Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IET Information Security

Lattice‐based unidirectional Proxy Re‐Encryption and Proxy Re‐Encryption + schemes

Kunwar Singh, Chandrasekharan Pandu Rangan, Samir Sheshank, Richa Agrawal

Published Dec 28, 2020• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The concept of Proxy Re‐Encryption (PRE) was introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss at Eurocrypt in 1998. In this concept, a semi‐trusted proxy user acquires a re‐encryption key from the delegator. Then the proxy can easily convert the encrypted message under Alice's public key into an encrypted message under Bob's public key, without knowing the content of the message. For a unidirectional PRE, a master secret security (MSS) has been proposed as another security requirement by Ateniese et al. MSS provides security to the secret key of the delegator from computation by association with a malicious delegatee and dishonest proxy. In this study, first we have shown that Aono et al.'s scheme is not secure under the MSS model. Second, we have designed a unidirectional PRE scheme, based on Aono et al.'s study, and proved its security under the MSS model. In Table 2, we have shown that our scheme is more efficient in terms of computational and communication costs. Third, we have constructed a lattice‐based unidirectional PRE + scheme, similar to the scheme proposed by Wang et al. In this scheme the encryptor itself works as the delegator.

DOI
10.1049/ise2.12000

Related papers

Lattice-based Unidirectional IBPRE Secure in Standard Model

Priyanka Dutta, Willy Susilo, Dung Hoang Duong +2 more

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) securely enables the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties, i.e., it offers delegation of decryption rights. PRE allows a semi-trusted third party termed as a "proxy" to securely divert encrypted files of user A (delegator) to user B (delegatee) without revealing any information about the underlying files to the proxy. To eliminate the necessity of having a costly certificate verification process, Green and Ateniese introduced an identity-based PRE (IB-PRE). The potential applicability of IB-PRE leads to intensive research from its first instantiation. Unfortunately, till today, there is no unidirectional IB-PRE secure in the standard model, which can withstand quantum attack. In this paper, we provide, for the first time, a concrete construction of unidirectional IB-PRE which is secure in standard model based on the hardness of learning with error problem. Our technique is to use the novel trapdoor delegation technique of Micciancio and Peikert. The way we use trapdoor delegation technique may prove useful for functionalities other than proxy re-encryption as well.

arXiv:2005.06741•May 14, 2020•2 citations

Improved collusion‐resistant unidirectional proxy re‐encryption scheme from lattice

Xuyang Wang, Aiqun Hu, Hao Fang

Proxy re‐encryption (PRE) is a promising cryptographic structure for pervasive data sharing in cloud‐based social networks, which enables a semi‐trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the corresponding plaintext. Since the proxy is semi‐trust, a PRE scheme which can resist the collusion attack will be of great practical value. Jiang et al . in 2015 and Kim and Jeong in 2016 have proposed collusion‐resistant PRE (CR‐PRE) schemes from the lattice by a similar technique, respectively. However, through the analysis of their schemes, the authors find that both of them have defects in the construction of the re‐encryption key, which will lead to the re‐encryption ciphertext cannot be decrypted or decrypted error with high probability. In this study, the authors first point out the defects in the work of Jiang et al . 's work and Kim and Jeong's work and propose an improved collusion‐resistant unidirectional PRE scheme from lattice, based on learning with errors problems. In addition to solving the defects, CR‐PRE still has many useful properties similar to the previous schemes, such as unidirectional, collusion resistant, chosen‐plaintext attack secure and so on.

IET Information Security•Jan 3, 2020•7 citations

Direct Constructions of Bidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption with Alleviated Trust in Proxy.

Jian Weng, Yunlei Zhao

In this work, we study (the direct constructions of) bidirectional proxy re-encryption (PRE) with alleviated trust in the proxy, specifically the master secret security (MSS) and the nontransitivity (NT) security, in the standard model, and achieve the following: • A multi-hop MSS-secure bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model, where the ciphertext remains constant size regardless how many times it has been re-encrypted. To the best of our knowledge, there exists previously no MSS-secure multi-hop bidirectional PRE scheme with constant size of ciphertexts (whether in the random oracle model or not). • A single-hop MSS-secure and non-transitive bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) in the standard model. The CCA-secure scheme is based on the CPA-secure scheme, and particularly employs a new re-encryption key (REK) generation mechanism to which each user makes equal contributions, where a single REK is used in both directions with the same computation so that the proxy needs not to distinguish the transform direction when it re-encrypts ciphertexts. Besides alleviated trust in proxy, single-hop non-transitive bidirectional PRE schemes also enjoy better fine-grained delegate right control (against malicious proxy). The security analysis uses Coron’s technique [Coron, Crypto 2000], which particularly allows adaptive secret-key corruption. Along the way, we also refine and clarify the security models for bidirectional PRE. 1

