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American Journal of Physics

The Copenhagen Interpretation

Henry Pierce Stapp

Published Aug 1, 1972• 307 citations
Publisher

Abstract

An attempt is made to give a coherent account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. The central point is that quantum theory is fundamentally pragmatic, but nonetheless complete. The principal difficulty in understanding quantum theory lies in the fact that its completeness is incompatible with external existence of the space-time continuum of classical physics.

DOI
10.1119/1.1986768

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An attempt is made to give a coherent account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. The central point is that quantum theory is fundamentally pragmatic, but nonetheless complete. The principal difficulty in understanding quantum theory lies in the fact that its completeness is incompatible with external existence of the space-time continuum of classical physics.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
Quantum physics is believed to be the fundamental theory underlying our understanding of the physical universe. However, it is based on concepts and principles that have always been difficult to understand and controversial in their interpretation. This book aims to explain these issues using a minimum of technical language and mathematics. After a brief introduction to the ideas of quantum physics, the problems of interpretation are identified and explained. The rest of the book surveys, describes and criticises a range of suggestions that have been made with the aim of resolving these problems; these include the traditional, or 'Copenhagen' interpretation, the possible role of the conscious mind in measurement and the postulate of parallel universes. This new edition has been revised throughout to take into account developments in this field over the past fifteen years, including the idea of 'consistent histories' to which a completely new chapter is devoted.
Quantum physics is believed to be the fundamental theory underlying our understanding of the physical universe. However, it is based on concepts and principles that have always been difficult to understand and controversial in their interpretation. This book aims to explain these issues using a minimum of technical language and mathematics. After a brief introduction to the ideas of quantum physics, the problems of interpretation are identified and explained. The rest of the book surveys, describes and criticises a range of suggestions that have been made with the aim of resolving these problems; these include the traditional, or 'Copenhagen' interpretation, the possible role of the conscious mind in measurement, and the postulate of parallel universes. This new edition has been revised throughout to take into account developments in this field over the past fifteen years, including the idea of 'consistent histories' to which a completely new chapter is devoted.
Within the last decade, significant progress has been made towards a consistent and complete reformulation of the Copenhagen interpretation (an interpretation consisting in a formulation of the experimental aspects of physics in terms of the basic formalism; it is consistent if free from internal contradiction and complete if it provides precise predictions for all experiments). The main steps involved decoherence (the transition from linear superpositions of macroscopic states to a mixing), Griffiths histories describing the evolution of quantum properties, a convenient logical structure for dealing with histories, and also some progress in semiclassical physics, which was made possible by new methods. The main outcome is a theory of phenomena, viz., the classically meaningful properties of a macroscopic system. It shows in particular how and when determinism is valid. This theory can be used to give a deductive form to measurement theory, which now covers some cases that were initially devised as counterexamples against the Copenhagen interpretation. These theories are described, together with their applications to some key experiments and some of their consequences concerning epistemology.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.
Some mostly recent theoretical and mathematical advances can be linked together to yield a new consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics. It relies upon a unique and universal interpretative rule of a logical character which is based upon Griffiths consistent historie. Some new results in semi-classical physics allow to derive classical physics from this rule, including its logical aspects, and to prove accordingly the existence of determinism within the quantum framework. Together with decoherence, this can be used to retrieve the existence of facts, despite the probabilistic character of the theory. Measurement theory can then be made entirely deductive. It is accordingly found that wave packet reduction is a logical property, whereas one can always choose to avoid using it. The practical consequences of this interpretation are most often in agreement with the Copenhagen formulation but they can be proved never to give rise to any logical inconsistency or paradox.