical complexity of $$\mathsf {poly}(n)$$ . We fix this by additionally providing specialized, concretely efficient preprocessing protocols for $$\mathcal {M}_{m\times m}(\mathbb {Z}/2^k\mathbb {Z})$$ that exploit the structure of the matrix ring.

DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_12

Related papers

Practical Fully Secure Three-Party Computation via Sublinear Distributed Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Elette Boyle, Niv Gilboa, Yuval Ishai +1 more

Secure multiparty computation enables a set of parties to securely carry out a joint computation on their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. A particularly motivated setting is that of three parties with a single corruption (hereafter denoted 3PC). This 3PC setting is particularly appealing for two main reasons: (1) it admits more efficient MPC protocols than in other standard settings; (2) it allows in principle to achieve full security (and fairness). Highly efficient protocols exist within this setting with security against a semi-honest</> adversary; however, a significant gap remains between these and protocols with stronger security against a malicious</> adversary. In this paper, we narrow this gap within concretely efficient protocols. More explicitly, we have the following contributions: Concretely Efficient Malicious 3PC. We present an optimized 3PC protocol for arithmetic circuits over rings with (amortized) communication of 1 ring element per multiplication gate per party, matching the best semi-honest protocols. The protocol applies also to Boolean circuits, significantly improving over previous protocols even for small circuits. Our protocol builds on recent techniques of Boneh et al. (Crypto 2019) for sublinear zero-knowledge proofs on distributed data, together with an efficient semi-honest protocol based on replicated secret sharing (Araki et al., CCS 2016). We present a concrete analysis of communication and computation costs, including several optimizations. For example, for 40-bit statistical security, and Boolean circuit with a million (nonlinear) gates, the overhead on top of the semi-honest protocol can involve less than 0.5KB of communication for the entire circuit,</> while the computational overhead is dominated by roughly 30 multiplications per gate in the field F247. In addition, we implemented and benchmarked the protocol for varied circuit sizes. Full Security. We augment the 3PC protocol to further provide full security</> (with guaranteed output delivery) while maintaining amortized 1 ring element communication per party per multiplication gate, and with hardly any impact on concrete efficiency. This is contrasted with the best previous 3PC protocols from the literature, which allow a corrupt party to mount a denial-of-service attack without being detected.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 6, 2019•63 citations