•Jan 1, 2011•7 citations

Unidirectional Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Proxy Re-Encryption

Benoît Libert, Damien Vergnaud

In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy re-encryption in which a proxy can transform-without seeing the plaintext-a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recently drawn renewed interest. Notably, Canetti and Hohenberger showed how to properly define (and realize) chosen-ciphertext security for the primitive. Their system is bidirectional as the translation key allows converting ciphertexts in both directions. This paper presents the first unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle idealization). The first system provably fits a unidirectional extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger security model. As a second contribution, the paper considers a more realistic adversarial model where attackers may choose dishonest users' keys on their own. It is shown how to modify the first scheme to achieve security in the latter scenario. At a moderate expense, the resulting system provides additional useful properties such as non-interactive temporary delegations. Both constructions are efficient and rely on mild complexity assumptions in bilinear groups. Like the Canetti-Hohenberger scheme, they meet a relaxed flavor of chosen-ciphertext security introduced by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen.

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Feb 18, 2011•143 citations

Lattice‐based multi‐use unidirectional proxy re‐encryption

Mingming Jiang, Yupu Hu, B. C. Wang +2 more

Abstract Proxy re‐encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a proxy to turn an Alice's ciphertext into a Bob's ciphertext on the same plaintext. At present, there are many different PRE schemes that have been proposed with different properties. However, all of them are based on the logarithm assumption and the large integer factorization assumption except for a bidirectional PRE scheme over lattices. In this paper, we construct the first multi‐use unidirectional PRE scheme based on lattices. In addition, the generation of the PRE key does not interact with two users, and the scheme can resist collusion attacks. Moreover, it is proved chosen plaintext attack secure in the standard model based on the Learning With Errors assumption. Finally, an identity‐based PRE is obtained from the basic construction. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security and Communication Networks•Jun 29, 2015•26 citations

New CCA-Secure Proxy Re-encryption Scheme without Random Oracles

Xu An Wang, Ping Wei, Minqing Zhang

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key to be transformed to those which can be decrypted by Bob. In PKC'08, Libert and Vergnaud proposed the first unidirectional RCCA-secure PRE scheme in the standard model. They left the open problem of constructing unidirectional CCA-secure PRE scheme in the standard model open. Until recently, this open problem was solved by Weng et al. and Shao et al. independently. In this paper, based on Shao et al.'s proposal, we give a new efficient CCA-secure PRE scheme without random oracles and prove its security.

