Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Constant Ciphertext-Rate Non-committing Encryption from Standard Assumptions

Zvika Brakerski, Pedro Costa Branco, Nico Döttling, Sanjam Garg, Giulio Malavolta

Published Jan 1, 2020• 17 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-64375-1_3

Related papers

Non-committing Encryption with Constant Ciphertext Expansion from Standard Assumptions

Yusuke Yoshida, Fuyuki Kitagawa, Keita Xagawa +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2020•4 citations

Non-Committing Encryption with Quasi-Optimal Ciphertext-Rate Based on the DDH Problem

Yusuke Yoshida, Fuyuki Kitagawa, Keisuke Tanaka

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2019•8 citations

Improved Non-committing Encryption Schemes Based on a General Complexity Assumption

Ivan Damgård, Jesper Buus Nielsen

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2000•170 citations

Optimal-Rate Non-Committing Encryption

Ran Canetti, Oxana Poburinnaya, Mariana Raykova

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2017•11 citations

Error-free, Multi-bit Non-committing Encryption with Constant Round Complexity

Huafei Zhu, Feng Bao

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2011•4 citations

Selective Opening Security for Receivers.

Carmit Hazay, Arpita Patra, Bogdan Warinschi

In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations
In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.