Secure Multi-Player Protocols: Fundamentals, Generality, and Efficiency

Serge Fehr

While classically cryptography is concerned with the problem of private communication among two entities, say players, in modern cryptography multi-player protocols play an important role.And among these, it is probably fair to say that secret sharing, and its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), as well as multi-party computation (MPC) belong to the most appealing and/or useful ones.The former two are basic tools to achieve better robustness of cryptographic schemes against malfunction or misuse by "decentralizing" the security from one single to a whole group of individuals (captured by the term threshold cryptography).The latter allows-at least in principle-to execute any collaboration among a group of players in a secure way that guarantees the correctness of the outcome but simultaneously respects the privacy of the participants.In this work, we study three aspects of secret sharing, VSS and MPC, which we denote by fundamentals, generality, and efficiency.By fundamentals we mean the quest for understanding why a protocol works and is secure in abstract (and hopefully simple) mathematical terms.By generality we mean generality with respect to the underlying mathematical structure, in other words, minimizing the mathematical axioms required to do some task.And efficiency of course deals with the improvement of protocols with respect to some meaningful complexity measure.We briefly summarize our main results.(1) We give a complete characterization of blackbox secret sharing in terms of simple algebraic conditions on the integer sharing coefficients, and we propose a black-box secret sharing scheme with minimal expansion factor.Note that, in contrast to the classical field-based secret sharing schemes, a black-box secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret sampled from an arbitrary Abelian group and requires only black-box access to the group operations and to random group elements.Such a scheme may be very useful in the construction of threshold cryptosystems based on groups with secret order (like RSA).(2) We show that without loss of efficiency, MPC can be based on arbitrary finite rings.This is in sharp contrast to the literature where essentially all MPC protocols require a much stronger mathematical structure, namely a field.Apart from its theoretical value, this can lead to efficiency improvements since it allows a greater freedom in the (mathematical) representation of the task that needs to be securely executed.(3) We propose a unified treatment of perfectly secure linear VSS and distributed commitments (a weaker version of the former), and we show that the security of such a scheme can be reduced to a linear algebra condition.The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear algebra arguments, in contrast v to some hybrid arguments used in the literature.(4) We construct a new unconditionally secure VSS scheme with minimized reconstruction complexity in the setting of a dishonest minority.This improves on the reconstruction complexity of the previously best known scheme without affecting the (asymptotic) complexity of the sharing phase.In the context of MPC with pre-processing, our scheme allows to improve the computation phase of earlier protocols without increasing the complexity of the pre-processing.(5) Finally, we consider commitment multiplication proofs, which allow to prove a multiplicative relation among three commitments, and which play a crucial role in computationally secure MPC.We study a non-interactive solution which works in a distributed-verifier setting and essentially consists of a few executions of Pedersen's VSS.We simplify and improve the protocol, and we point out a (previously overlooked) property which helps to construct non-interactive proofs of partial knowledge in this setting.This allows for instance to prove the knowledge of ℓ out of m given secrets, without revealing which ones.We also construct a noninteractive distributed-verifier proof of circuit satisfiability, which-in principle-allows to prove anything that can be proven without giving away the proof.

•Jan 1, 2003•2 citations

Secure Arithmetic Computation with No Honest Majority.

Yuval Ishai, Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai

We study the complexity of securely evaluating arithmetic circuits over finite rings. This question is motivated by natural secure computation tasks. Focusing mainly on the case of two-party protocols with security against malicious parties, our main goals are to: (1) only make black-box calls to the ring operations and standard cryptographic primitives, and (2) minimize the number of such black-box calls as well as the communication overhead. We present several solutions which differ in their efficiency, generality, and underlying intractability assumptions. These include: • An unconditionally secure protocol in the OT-hybrid model which makes a black-box use of an arbitrary ring R, but where the number of ring operations grows linearly with (an upper bound on) log |R|. • Computationally secure protocols in the OT-hybrid model which make a black-box use of an underlying ring, and in which the number of ring operations does not grow with the ring size. The protocols rely on variants of previous intractability assumptions related to linear codes. In the most efficient instance of these protocols, applied to a suitable class of fields, the (amortized) communication cost is a constant number of field elements per multiplication gate and the computational cost is dominated by O(log k) field operations per gate, where k is a security parameter. These results extend a previous approach of Naor and Pinkas for secure polynomial evaluation (SIAM J. Comput., 35(5), 2006). • A protocol for the rings Zm = Z/mZ which only makes a black-box use of a homomorphic encryption scheme. When m is prime, the (amortized) number of calls to the encryption scheme for each gate of the circuit is constant. All of our protocols are in fact UC-secure in the OT-hybrid model and can be generalized to multiparty computation with an arbitrary number of malicious parties.

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

Fast Fully Secure Multi-Party Computation over Any Ring with Two-Thirds Honest Majority

Anders Dalskov, Daniel E. Escudero, Ariel Nof

We introduce a new MPC protocol to securely compute any functionality over an arbitrary black-box finite ring (which may not be commutative), tolerating t < n/3 active corruptions whileguaranteeing output delivery (G.O.D.). Our protocol is based on replicated secret-sharing, whose share size is known to grow exponentially with the number of parties n. However, even though the internal storage and computation in our protocol remains exponential, the communication complexity of our protocol is constant, except for a light constant-round check that is performed at the end before revealing the output.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 7, 2022•21 citations

