The present form of quantum mechanics is based on the Copenhagen school of interpretation. Einstein did not belong to the Copenhagen school, because he did not believe in probabilistic interpretation of fundamental physical laws. This is the reason why we are still debating whether there is a more deterministic theory. One cause of this separation between Einstein and the Copenhagen school could have been that the Copenhagen physicists thoroughly ignored Einstein's main concern: the principle of relativity. Paul A. M. Dirac was the first one to realize this problem. Indeed, from 1927 to 1963, Paul A. M. Dirac published at least four papers to study the problem of making the uncertainty relation consistent with Einstein's Lorentz covariance. It is interesting to combine those papers by Dirac to make the uncertainty relation consistent with relativity. It is shown that the mathematics of two coupled oscillators enables us to carry out this job. We are then led to the question of whether the concept of localized probability distribution is consistent with Lorentz covariance.
The present form of quantum mechanics is based on the Copenhagen school of interpretation. Einstein did not belong to the Copenhagen school, because he did not believe in probabilistic interpretation of fundamental physical laws. This is the reason why we are still debating whether there is a more deterministic theory. One cause of this separation between Einstein and the Copenhagen school could have been that the Copenhagen physicists thoroughly ignored Einstein's main concern: the principle of relativity. Paul A. M. Dirac was the first one to realize this problem. Indeed, from 1927 to 1963, Paul A. M. Dirac published at least four papers to study the problem of making the uncertainty relation consistent with Einstein's Lorentz covariance. It is interesting to combine those papers by Dirac to make the uncertainty relation consistent with relativity. It is shown that the mathematics of two coupled oscillators enables us to carry out this job. We are then led to the question of whether the concept of localized probability distribution is consistent with Lorentz covariance.
The present form of quantum mechanics is based on the Copenhagen school of interpretation. Einstein did not belong to the Copenhagen school, because he did not believe in probabilistic interpretation of fundamental physical laws. This is the reason why we are still debating whether there is a more deterministic theory. One cause of this separation between Einstein and the Copenhagen school could have been that the Copenhagen physicists thoroughly ignored Einstein’s main concern: the principle of relativity. Paul A. M. Dirac was the first one to realize this problem. Indeed, from 1927 to 1963, Paul A. M. Dirac published at least four papers to study the problem of making the uncertainty relation consistent with Einstein’s Lorentz covariance. It is interesting to combine those papers by Dirac to make the uncertainty relation consistent with relativity. It is shown that the mathematics of two coupled oscillators enables us to carry out this job. We are then led to the question of whether the concept of localized probability distribution is consistent with Lorentz covariance.
Although Dirac rarely participated in the interpretational debates over quantum theory, it is traditionally assumed that his views were aligned with Heisenberg and Bohr in the so-called Copenhagen-Göttingen camp. However, an unpublished—and apparently unknown—lecture of Dirac's reveals that this view is mistaken; in the famous debate between Einstein and Bohr, Dirac sided with Einstein. Surprisingly, Dirac believed that quantum mechanics was not complete, that the uncertainty principle would not survive in the future physics, and that a deterministic description of the microworld would be recovered. In this paper I show how we can make sense of this unpublished lecture in the context of Dirac's broader philosophy of quantum mechanics, and how our present understanding of Dirac's philosophical views must be revised.
Paul Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central figures of the last century physics, contributing in several and remarkable ways to the development of quantum mechanics; he was also at the centre of an active community of physicists, with whom he had extensive interactions and correspondence. In particular, Dirac was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli. For this reason, among others, Dirac is generally considered a supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Similarly, he was considered a physicist sympathetic with the positivistic attitude which shaped the development of quantum theory in the 1920s. Against this background, the aim of the present essay is twofold: on the one hand, we will argue that, analyzing specific examples taken from Dirac's published works, he can neither be considered a positivist nor a physicist methodologically guided by the observability doctrine. On the other hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac's figure from the mentioned Copenhagen interpretation, since in his long career he employed remarkably different—and often contradicting—methodological principles and philosophical perspectives with respect to those followed by the supporters of that interpretation. Quanta 2019; 8: 68–87.
Quantum mechanics, one of the most successful theories in the history of science, was created to account for physical systems not describable by classical physics. Though it is consistent with all experiments conducted thus far, many of its core concepts (amplitudes, global phases, etc.) can not be directly accessed and its interpretation is still the subject of intense debate, more than 100 years since it was introduced. So, a fundamental question is why this particular mathematical model is the one that nature chooses, if indeed it is the correct model. In the past two decades there has been a renewed effort to determine what physical or informational principles define quantum mechanics. In this paper, recent attempts at establishing reasonable physical principles are reviewed and their degree of success is tabulated. An alternative approach using joint quasi-probability distributions is shown to provide a common basis of representing most of the proposed principles. It is argued that having a common representation of the principles can provide intuition and guidance to relate current principles or advance new principles. The current state of affairs, along with some alternative views are discussed.
Since its inception, the many counter-intuitive aspects and results of quantum mechanics have provoked strong philosophical debates and many interpretations. Even fundamental issues, such as Max Born's basic rules concerning probability amplitudes and probability distributions, took decades to be appreciated by society and many leading scientists. Richard Feynman once said, think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.[48] According to Steven Weinberg, There is now in my opinion no entirely satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen interpretation - due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr - remains the quantum mechanical formalism that is currently most widely accepted amongst physicists, some 75 years after its enunciation. According to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature which will eventually be replaced by a deterministic theory, but instead must be considered a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality. The full paper: http://www.iiste.org/PDFshare/APTA-PAGENO-307447-311734.pdf
After the discovery of quantum mechanics by Heisenberg and Schrödinger in 1925, Einstein raised again and again objections to this theory. Obviously, he had the impression that (a) quantum mechanics does not adequately grasp reality, that it is (b) based on probabilistic laws of nature and that it is (c) for this reason incomplete. Einstein must have obtained this impression from many presentations of quantum mechanics in the first decade after its discovery. -- However, technical refutations of Einstein's objections were not possible when these arguments were put forward, since the necessary formal tools were not yet available at this time. Instead, the advocates of quantum mechanics tried to disprove Einstein merely by intuitive and less rigorous arguments. -- In the light of current physics we find that the objections (a) and (b) are irrelevant since, in accordance with Einstein's intentions, quantum mechanics does refer to reality and is not based on probabilistic laws. Only the incompleteness argument is incorrect. However, for technical reasons a convincing refutation of this objection only became possible thirty years after its formulation and ten years after Einstein's death.