Starting from logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics we reconstruct the logic of so-called no-signaling theories, where the correlations among subsystems of a composite system are restricted only by a simplest form of causality forbidding an instantaneous communication. Although such theories are, as it seems, irrelevant for the description of physical reality, they are helpful in understanding the relevance of quantum mechanics. The logical structure of each theory has an epistemological flavor, as it is based on analysis of possible results of experiments. In this note we emphasize that not only logical structures of classical, quantum and no-signaling theory may be treated on the same ground but it is also possible to give to all of them a common ontological basis by constructing a “phase space” in all cases. In non-classical cases the phase space is not a set, as in classical theory, but a more general object obtained by means of category theory, but conceptually it plays the same role as the phase space in classical physics.
Starting from logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics we reconstruct the logic of so-called no-signaling theories, where the correlations among subsystems of a composite system are restricted only by a simplest form of causality forbidding an instantaneous communication. Although such theories are, as it seems, irrelevant for the description of physical reality, they are helpful in understanding the relevance of quantum mechanics. The logical structure of each theory has an epistemological flavor, as it is based on analysis of possible results of experiments. In this note we emphasize that not only logical structures of classical, quantum and no-signaling theory may be treated on the same ground but it is also possible to give to all of them a common ontological basis by constructing a “phase space” in all cases. In non-classical cases the phase space is not a set, as in classical theory, but a more general object obtained by means of category theory, but conceptually it plays the same role as the phase space in classical physics.
Abstract Using a quantum logic approach we analyze the structure of the so-called non-signaling theories respecting relativistic causality, but allowing correlations violating bounds imposed by quantum mechanics such as CHSH inequality. We discuss the relations among such theories, quantum mechanics, and classical physics. Our main result is the construction of a probability theory adequate for the simplest instance of a non-signaling theory—the two non-signaling boxes world—in which we exhibit its differences in comparison with classical and quantum probabilities. We show that the question of whether such a theory can be treated as a kind of ‘generalization’ of the quantum theory of the two-qubit system cannot be answered positively. Some of its features put it closer to the quantum world—on the one hand, for example, the measurements are destructive, though on the other hand the Heisenberg uncertainty relations are not satisfied. Another interesting property contrasting it from quantum mechanics is that the subset of ‘classically correlated states’, i.e. the states with only classical correlations, does not reproduce the classical world of the two two-state systems. Our results establish a new link between quantum information theory and the well-developed theory of quantum logics.
The aim of this paper is to relate algebraic quantum mechanics to topos theory, so as to construct new foundations for quantum logic and quantum spaces. Motivated by Bohr’s idea that the empirical content of quantum physics is accessible only through classical physics, we show how a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables A induces a topos T(A) in which the amalgamation of all of its commutative subalgebras comprises a single commutative C*-algebra A . According to the constructive Gelfand duality theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey, the latter has an internal spectrum Σ(A) in T(A) , which in our approach plays the role of the quantum phase space of the system. Thus we associate a locale (which is the topos-theoretical notion of a space and which intrinsically carries the intuitionistic logical structure of a Heyting algebra) to a C*-algebra (which is the noncommutative notion of a space). In this setting, states on A become probability measures (more precisely, valuations) on Σ , and self-adjoint elements of A define continuous functions (more precisely, locale maps) from Σ to Scott’s interval domain. Noting that open subsets of Σ(A) correspond to propositions about the system, the pairing map that assigns a (generalized) truth value to a state and a proposition assumes an extremely simple categorical form. Formulated in this way, the quantum theory defined by A is essentially turned into a classical theory, internal to the topos T(A) .These results were inspired by the topos-theoretic approach to quantum physics proposed by Butterfield and Isham, as recently generalized by Döring and Isham.
The philosophical tradition has long sought an ineffable substratum of physical reality—something more fundamental than the world of appearances, prior to experience, the ground of all that is. Plato reached for it with his theory of forms. The attempt was genuine but the logic was inverted: mind was installed as the source of the fundamental, and the physical world was rendered derivative. This paper argues that quantum mechanics, read without presupposition and without the interpretive additions of the Copenhagen tradition, delivers precisely what the philosophical tradition was seeking—but with the arrow pointing in the opposite direction. The possibility space of quantum mechanics—the Hilbert space structure of the universal wave function, evolving unitarily under the Schrödinger equation, holistic in its composition, non-local in its correlations, geometric in its dynamics—is the genuine ineffable substratum: more fundamental than the classical world of appearances, prior to experience, the ground of all physical dispositions. Mind is not the source of this reality. It is the instrument through which this reality generates the appearance of a classical world. The modal ontology presented here holds that physical reality has a fundamentally modal structure. The microcosm is a universe of structured possibilities. The classical world is its emergent surface. Eigenvalues are its currency of contact with experience. The Schrödinger equation is the law of its rotation. Born rule probabilities are structurally grounded propensities—objective dispositional properties of the possibility structure, uniquely characterized by Gleason’s theorem as the only consistent probability measure on Hilbert space. The holism and non-locality enforced by the tensor product structure of composite systems are genuine structural features of physical reality, confirmed by Bell’s theorem and experiment. The Copenhagen tradition’s interpretive apparatus—collapse postulate, classical observer, Heisenberg cut, instrumentalism—is set aside, and the formalism is allowed to speak for itself. What it says is stranger, more precise, and more beautiful than two and a half millennia of philosophical tradition imagined. It has been saying it all along.
