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Quantum Security of the Legendre PRF

Paul Frixons, André Schrottenloher

Published Aug 16, 2021• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this paper, we study the security of the Legendre PRF against quantum attackers, given classical queries only, and without quantum random-access memories. We give two algorithms that recover the key of a shifted Legendre symbol with unknown shift, with a complexity smaller than the exhaustive search of the key. The first one is a quantum variant of the table-based collision algorithm. The second one is an offline variant of Kuperberg's abelian hidden shift algorithm. We note that the latter, although asymptotically promising, is not currently the most efficient against practical parameters.

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In this paper, we study the security of the Legendre PRF against quantum attackers, given classical queries only, and without quantum random-access memories. We give two algorithms that recover the key of a shifted Legendre symbol with unknown shift, with a complexity smaller than the exhaustive search of the key. The first one is a quantum variant of the table-based collision algorithm. The second one is an offline variant of Kuperberg's abelian hidden shift algorithm. We note that the latter, although asymptotically promising, is not currently the most efficient against practical parameters.
Due to their simple security assessments, permutation-based pseudo-random functions (PRFs) have become widely used in cryptography. It has been shown that PRFs using a single n-bit permutation achieve n/2 bits of security, while those using two permutation calls provide 2n/3 bits of security in the classical setting. This paper studies the security of permutation-based PRFs within the Q1 model, where attackers are restricted to classical queries and offline quantum computations. We present improved quantum-time/classical-data tradeoffs compared with the previous attacks. Specifically, under the same assumptions/hardware as Grover’s exhaustive search attack, i.e. the offline Simon algorithm, we can recover keys in quantum time Õ(2n/3), with O(2n/3) classical queries and O(n2) qubits. Furthermore, we enhance previous superposition attacks by reducing the data complexity from exponential to polynomial, while maintaining the same time complexity. This implies that permutation-based PRFs become vulnerable when adversaries have access to quantum computing resources. It is pointed out that the above quantum attack can be applied to several cryptographic schemes, including PDMMAC and pEDM, as well as general instantiations like XopEM, EDMEM, EDMDEM, and others.
Quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key requires a linear number of decryption queries. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.
Almost all of the most successful quantum algorithms discovered to date exploit the ability of the Fourier transform to recover subgroup structures of functions, especially periodicity. The fact that Fourier transforms can also be used to capture shift structure has received far less attention in the context of quantum computation. In this paper, we present three examples of “unknown shift” problems that can be solved efficiently on a quantum computer using the quantum Fourier transform. For one of these problems, the shifted Legendre symbol problem, we give evidence that the problem is hard to solve classically, by showing a reduction from breaking algebraically homomorphic cryptosystems. We also define the hidden coset problem, which generalizes the hidden shift problem and the hidden subgroup problem. This framework provides a unified way of viewing the ability of the Fourier transform to capture subgroup and shift structure.
Quantum attacks using superposition queries are known to break many classically secure modes of operation. While these attacks do not necessarily threaten the security of the modes themselves, since they rely on a strong adversary model, they help us to draw limits on their provable security.Typically these attacks use the structure of the mode (stream cipher, MAC or authenticated encryption scheme) to embed a period-finding problem, which can be solved with a dedicated quantum algorithm. The hidden period can be recovered with a few superposition queries (e.g., O(n) for Simon’s algorithm), leading to state or key-recovery attacks. However, this strategy breaks down if the period changes at each query, e.g., if it depends on a nonce.In this paper, we focus on this case and give dedicated state-recovery attacks on the authenticated encryption schemes Rocca, Rocca-S, Tiaoxin-346 and AEGIS- 128L. These attacks rely on a procedure to find a Boolean hidden shift with a single superposition query, which overcomes the change of nonce at each query. This approach has the drawback of a lower success probability, meaning multiple independent (and parallelizable) runs are needed.We stress that these attacks do not break any security claim of the authors, and do not threaten the schemes if the adversary only makes classical queries.
Quantum query is a basic subroutine in many quantum algorithms, and Quantum Random Access Memory (QRAM) provides a natural way to realize such coherent query access. In delegated settings, however, a standard QRAM query interface can expose sensitive information to the server. This paper introduces oblivious QRAM, a cryptographic abstraction for privacy-preserving delegated coherent query access. The protocol consists of an offline refresh phase and an online protected query phase. The database is stored in an encrypted and shuffled layout, and each query is protected by coherent address masking using either a quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation (qPRP) based method or a quantum one-time pad (qOTP) based method. In the adopted client model, the online protection adds only modest quantum overhead beyond the query register, avoiding the exponential quantum resources that would otherwise be required by an equivalent local QRAM construction. The qPRP-based variant also supports multi-query use by distributing database refresh across multiple queries to reduce classical communication. To address malicious servers, decoy checks are further incorporated to strengthen privacy protection and enable probabilistic tampering detection. Compared with fully blind quantum computing, this framework provides a lighter abstraction tailored to private delegated QRAM access, significantly reducing quantum resource requirements on both the client and server sides and achieving an exponential reduction in quantum communication.