Secure Arithmetic Computation with No Honest Majority

Yuval Ishai, Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai

We study the complexity of securely evaluating arithmetic circuits over finite rings. This question is motivated by natural secure computation tasks. Focusing mainly on the case of two-party protocols with security against malicious parties, our main goals are to: (1) only make black-box calls to the ring operations and standard cryptographic primitives, and (2) minimize the number of such black-box calls as well as the communication overhead. We present several solutions which differ in their efficiency, generality, and underlying intractability assumptions. These include: 1. An unconditionally secure protocol in the OT-hybrid model which makes a black-box use of an arbitrary ring $R$, but where the number of ring operations grows linearly with (an upper bound on) $\log|R|$. 2. Computationally secure protocols in the OT-hybrid model which make a black-box use of an underlying ring, and in which the number of ring operations does not grow with the ring size. These results extend a previous approach of Naor and Pinkas for secure polynomial evaluation (SIAM J. Comput., 35(5), 2006). 3. A protocol for the rings $\mathbb{Z}_m=\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$ which only makes a black-box use of a homomorphic encryption scheme. When $m$ is prime, the (amortized) number of calls to the encryption scheme for each gate of the circuit is constant. All of our protocols are in fact UC-secure in the OT-hybrid model and can be generalized to multiparty computation with an arbitrary number of malicious parties.

arXiv:0811.0475•Nov 4, 2008•0 citations

Efficient Construction of Secure Multiparty Computation Realizing Practical Functionality

礼央 江利口

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.

•Mar 23, 2023•0 citations
We construct the first efficient, unconditionally secure MPC protocol that only requires black-box access to a non-commutative ring R. Previous results in the same setting were efficient only either for a constant number of corruptions or when computing branching programs and formulas. Our techniques are based on a generalization of Shamir’s secret sharing to non-commutative rings, which we derive from the work on Reed Solomon codes by Quintin, Barbier and Chabot (IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2013). When the center of the ring contains a set A={α0,…,αn}A = \{\alpha _0, \ldots , \alpha _n\}A={α0​,…,αn​} such that ∀i≠j,αi − αj∈R∗\forall i \ne j, \alpha _i \,-\, \alpha _j \in R^*∀i=j,αi​−αj​∈R∗ , the resulting secret sharing scheme is strongly multiplicative and we can generalize existing constructions over finite fields without much trouble. Most of our work is devoted to the case where the elements of A do not commute with all of R, but they just commute with each other. For such rings, the secret sharing scheme cannot be linear “on both sides” and furthermore it is not multiplicative. Nevertheless, we are still able to build MPC protocols with a concretely efficient online phase and black-box access to R. As an example we consider the ring Mm×m(Z/2kZ)\mathcal {M}_{m\times m}(\mathbb {Z}/2^k\mathbb {Z})Mm×m​(Z/2kZ) , for which when m>log⁡(n+1)m > \log (n+1)m>log(n+1) , we obtain protocols that require around ⌈log⁡(n+1)⌉/2\lceil \log (n+1)\rceil /2⌈log(n+1)⌉/2 less communication and 2⌈log⁡(n+1)⌉2\lceil \log (n+1)\rceil 2⌈log(n+1)⌉ less computation than the state of the art protocol based on Circuit Amortization Friendly Encodings (Dalskov, Lee and Soria-Vazquez, ASIACRYPT 2020). In this setting with a “less commutative” A, our black-box preprocessing phase has a less practical complexity of poly(n)\mathsf {poly}(n)poly(n) . We fix this by additionally providing specialized, concretely efficient preprocessing protocols for Mm×m(Z/2kZ)\mathcal {M}_{m\times m}(\mathbb {Z}/2^k\mathbb {Z})Mm×m​(Z/2kZ) that exploit the structure of the matrix ring.
Secure multiparty computation enables a set of parties to securely carry out a joint computation on their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. A particularly motivated setting is that of three parties with a single corruption (hereafter denoted 3PC). This 3PC setting is particularly appealing for two main reasons: (1) it admits more efficient MPC protocols than in other standard settings; (2) it allows in principle to achieve full security (and fairness). Highly efficient protocols exist within this setting with security against a semi-honest</> adversary; however, a significant gap remains between these and protocols with stronger security against a malicious</> adversary. In this paper, we narrow this gap within concretely efficient protocols. More explicitly, we have the following contributions: Concretely Efficient Malicious 3PC. We present an optimized 3PC protocol for arithmetic circuits over rings with (amortized) communication of 1 ring element per multiplication gate per party, matching the best semi-honest protocols. The protocol applies also to Boolean circuits, significantly improving over previous protocols even for small circuits. Our protocol builds on recent techniques of Boneh et al. (Crypto 2019) for sublinear zero-knowledge proofs on distributed data, together with an efficient semi-honest protocol based on replicated secret sharing (Araki et al., CCS 2016). We present a concrete analysis of communication and computation costs, including several optimizations. For example, for 40-bit statistical security, and Boolean circuit with a million (nonlinear) gates, the overhead on top of the semi-honest protocol can involve less than 0.5KB of communication for the entire circuit,</> while the computational overhead is dominated by roughly 30 multiplications per gate in the field F247. In addition, we implemented and benchmarked the protocol for varied circuit sizes. Full Security. We augment the 3PC protocol to further provide full security</> (with guaranteed output delivery) while maintaining amortized 1 ring element communication per party per multiplication gate, and with hardly any impact on concrete efficiency. This is contrasted with the best previous 3PC protocols from the literature, which allow a corrupt party to mount a denial-of-service attack without being detected.
While classically cryptography is concerned with the problem of private communication among two entities, say players, in modern cryptography multi-player protocols play an important role.And among these, it is probably fair to say that secret sharing, and its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), as well as multi-party computation (MPC) belong to the most appealing and/or useful ones.The former two are basic tools to achieve better robustness of cryptographic schemes against malfunction or misuse by "decentralizing" the security from one single to a whole group of individuals (captured by the term threshold cryptography).The latter allows-at least in principle-to execute any collaboration among a group of players in a secure way that guarantees the correctness of the outcome but simultaneously respects the privacy of the participants.In this work, we study three aspects of secret sharing, VSS and MPC, which we denote by fundamentals, generality, and efficiency.By fundamentals we mean the quest for understanding why a protocol works and is secure in abstract (and hopefully simple) mathematical terms.By generality we mean generality with respect to the underlying mathematical structure, in other words, minimizing the mathematical axioms required to do some task.And efficiency of course deals with the improvement of protocols with respect to some meaningful complexity measure.We briefly summarize our main results.(1) We give a complete characterization of blackbox secret sharing in terms of simple algebraic conditions on the integer sharing coefficients, and we propose a black-box secret sharing scheme with minimal expansion factor.Note that, in contrast to the classical field-based secret sharing schemes, a black-box secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret sampled from an arbitrary Abelian group and requires only black-box access to the group operations and to random group elements.Such a scheme may be very useful in the construction of threshold cryptosystems based on groups with secret order (like RSA).