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Springer eBooks

Public-key Encryption

Jiang Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2020• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-15-8427-5_3

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Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) supports to check whether two ciphertexts encrypted under different public keys contain the same message or not. PKEET has many interesting applications such as keyword search on encrypted data, encrypted data partitioning for efficient encrypted data management, personal health record systems, spam filtering in encrypted email systems and so on. However, the PKEET scheme lacks an authorization mechanism for a user to control the comparison of its ciphertexts with others. In 2015, Ma et al. introduce the notion of PKEET with flexible authorization (PKEET-FA) which strengthens privacy protection. Since 2015, there are several follow-up works on PKEET-FA. But, all are secure in the random-oracle model. Moreover, all are vulnerable to quantum attacks. In this paper, we provide three constructions of quantum-safe PKEET-FA secure in the standard model. Proposed constructions are secure based on the hardness assumptions of integer lattices and ideal lattices. Finally, we implement the PKEET-FA scheme over ideal lattices.

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In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes (PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE, as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable - and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key. Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable.

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Bi-Deniable Public-Key Encryption

Adam O’Neill, Chris Peikert, Brent R. Waters

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2011•125 citations
Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) supports to check whether two ciphertexts encrypted under different public keys contain the same message or not. PKEET has many interesting applications such as keyword search on encrypted data, encrypted data partitioning for efficient encrypted data management, personal health record systems, spam filtering in encrypted email systems and so on. However, the PKEET scheme lacks an authorization mechanism for a user to control the comparison of its ciphertexts with others. In 2015, Ma et al. introduce the notion of PKEET with flexible authorization (PKEET-FA) which strengthens privacy protection. Since 2015, there are several follow-up works on PKEET-FA. But, all are secure in the random-oracle model. Moreover, all are vulnerable to quantum attacks. In this paper, we provide three constructions of quantum-safe PKEET-FA secure in the standard model. Proposed constructions are secure based on the hardness assumptions of integer lattices and ideal lattices. Finally, we implement the PKEET-FA scheme over ideal lattices.
In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes (PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE, as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable - and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key. Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable.