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On Counterfactuals and Contextuality

Karl Svozil

Published Jan 1, 2004• 22 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract. Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard to its nonempirical content. To this end, a uniqueness property of states, explosion views and link observables are introduced. If only a single context associated with a particular maximum set of observables can be operationalized, then a context translation principle resolves measurements of different contexts. COUNTERFACTUALS With the rise of quantum mechanics [1, 2, 3, 4] physics proper entered an ancient and sometimes fierce debate in theology and philosophy: the controversy between realism versus idealism. Whereas realism has been subsumed by the proposition that [5] “some entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind, ” idealism put forward that “we have not the faintest reason for believing in the existence of unexperienced entities. [[Realism]] has been adopted... solely because it simplifies our view of the universe. ” And whereas these issues can be considered nonoperational and thus metaphysical or even ideological, it is also true that they have inspired a great number of minds, to the effect of stimulating new approaches to quantum mechanics, revealing many theoretical details, quantum phenomena and quantum technologies. The Kochen-Specker theorem [6], for example, was motivated from the onset by scholasticism, as in an early programmatic article [7] Ernst Specker related the discussion on the foundations of quantum mechanics to scholastic

Related papers

On Counterfactuals and Contextuality

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Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard to its nonempirical content. To this end, a uniqueness property of states, explosion views and link observables are introduced. If only a single context associated with a particular maximum set of observables can be operationalized, then a context translation principle resolves measurements of different contexts.

arXiv:quant-ph/0406014•AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2005•23 citations

Extracontextuality and extravalence in quantum mechanics

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We develop the point of view where quantum mechanics results from the interplay between the quantized number of 'modalities' accessible to a quantum system, and the continuum of 'contexts' that are required to define these modalities. We point out the specific roles of 'extracontextuality' and 'extravalence' of modalities, and relate them to the Kochen-Specker and Gleason theorems.This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Foundations of quantum mechanics and their impact on contemporary society'.

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Foundations of Quantum Mechanics

Emily Adlam

Quantum mechanics is an extraordinarily successful scientific theory. But more than 100 years after it was first introduced, the interpretation of the theory remains controversial. This Element introduces some of the most puzzling questions at the foundations of quantum mechanics and provides an up-to-date and forward-looking survey of the most prominent ways in which physicists and philosophers of physics have attempted to resolve them. Topics covered include nonlocality, contextuality, the reality of the wavefunction and the measurement problem. The discussion is supplemented with descriptions of some of the most important mathematical results from recent work in quantum foundations, including Bell's theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem and the PBR theorem.

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Quantum contextuality in the Copenhagen approach

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The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.

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Perspectivist Account of Truth-Theoretic Semantics in Quantum Mechanics

Vassilios Karakostas

According to various no-go results in the foundations of quantum mechanics, for any system associated to a Hilbert space of dimension higher than two, it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to the system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton uniqueness theorem is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. On this basis, a perspectivist/contextual account of truth valuation in the quantum domain is produced that satisfies Tarski's criterion of material adequacy for a theory of truth. In light of the latter, perspectivist truth conforms to perspective or context-bound correspondence of a de re nature, designating locally an objectively existing state of affairs. Such an account derives by virtue of the microphysical nature of physical reality in displaying a context-dependence of facts; thus, it essentially opposes a non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference, or a panoptical standpoint from which to state all facts of nature.

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Chapter 5. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIOTEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALS

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.

De Gruyter eBooks•Dec 31, 2006•0 citations
Abstract. Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard to its nonempirical content. To this end, a uniqueness property of states, explosion views and link observables are introduced. If only a single context associated with a particular maximum set of observables can be operationalized, then a context translation principle resolves measurements of different contexts. COUNTERFACTUALS With the rise of quantum mechanics [1, 2, 3, 4] physics proper entered an ancient and sometimes fierce debate in theology and philosophy: the controversy between realism versus idealism. Whereas realism has been subsumed by the proposition that [5] “some entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind, ” idealism put forward that “we have not the faintest reason for believing in the existence of unexperienced entities. [[Realism]] has been adopted... solely because it simplifies our view of the universe. ” And whereas these issues can be considered nonoperational and thus metaphysical or even ideological, it is also true that they have inspired a great number of minds, to the effect of stimulating new approaches to quantum mechanics, revealing many theoretical details, quantum phenomena and quantum technologies. The Kochen-Specker theorem [6], for example, was motivated from the onset by scholasticism, as in an early programmatic article [7] Ernst Specker related the discussion on the foundations of quantum mechanics to scholastic
We develop the point of view where quantum mechanics results from the interplay between the quantized number of 'modalities' accessible to a quantum system, and the continuum of 'contexts' that are required to define these modalities. We point out the specific roles of 'extracontextuality' and 'extravalence' of modalities, and relate them to the Kochen-Specker and Gleason theorems.This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Foundations of quantum mechanics and their impact on contemporary society'.
Quantum mechanics is an extraordinarily successful scientific theory. But more than 100 years after it was first introduced, the interpretation of the theory remains controversial. This Element introduces some of the most puzzling questions at the foundations of quantum mechanics and provides an up-to-date and forward-looking survey of the most prominent ways in which physicists and philosophers of physics have attempted to resolve them. Topics covered include nonlocality, contextuality, the reality of the wavefunction and the measurement problem. The discussion is supplemented with descriptions of some of the most important mathematical results from recent work in quantum foundations, including Bell's theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem and the PBR theorem.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
According to various no-go results in the foundations of quantum mechanics, for any system associated to a Hilbert space of dimension higher than two, it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to the system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton uniqueness theorem is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. On this basis, a perspectivist/contextual account of truth valuation in the quantum domain is produced that satisfies Tarski's criterion of material adequacy for a theory of truth. In light of the latter, perspectivist truth conforms to perspective or context-bound correspondence of a de re nature, designating locally an objectively existing state of affairs. Such an account derives by virtue of the microphysical nature of physical reality in displaying a context-dependence of facts; thus, it essentially opposes a non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference, or a panoptical standpoint from which to state all facts of nature.
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.