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Lecture notes in computer science

Improved Attacks Against Key Reuse in Learning with Errors Key Exchange

Nina Bindel, Douglas Stebila, Shannon Veitch

Published Jan 1, 2021• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-88238-9_9

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In this work, we initially present in Chapter 1 the theoretical background of the LWE problem. Chapter 2 describes in depth the NewHope post-quantum lattice-based cryptosystem, which is based on a variant of LWE called Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE). Chapter 3 analyses two key reuse attacks on NewHope as published in literature and our implementation of them.

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Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE)-based key exchange is one of the most efficient and secure primitive for post-quantum cryptography. One common approach to achieve key exchange over RLWE is error reconciliation. Recently, an efficient attack against reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocols with reused keys was proposed. This attack can recover a long-term private key if a key pair is reused. We also know that in the real world, key reuse is commonly adopted in applications like the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to improve performance. Directly motivated by this attack, we construct a new randomized RLWE-based key exchange protocol against this attack. Our lightweight approach incorporates an additional ephemeral public error term into key exchange materials, so that this attack no longer works. With the same attack, we practically show that the signal value of our protocol is indistinguishable from uniform random, therefore, this attack no longer works. We explain how the attack fails, present 200-bit classic and 80-bit quantum secure parameter choice, efficient implementations, comparisons and discussion. Benchmark shows our protocol is truly efficient and even faster than related vulnerable protocols.
In this paper, we show that the signal function used in Ring-Learning with Errors (RLWE) key exchange could leak information to find the secret s of a reused public key p = as+2e. This work is motivated by an attack proposed in [1] and gives an insight into how public keys reused for long term in RLWE key exchange protocols can be exploited. This work specifically focuses on the attack on the KE protocol in [2] by initiating multiple sessions with the honest party and analyze the output of the signal function. Experiments have confirmed the success of our attack in recovering the secret.