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International Journal of Information and Communication Technology

Chosen-ciphertext secure bidirectional proxy broadcast re-encryption schemes

SunJin, HuYupu

Published Jan 1, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A proxy re-encryption PRE scheme supports the delegation of decryption rights via a proxy, who makes the ciphertexts decryptable by the delegatee. However, how to structure a chosen-ciphertext secu...
DOI
10.5555/2961060.2961068

Related papers

Direct Constructions of Bidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption with Alleviated Trust in Proxy.

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In this work, we study (the direct constructions of) bidirectional proxy re-encryption (PRE) with alleviated trust in the proxy, specifically the master secret security (MSS) and the nontransitivity (NT) security, in the standard model, and achieve the following: • A multi-hop MSS-secure bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model, where the ciphertext remains constant size regardless how many times it has been re-encrypted. To the best of our knowledge, there exists previously no MSS-secure multi-hop bidirectional PRE scheme with constant size of ciphertexts (whether in the random oracle model or not). • A single-hop MSS-secure and non-transitive bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) in the standard model. The CCA-secure scheme is based on the CPA-secure scheme, and particularly employs a new re-encryption key (REK) generation mechanism to which each user makes equal contributions, where a single REK is used in both directions with the same computation so that the proxy needs not to distinguish the transform direction when it re-encrypts ciphertexts. Besides alleviated trust in proxy, single-hop non-transitive bidirectional PRE schemes also enjoy better fine-grained delegate right control (against malicious proxy). The security analysis uses Coron’s technique [Coron, Crypto 2000], which particularly allows adaptive secret-key corruption. Along the way, we also refine and clarify the security models for bidirectional PRE. 1

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Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to use the reencryption keys to convert ciphertexts encrypted under the delegators' public keys into ones that can be decrypted using the delegatees' secret keys, without revealing the underlying plaintext. However, PRE is limited to an all-or-nothing re-encryption, that is, the delegatee can either decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the whole message, or it learns nothing about the underlying message. To address this limitation, Zhou et al. (Asiacrypt 2023) proposed a new variant of PRE called fine-grained PRE (FPRE). FPRE extends PRE to support fine-grained re-encryption, allowing the proxy to convert any ciphertext encrypting a message m to a new ciphertext encrypting f (m) with a fine-grained re-encryption key for any function f. This enables the delegator to flexibly control the sharing of messages by specifying functions. Unfortunately, their scheme achieves only CPA security and requires a common random/reference string (CRS) during key generation. This requirement may weaken the syntax of (F)PRE, which allows users to independently generate their own keys. In this paper, we propose a new FPRE for bounded linear functions that we prove is CCA1 secure and does not require a CRS, based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption. When the linear function is set to be the identity function, our construction immediately yields the first PRE scheme without a CRS, with CCA1 security under adaptive corruptions in the standard model. The main technique behind our construction is the design of a deterministic preimage computation algorithm for the decryption oracle in the security proof. To demonstrate the broader applicability of our proposed algorithm beyond the context of (F)PRE, we use it to prove the selective-identity CCA1 security of Agrawal et al.'s (Eurocrypt 2010) identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, which was previously only known to be selective-identity CPA secure.

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ID-Based Proxy Re-encryption Scheme with Chosen-Ciphertext Security

Woo Kwon Koo, Jungyeon Hwang, Hyoung-Joong Kim +1 more

A proxy re-encryption scheme allows Alice to temporarily delegate the decryption rights to Bob via a proxy. Alice gives the proxy a re-encryption key so that the proxy can convert a ciphertext for Alice into the ciphertext for Bob. Recently, ID-based proxy re-encryption schemes are receiving considerable attention for a variety of applications such as distributed storage, DRM, and email-forwarding system. And a non-interactive identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme was proposed for achieving CCA-security by Green and Ateniese. In the paper, we show that the identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme is unfortunately vulnerable to a collusion attack. The collusion of a proxy and a malicious user enables two parties to derive other honest users' private keys and thereby decrypt ciphertexts intended for only the honest user. To solve this problem, we propose two ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme schemes, which are proved secure under CPA and CCA in the random oracle model. For achieving CCA-security, we present self-authentication tag based on short signature. Important features of proposed scheme is that ciphertext structure is preserved after the ciphertext is re-encrypted. Therefore it does not lead to ciphertext expansion. And there is no limitation on the number of re-encryption.

Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea•Jan 1, 2009•1 citation
In this work, we study (the direct constructions of) bidirectional proxy re-encryption (PRE) with alleviated trust in the proxy, specifically the master secret security (MSS) and the nontransitivity (NT) security, in the standard model, and achieve the following: • A multi-hop MSS-secure bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model, where the ciphertext remains constant size regardless how many times it has been re-encrypted. To the best of our knowledge, there exists previously no MSS-secure multi-hop bidirectional PRE scheme with constant size of ciphertexts (whether in the random oracle model or not). • A single-hop MSS-secure and non-transitive bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) in the standard model. The CCA-secure scheme is based on the CPA-secure scheme, and particularly employs a new re-encryption key (REK) generation mechanism to which each user makes equal contributions, where a single REK is used in both directions with the same computation so that the proxy needs not to distinguish the transform direction when it re-encrypts ciphertexts. Besides alleviated trust in proxy, single-hop non-transitive bidirectional PRE schemes also enjoy better fine-grained delegate right control (against malicious proxy). The security analysis uses Coron’s technique [Coron, Crypto 2000], which particularly allows adaptive secret-key corruption. Along the way, we also refine and clarify the security models for bidirectional PRE. 1
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to use the reencryption keys to convert ciphertexts encrypted under the delegators' public keys into ones that can be decrypted using the delegatees' secret keys, without revealing the underlying plaintext. However, PRE is limited to an all-or-nothing re-encryption, that is, the delegatee can either decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the whole message, or it learns nothing about the underlying message. To address this limitation, Zhou et al. (Asiacrypt 2023) proposed a new variant of PRE called fine-grained PRE (FPRE). FPRE extends PRE to support fine-grained re-encryption, allowing the proxy to convert any ciphertext encrypting a message m to a new ciphertext encrypting f (m) with a fine-grained re-encryption key for any function f. This enables the delegator to flexibly control the sharing of messages by specifying functions. Unfortunately, their scheme achieves only CPA security and requires a common random/reference string (CRS) during key generation. This requirement may weaken the syntax of (F)PRE, which allows users to independently generate their own keys. In this paper, we propose a new FPRE for bounded linear functions that we prove is CCA1 secure and does not require a CRS, based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption. When the linear function is set to be the identity function, our construction immediately yields the first PRE scheme without a CRS, with CCA1 security under adaptive corruptions in the standard model. The main technique behind our construction is the design of a deterministic preimage computation algorithm for the decryption oracle in the security proof. To demonstrate the broader applicability of our proposed algorithm beyond the context of (F)PRE, we use it to prove the selective-identity CCA1 security of Agrawal et al.'s (Eurocrypt 2010) identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, which was previously only known to be selective-identity CPA secure.
Proxy re-encryption is a cryptographic primitive developed to delegate the decryption right from one party (the delegator) to another (the delegatee). So far, research efforts have only been devoted to the intra-domain setting, where the delegator and the delegatee are registered in the same domain. In this paper, we investigate the proxy re-encryption in the inter-domain setting, where the delegator and the delegatee are from different domains, and focus on the identity-based case. We analyze the trust relationships and possible threats to the plaintext privacy, and provide rigorous security definitions. We propose a new inter-domain identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme and prove its security in our security model. An interesting property of the proposed scheme is that, to achieve the chosen plaintext security for the delegator, the delegatee’s IBE only needs to be one-way. 1
The notion of proxy cryptography is very useful in cases when one user needs to perform sensitive operation without holding the necessary secret key. Recently, proxy reencryption scheme received much attention due to its application in information storing, secure email, etc. In this paper, we propose a proxy re-encryption used to divert ciphertext from one group to another. The scheme is bidirectional and any member can independently decrypt the ciphertexts encrypted to its group. We discuss the security of the proposed scheme and show that our scheme withstands chosen ciphertext attack in standard model.
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy re-encryption in which a proxy can transform-without seeing the plaintext-a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recently drawn renewed interest. Notably, Canetti and Hohenberger showed how to properly define (and realize) chosen-ciphertext security for the primitive. Their system is bidirectional as the translation key allows converting ciphertexts in both directions. This paper presents the first unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle idealization). The first system provably fits a unidirectional extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger security model. As a second contribution, the paper considers a more realistic adversarial model where attackers may choose dishonest users' keys on their own. It is shown how to modify the first scheme to achieve security in the latter scenario. At a moderate expense, the resulting system provides additional useful properties such as non-interactive temporary delegations. Both constructions are efficient and rely on mild complexity assumptions in bilinear groups. Like the Canetti-Hohenberger scheme, they meet a relaxed flavor of chosen-ciphertext security introduced by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen.
A proxy re-encryption scheme allows Alice to temporarily delegate the decryption rights to Bob via a proxy. Alice gives the proxy a re-encryption key so that the proxy can convert a ciphertext for Alice into the ciphertext for Bob. Recently, ID-based proxy re-encryption schemes are receiving considerable attention for a variety of applications such as distributed storage, DRM, and email-forwarding system. And a non-interactive identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme was proposed for achieving CCA-security by Green and Ateniese. In the paper, we show that the identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme is unfortunately vulnerable to a collusion attack. The collusion of a proxy and a malicious user enables two parties to derive other honest users' private keys and thereby decrypt ciphertexts intended for only the honest user. To solve this problem, we propose two ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme schemes, which are proved secure under CPA and CCA in the random oracle model. For achieving CCA-security, we present self-authentication tag based on short signature. Important features of proposed scheme is that ciphertext structure is preserved after the ciphertext is re-encrypted. Therefore it does not lead to ciphertext expansion. And there is no limitation on the number of re-encryption.