International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)•Dec 1, 2010•2 citations
Abstract The concept of Proxy Re‐Encryption (PRE) was introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss at Eurocrypt in 1998. In this concept, a semi‐trusted proxy user acquires a re‐encryption key from the delegator. Then the proxy can easily convert the encrypted message under Alice's public key into an encrypted message under Bob's public key, without knowing the content of the message. For a unidirectional PRE, a master secret security (MSS) has been proposed as another security requirement by Ateniese et al. MSS provides security to the secret key of the delegator from computation by association with a malicious delegatee and dishonest proxy. In this study, first we have shown that Aono et al.'s scheme is not secure under the MSS model. Second, we have designed a unidirectional PRE scheme, based on Aono et al.'s study, and proved its security under the MSS model. In Table 2, we have shown that our scheme is more efficient in terms of computational and communication costs. Third, we have constructed a lattice‐based unidirectional PRE + scheme, similar to the scheme proposed by Wang et al. In this scheme the encryptor itself works as the delegator.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) securely enables the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties, i.e., it offers delegation of decryption rights. PRE allows a semi-trusted third party termed as a "proxy" to securely divert encrypted files of user A (delegator) to user B (delegatee) without revealing any information about the underlying files to the proxy. To eliminate the necessity of having a costly certificate verification process, Green and Ateniese introduced an identity-based PRE (IB-PRE). The potential applicability of IB-PRE leads to intensive research from its first instantiation. Unfortunately, till today, there is no unidirectional IB-PRE secure in the standard model, which can withstand quantum attack. In this paper, we provide, for the first time, a concrete construction of unidirectional IB-PRE which is secure in standard model based on the hardness of learning with error problem. Our technique is to use the novel trapdoor delegation technique of Micciancio and Peikert. The way we use trapdoor delegation technique may prove useful for functionalities other than proxy re-encryption as well.
Proxy re‐encryption (PRE) is a promising cryptographic structure for pervasive data sharing in cloud‐based social networks, which enables a semi‐trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the corresponding plaintext. Since the proxy is semi‐trust, a PRE scheme which can resist the collusion attack will be of great practical value. Jiang et al . in 2015 and Kim and Jeong in 2016 have proposed collusion‐resistant PRE (CR‐PRE) schemes from the lattice by a similar technique, respectively. However, through the analysis of their schemes, the authors find that both of them have defects in the construction of the re‐encryption key, which will lead to the re‐encryption ciphertext cannot be decrypted or decrypted error with high probability. In this study, the authors first point out the defects in the work of Jiang et al . 's work and Kim and Jeong's work and propose an improved collusion‐resistant unidirectional PRE scheme from lattice, based on learning with errors problems. In addition to solving the defects, CR‐PRE still has many useful properties similar to the previous schemes, such as unidirectional, collusion resistant, chosen‐plaintext attack secure and so on.
In this work, we study (the direct constructions of) bidirectional proxy re-encryption (PRE) with alleviated trust in the proxy, specifically the master secret security (MSS) and the nontransitivity (NT) security, in the standard model, and achieve the following: • A multi-hop MSS-secure bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model, where the ciphertext remains constant size regardless how many times it has been re-encrypted. To the best of our knowledge, there exists previously no MSS-secure multi-hop bidirectional PRE scheme with constant size of ciphertexts (whether in the random oracle model or not). • A single-hop MSS-secure and non-transitive bidirectional PRE scheme with security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) in the standard model. The CCA-secure scheme is based on the CPA-secure scheme, and particularly employs a new re-encryption key (REK) generation mechanism to which each user makes equal contributions, where a single REK is used in both directions with the same computation so that the proxy needs not to distinguish the transform direction when it re-encrypts ciphertexts. Besides alleviated trust in proxy, single-hop non-transitive bidirectional PRE schemes also enjoy better fine-grained delegate right control (against malicious proxy). The security analysis uses Coron’s technique [Coron, Crypto 2000], which particularly allows adaptive secret-key corruption. Along the way, we also refine and clarify the security models for bidirectional PRE. 1
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy re-encryption in which a proxy can transform-without seeing the plaintext-a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recently drawn renewed interest. Notably, Canetti and Hohenberger showed how to properly define (and realize) chosen-ciphertext security for the primitive. Their system is bidirectional as the translation key allows converting ciphertexts in both directions. This paper presents the first unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle idealization). The first system provably fits a unidirectional extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger security model. As a second contribution, the paper considers a more realistic adversarial model where attackers may choose dishonest users' keys on their own. It is shown how to modify the first scheme to achieve security in the latter scenario. At a moderate expense, the resulting system provides additional useful properties such as non-interactive temporary delegations. Both constructions are efficient and rely on mild complexity assumptions in bilinear groups. Like the Canetti-Hohenberger scheme, they meet a relaxed flavor of chosen-ciphertext security introduced by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen.
Abstract Proxy re‐encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a proxy to turn an Alice's ciphertext into a Bob's ciphertext on the same plaintext. At present, there are many different PRE schemes that have been proposed with different properties. However, all of them are based on the logarithm assumption and the large integer factorization assumption except for a bidirectional PRE scheme over lattices. In this paper, we construct the first multi‐use unidirectional PRE scheme based on lattices. In addition, the generation of the PRE key does not interact with two users, and the scheme can resist collusion attacks. Moreover, it is proved chosen plaintext attack secure in the standard model based on the Learning With Errors assumption. Finally, an identity‐based PRE is obtained from the basic construction. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key to be transformed to those which can be decrypted by Bob. In PKC'08, Libert and Vergnaud proposed the first unidirectional RCCA-secure PRE scheme in the standard model. They left the open problem of constructing unidirectional CCA-secure PRE scheme in the standard model open. Until recently, this open problem was solved by Weng et al. and Shao et al. independently. In this paper, based on Shao et al.'s proposal, we give a new efficient CCA-secure PRE scheme without random oracles and prove its security.