Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

A quantum mechanical description of the liar paradox

Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Sonja Smets

Published Jan 1, 1997• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Related papers

A Quantum Structure Description of the Liar Paradox

Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Sonja Smets

arXiv:quant-ph/0106131•International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Dec 1, 1999•50 citations

The Liar-paradox in a Quantum Mechanical Perspective

Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Sonja Smets

arXiv:quant-ph/0007047•Foundations of Science•Jun 1, 1999•31 citations

The Generalised Liar Paradox: A Quantum Model and Interpretation

Jan Broekaert, Diederik Aerts, Bart D’Hooghe

arXiv:quant-ph/0404066•Foundations of Science•Sep 25, 2006•12 citations

The quantum liar experiment in Cramer's transactional interpretation

Ruth E. Kastner

arXiv:0906.1626•Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics•Mar 2, 2010•17 citations

What the liar paradox can reveal about the quantum logical structure of our minds

Erhard Bieberich

In human consciousness perceptions are distinct or atomistic events despite being perceived by an apparently undivided inner observer. This paper applies both classical (Boolean) and quantum logic to analysis of the Liar paradox which is taken as a typical example of a self-referential negation in the perception space of an undivided observer. The conception of self-referential paradoxes is a unique ability of the human mind still lacking an explanation on the basis of logic. It will be shown that both classical and quantum logics fail to resolve the paradox because of the particle-like (atomistic) nature of physical events in the moments of perception. I suggest a physical mechanism that can deal with our experience of self-referential paradox. Because it is also shown that this cannot be achieved by any previously suggested classical or quantum mechanical operation, the newly proposed mechanism provides a better model than others for an important aspect of the structure of our minds.

arXiv:quant-ph/0101062•Jan 15, 2001•4 citations

Revisiting the Aerts-Broekaert-Smets quantum model of the liar paradox

Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi

The quantum model of the two-sentence liar paradox proposed by Aerts, Broekaert, and Smets is an early example of the use of quantum formalism to describe cognitive dynamics. Our reconstruction is primarily pedagogical in intent, but it also leads to a number of clarifications, and to some new observations, concerning the structure of the model. Rewriting the model in Dirac notation, we make explicit the distinction between truth values originating from a decision and from semantic inference, and show that the associated enlargement of the one-sentence state space corresponds to a factorization with respect to which the non-paradoxical configurations are separable while the genuine liar state is entangled. We also derive the Hamiltonian generating the four-state cyclic evolution, express it in compact operator form, and give the resulting transition probabilities in closed form. We emphasize that the liar cycle admits a unitarily equivalent representation in the four-dimensional truth-only space, where the unmeasured liar state is separable, so the dimensional enlargement is not required by the unitary part of the dynamics; it is required, however, by the measurement structure. The enlargement is also required by the dynamics as soon as revision processes are admitted, in which states with identical truth content but different origins have different successors, the origin degree of freedom then acting as a minimal form of cognitive memory. We conclude by discussing the possible relationship between the model and more general deliberative processes.

q-bio.NCCross-listedarXiv:2609.09228•Sep 8, 2026•0 citations
In human consciousness perceptions are distinct or atomistic events despite being perceived by an apparently undivided inner observer. This paper applies both classical (Boolean) and quantum logic to analysis of the Liar paradox which is taken as a typical example of a self-referential negation in the perception space of an undivided observer. The conception of self-referential paradoxes is a unique ability of the human mind still lacking an explanation on the basis of logic. It will be shown that both classical and quantum logics fail to resolve the paradox because of the particle-like (atomistic) nature of physical events in the moments of perception. I suggest a physical mechanism that can deal with our experience of self-referential paradox. Because it is also shown that this cannot be achieved by any previously suggested classical or quantum mechanical operation, the newly proposed mechanism provides a better model than others for an important aspect of the structure of our minds.
The quantum model of the two-sentence liar paradox proposed by Aerts, Broekaert, and Smets is an early example of the use of quantum formalism to describe cognitive dynamics. Our reconstruction is primarily pedagogical in intent, but it also leads to a number of clarifications, and to some new observations, concerning the structure of the model. Rewriting the model in Dirac notation, we make explicit the distinction between truth values originating from a decision and from semantic inference, and show that the associated enlargement of the one-sentence state space corresponds to a factorization with respect to which the non-paradoxical configurations are separable while the genuine liar state is entangled. We also derive the Hamiltonian generating the four-state cyclic evolution, express it in compact operator form, and give the resulting transition probabilities in closed form. We emphasize that the liar cycle admits a unitarily equivalent representation in the four-dimensional truth-only space, where the unmeasured liar state is separable, so the dimensional enlargement is not required by the unitary part of the dynamics; it is required, however, by the measurement structure. The enlargement is also required by the dynamics as soon as revision processes are admitted, in which states with identical truth content but different origins have different successors, the origin degree of freedom then acting as a minimal form of cognitive memory. We conclude by discussing the possible relationship between the model and more general deliberative processes.