The mathematical universe of the quantum topos, which is formulated on the basis of classical Boolean snapshots, delivers a neo-realist description of quantum mechanics that preserves realism. The main contribution of this article is developing formal objectivity in physical theories beyond quantum mechanics in the topos-theory approach. It will be shown that neo-realist responses to non-perturbative structures of quantum field theory do not preserve realism. In this regard, the method of Feynman graphons is applied to reframe the task of describing objectivity in quantum field theory in terms of replacing the standard Hilbert-space/operator-algebra ontology with a new context category built from a certain family of topological Hopf subalgebras of the topological Hopf algebra of renormalization as algebraic/combinatorial data tied to non-perturbative structures. This topological-Hopf-algebra ontology, which is independent of instrumentalist probabilities, enables us to reconstruct gauge field theories on the basis of the mathematical universe of the non-perturbative topos. The non-Boolean logic of the non-perturbative topos cannot be recovered by classical Boolean snapshots, which is in contrast to the quantum-topos reformulation of quantum mechanics. The article formulates a universal version of the non-perturbative topos to show that quantum field theory is a globally and locally neo-realist theory which can be reconstructed independent of the standard Hilbert-space/operator-algebra ontology. Formal objectivity of the universal non-perturbative topos offers a new route to build objective semantics for non-perturbative structures.
Quantum mechanics is among the most successful physical theories, yet its formulation and empirical testing rely on classical structures. Following Lev Landau and Niels Bohr, this reliance is not merely pragmatic: quantum observables acquire empirical meaning only relative to classical reference frames, and, in practice, quantization starts from classical models. At the same time, the two domains display forms of mutual irreducibility: intrinsically quantum features (that is, spin and exchange statistics) have no counterpart in the phase-space ontology of classical point-particle mechanics, while classical trajectory chaos does not arise straightforwardly from unitary quantum evolution in closed systems. A hierarchy is commonly established between classical and quantum theories, namely, a claim of ontological and explanatory priority according to which quantum mechanics is fundamental and classical mechanics is only a limiting case. This claim is less secure than is often assumed; therefore, the traditional hierarchy deserves to be examined. In this paper, we argue that a quantum–classical framework provides an effective and structurally faithful representation of empirically accessible physical systems in regimes where quantum and classical degrees of freedom coexist within a single, consistent effective dynamical description. To give this point of view a firm theoretical basis, we discuss the quasi-Lie formal structure underlying quantum–classical hybrid dynamics, with applications ranging from gravity and condensed matter to open, driven systems in biology and complex media.
In my dissertation I analyze the structure of fundamental physical theories. I start with an analysis of what an adequate primitive ontology is, discussing the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and theirs solutions. It is commonly said that these theories have little in common. I argue instead that the moral of the measurement problem is that the wave function cannot represent physical objects and a common structure between these solutions can be recognized: each of them is about a clear three-dimensional primitive ontology that evolves according to a law determined by the wave function. The primitive ontology is what matter is made of while the wave function tells the matter how to move. One might think that what is important in the notion of primitive ontology is their three-dimensionality. If so, in a theory like classical electrodynamics electromagnetic fields would be part of the primitive ontology. I argue that, reflecting on what the purpose of a fundamental physical theory is, namely to explain the behavior of objects in three--dimensional space, one can recognize that a fundamental physical theory has a particular architecture. If so, electromagnetic fields play a different role in the theory than the particles and therefore should be considered, like the wave function, as part of the law.Therefore, we can characterize the general structure of a fundamental physical theory as a mathematical structure grounded on a primitive ontology. I explore this idea to better understand theories like classical mechanics and relativity, emphasizing that primitive ontology is crucial in the process of building new theories, being fundamental in identifying the symmetries. Finally, I analyze what it means to explain the word around us in terms of the notion of primitive ontology in the case of regularities of statistical character. Here is where the notion of typicality comes into play: we have explained a phenomenon if the typical histories of the primitive ontology give rise to the statistical regularities we observe.