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Multiplicative Depth Independent & Efficient MPC in the Presence of Mixed Adversary.

Achintya Desai, S. Sundar Raj, Kannan Srinathan

Published Jan 1, 2020• 0 citations
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Efficient MPC with a Mixed Adversary

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Over the past 20 years, the efficiency of secure multi-party protocols has been greatly improved. While the seminal protocols from the late 80’s require a communication of Ω(n⁶) field elements per multiplication among n parties, recent protocols offer linear communication complexity. This means that each party needs to communicate a constant number of field elements per multiplication, independent of n. However, these efficient protocols only offer active security, which implies that at most t<n/3 (perfect security), respectively t<n/2 (statistical or computational security) parties may be corrupted. Higher corruption thresholds (i.e., t≥ n/2) can only be achieved with degraded security (unfair abort), where one single corrupted party can prevent honest parties from learning their outputs. The aforementioned upper bounds (t<n/3 and t<n/2) have been circumvented by considering mixed adversaries (Fitzi et al., Crypto' 98), i.e., adversaries that corrupt, at the same time, some parties actively, some parties passively, and some parties in the fail-stop manner. It is possible, for example, to achieve perfect security even if 2/3 of the parties are faulty (three quarters of which may abort in the middle of the protocol, and a quarter may even arbitrarily misbehave). This setting is much better suited to many applications, where the crash of a party is more likely than a coordinated active attack. Surprisingly, since the presentation of the feasibility result for the mixed setting, no progress has been made in terms of efficiency: the state-of-the-art protocol still requires a communication of Ω(n⁶) field elements per multiplication. In this paper, we present a perfectly-secure MPC protocol for the mixed setting with essentially the same efficiency as the best MPC protocols for the active-only setting. For the first time, this allows to tolerate faulty majorities, while still providing optimal efficiency. As a special case, this also results in the first fully-secure MPC protocol secure against any number of crashing parties, with optimal (i.e., linear in n) communication. We provide simulation-based proofs of our construction.

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Reducing the Overhead of MPC over a Large Population

Ashish Choudhury, Arpita Patra, Nigel Paul Smart

Abstract. We present a secure honest majority MPC protocol, against a static adversary, which aims to reduce the communication cost in the situation where there are a large number of parties and the number of adversarially con-trolled parties is relatively small. Our goal is to reduce the usage of point-to-point channels among the parties, thus enabling them to run multiple different protocol executions. Our protocol has highly efficient theoretical communi-cation cost when compared with other protocols in the literature; specifically the circuit-dependent communication cost, for circuits of suitably large depth, is O(|ckt|κ7), for security parameter κ and circuit size |ckt|. Our protocol finds application in cloud computing scenario, where the fraction of corrupted parties is relatively small. By mini-mizing the usage of point-to-point channels, our protocol can enable a cloud service provider to run multiple MPC protocols. 1

•Jan 1, 2014•0 citations
Over the past 20 years, the efficiency of secure multi-party protocols has been greatly improved. While the seminal protocols from the late 80’s require a communication of Ω(n⁶) field elements per multiplication among n parties, recent protocols offer linear communication complexity. This means that each party needs to communicate a constant number of field elements per multiplication, independent of n. However, these efficient protocols only offer active security, which implies that at most t<n/3 (perfect security), respectively t<n/2 (statistical or computational security) parties may be corrupted. Higher corruption thresholds (i.e., t≥ n/2) can only be achieved with degraded security (unfair abort), where one single corrupted party can prevent honest parties from learning their outputs. The aforementioned upper bounds (t<n/3 and t<n/2) have been circumvented by considering mixed adversaries (Fitzi et al., Crypto' 98), i.e., adversaries that corrupt, at the same time, some parties actively, some parties passively, and some parties in the fail-stop manner. It is possible, for example, to achieve perfect security even if 2/3 of the parties are faulty (three quarters of which may abort in the middle of the protocol, and a quarter may even arbitrarily misbehave). This setting is much better suited to many applications, where the crash of a party is more likely than a coordinated active attack. Surprisingly, since the presentation of the feasibility result for the mixed setting, no progress has been made in terms of efficiency: the state-of-the-art protocol still requires a communication of Ω(n⁶) field elements per multiplication. In this paper, we present a perfectly-secure MPC protocol for the mixed setting with essentially the same efficiency as the best MPC protocols for the active-only setting. For the first time, this allows to tolerate faulty majorities, while still providing optimal efficiency. As a special case, this also results in the first fully-secure MPC protocol secure against any number of crashing parties, with optimal (i.e., linear in n) communication. We provide simulation-based proofs of our construction.
Abstract. We present a secure honest majority MPC protocol, against a static adversary, which aims to reduce the communication cost in the situation where there are a large number of parties and the number of adversarially con-trolled parties is relatively small. Our goal is to reduce the usage of point-to-point channels among the parties, thus enabling them to run multiple different protocol executions. Our protocol has highly efficient theoretical communi-cation cost when compared with other protocols in the literature; specifically the circuit-dependent communication cost, for circuits of suitably large depth, is O(|ckt|κ7), for security parameter κ and circuit size |ckt|. Our protocol finds application in cloud computing scenario, where the fraction of corrupted parties is relatively small. By mini-mizing the usage of point-to-point channels, our protocol can enable a cloud service provider to run multiple MPC protocols. 1