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Realism about the Wave Function

Eddy Keming Chen

Published Oct 13, 2018• 67 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.

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Realism about the wave function

Eddy Keming Chen

Abstract A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non‐relativistic quantum mechanics.

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The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics

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Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.

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On the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics

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What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.

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Survey of the Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Mario Bunge

A survey is made of the hitherto proposed answers to the following crucial questions arising in the physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism of wave mechanics: (I) What is the meaning of the dynamical variables and of their eigenvalues? (II) What is the meaning of the wave function? (III) What is the nature and origin of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations? (IV) What is the nature of the systems dealt with by wave mechanics? Taking into account the interpretations that have been proposed in the last few years, a surprisingly large number of answers is found. The present situation in quantum mechanics is compared with similar crises in the past history of physics. The mere multiplicity of consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics is regarded as a warning against the dogmatic adherence to any one of them, to the exclusion of new possibilities.

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Scientific Realism and Primitive Ontology

Valia Allori

In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave-function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave-function. According to the wave-function ontology approach, the wave-function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave-function does not represent physical entities. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called ‘explanationism’ realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrarily to what is commonly though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave-function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.

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The nomological interpretation of quantum wave function

Kefu Zhu

The law of nature is a core concept in the philosophy of science, but there are significant differences among science philosophers regarding the necessity and connotation of this concept. The current understanding of the law of nature can be roughly divided into two categories – the regularity approach and the necessity approach. How to understand the status of quantum states is a core issue in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The following analysis focuses on the nomological interpretation of the wave function of quantum mechanics proposed by some scholars of the Bohmian school. To defend this interpretation, supporters have put forward various arguments and carefully distinguished different meanings of “nomology”. This is not only related to the several major approaches to understanding the law of nature that already exist in the philosophy of science but also shows a different perspective from the literature. In particular, these new arguments provide a reference for re-examining the formalism of the quantum histories interpretation.

Routledge eBooks•Aug 22, 2025•0 citations
A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
Abstract A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non‐relativistic quantum mechanics.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
A survey is made of the hitherto proposed answers to the following crucial questions arising in the physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism of wave mechanics: (I) What is the meaning of the dynamical variables and of their eigenvalues? (II) What is the meaning of the wave function? (III) What is the nature and origin of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations? (IV) What is the nature of the systems dealt with by wave mechanics? Taking into account the interpretations that have been proposed in the last few years, a surprisingly large number of answers is found. The present situation in quantum mechanics is compared with similar crises in the past history of physics. The mere multiplicity of consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics is regarded as a warning against the dogmatic adherence to any one of them, to the exclusion of new possibilities.
In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave-function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave-function. According to the wave-function ontology approach, the wave-function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave-function does not represent physical entities. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called ‘explanationism’ realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrarily to what is commonly though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave-function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.
The law of nature is a core concept in the philosophy of science, but there are significant differences among science philosophers regarding the necessity and connotation of this concept. The current understanding of the law of nature can be roughly divided into two categories – the regularity approach and the necessity approach. How to understand the status of quantum states is a core issue in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The following analysis focuses on the nomological interpretation of the wave function of quantum mechanics proposed by some scholars of the Bohmian school. To defend this interpretation, supporters have put forward various arguments and carefully distinguished different meanings of “nomology”. This is not only related to the several major approaches to understanding the law of nature that already exist in the philosophy of science but also shows a different perspective from the literature. In particular, these new arguments provide a reference for re-examining the formalism of the quantum histories interpretation.