(2) We show that without loss of efficiency, MPC can be based on arbitrary finite rings.This is in sharp contrast to the literature where essentially all MPC protocols require a much stronger mathematical structure, namely a field.Apart from its theoretical value, this can lead to efficiency improvements since it allows a greater freedom in the (mathematical) representation of the task that needs to be securely executed.(3) We propose a unified treatment of perfectly secure linear VSS and distributed commitments (a weaker version of the former), and we show that the security of such a scheme can be reduced to a linear algebra condition.The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear algebra arguments, in contrast v to some hybrid arguments used in the literature.(4) We construct a new unconditionally secure VSS scheme with minimized reconstruction complexity in the setting of a dishonest minority.This improves on the reconstruction complexity of the previously best known scheme without affecting the (asymptotic) complexity of the sharing phase.In the context of MPC with pre-processing, our scheme allows to improve the computation phase of earlier protocols without increasing the complexity of the pre-processing.(5) Finally, we consider commitment multiplication proofs, which allow to prove a multiplicative relation among three commitments, and which play a crucial role in computationally secure MPC.We study a non-interactive solution which works in a distributed-verifier setting and essentially consists of a few executions of Pedersen's VSS.We simplify and improve the protocol, and we point out a (previously overlooked) property which helps to construct non-interactive proofs of partial knowledge in this setting.This allows for instance to prove the knowledge of ℓ out of m given secrets, without revealing which ones.We also construct a noninteractive distributed-verifier proof of circuit satisfiability, which-in principle-allows to prove anything that can be proven without giving away the proof.
We study the complexity of securely evaluating arithmetic circuits over finite rings. This question is motivated by natural secure computation tasks. Focusing mainly on the case of two-party protocols with security against malicious parties, our main goals are to: (1) only make black-box calls to the ring operations and standard cryptographic primitives, and (2) minimize the number of such black-box calls as well as the communication overhead. We present several solutions which differ in their efficiency, generality, and underlying intractability assumptions. These include: • An unconditionally secure protocol in the OT-hybrid model which makes a black-box use of an arbitrary ring R, but where the number of ring operations grows linearly with (an upper bound on) log |R|. • Computationally secure protocols in the OT-hybrid model which make a black-box use of an underlying ring, and in which the number of ring operations does not grow with the ring size. The protocols rely on variants of previous intractability assumptions related to linear codes. In the most efficient instance of these protocols, applied to a suitable class of fields, the (amortized) communication cost is a constant number of field elements per multiplication gate and the computational cost is dominated by O(log k) field operations per gate, where k is a security parameter. These results extend a previous approach of Naor and Pinkas for secure polynomial evaluation (SIAM J. Comput., 35(5), 2006). • A protocol for the rings Zm = Z/mZ which only makes a black-box use of a homomorphic encryption scheme. When m is prime, the (amortized) number of calls to the encryption scheme for each gate of the circuit is constant. All of our protocols are in fact UC-secure in the OT-hybrid model and can be generalized to multiparty computation with an arbitrary number of malicious parties.
We introduce a new MPC protocol to securely compute any functionality over an arbitrary black-box finite ring (which may not be commutative), tolerating t < n/3 active corruptions whileguaranteeing output delivery (G.O.D.). Our protocol is based on replicated secret-sharing, whose share size is known to grow exponentially with the number of parties n. However, even though the internal storage and computation in our protocol remains exponential, the communication complexity of our protocol is constant, except for a light constant-round check that is performed at the end before revealing the output.
We study the complexity of securely evaluating arithmetic circuits over finite rings. This question is motivated by natural secure computation tasks. Focusing mainly on the case of two-party protocols with security against malicious parties, our main goals are to: (1) only make black-box calls to the ring operations and standard cryptographic primitives, and (2) minimize the number of such black-box calls as well as the communication overhead. We present several solutions which differ in their efficiency, generality, and underlying intractability assumptions. These include: 1. An unconditionally secure protocol in the OT-hybrid model which makes a black-box use of an arbitrary ring RRR, but where the number of ring operations grows linearly with (an upper bound on) log⁡∣R∣\log|R|log∣R∣. 2. Computationally secure protocols in the OT-hybrid model which make a black-box use of an underlying ring, and in which the number of ring operations does not grow with the ring size. These results extend a previous approach of Naor and Pinkas for secure polynomial evaluation (SIAM J. Comput., 35(5), 2006). 3. A protocol for the rings Zm=Z/mZ\mathbb{Z}_m=\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}Zm​=Z/mZ which only makes a black-box use of a homomorphic encryption scheme. When mmm is prime, the (amortized) number of calls to the encryption scheme for each gate of the circuit is constant. All of our protocols are in fact UC-secure in the OT-hybrid model and can be generalized to multiparty computation with an arbitrary number of malicious parties.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.