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Sensors

Measurement-Device-Independent Two-Party Cryptography with Error Estimation

Zishuai Zhou, Qisheng Guang, Chaohui Gao, Dong Jiang, Lijun Chen

Published Nov 7, 2020• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

We present an innovative method for quantum two-party cryptography. Our protocol introduces joint measurement and error estimation to improve the security of two-party cryptographic protocols. Our protocol removes the assumption of the attacker's limited power and catches the attacking actions through highly estimated bit error rate. Our protocol is formally proved to be secure against both eavesdroppers and dishonest communication parties. We also utilize our designed protocol to construct two specific two-party cryptographic applications: Quantum bit commitment and quantum password identification.

DOI
10.3390/s20216351

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We present an innovative method for quantum two-party cryptography. Our protocol introduces joint measurement and error estimation to improve the security of two-party cryptographic protocols. Our protocol removes the assumption of the attacker's limited power and catches the attacking actions through highly estimated bit error rate. Our protocol is formally proved to be secure against both eavesdroppers and dishonest communication parties. We also utilize our designed protocol to construct two specific two-party cryptographic applications: Quantum bit commitment and quantum password identification.
The goal of two-party cryptography is to enable two parties, Alice and Bob, to solve common tasks without the need for mutual trust. Examples of such tasks are private access to a database, and secure identification. Quantum communication enables security for all of these problems in the noisy-storage model by sending more signals than the adversary can store in a certain time frame. Here, we initiate the study of device-independent (DI) protocols for two-party cryptography in the noisy-storage model. Specifically, we present a relatively easy to implement protocol for a cryptographic building block known as weak string erasure and prove its security even if the devices used in the protocol are prepared by the dishonest party. DI two-party cryptography is made challenging by the fact that Alice and Bob do not trust each other, which requires new techniques to establish security. We fully analyse the case of memoryless devices (for which sequential attacks are optimal) and the case of sequential attacks for arbitrary devices. The key ingredient of the proof, which might be of independent interest, is an explicit (and tight) relation between the violation of the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt inequality observed by Alice and Bob and uncertainty generated by Alice against Bob who is forced to measure his system before finding out Alice's setting (guessing with postmeasurement information). In particular, we show that security is possible for arbitrarily small violation.
Bit commitment is an essential primitive in quantum cryptography. It is the basic building block of many cryptographic protocols in which it provides security over distrustful parties. This paper proposes a secured quantum two-bit commitment protocol for any two classical bits. The protocol contains two parties - a committer and a receiver - who share both quantum and classical communication channels. The main phases of this protocol are commitment and revealing phases where the concealing and binding conditions are proved in order to accept the commitment message. The proposed framework utilizes different security layers to hide specific quantum states in a superposition alongside trivial one qubit operations. The secured unitary transformations are applied by the two parties to meet the concealing and binding conditions. To verify the success of the proposed protocol, the measured output of the two parties are compared. The protocol operates under the assumption that the two parties might cheat and the possible existence of an eavesdropper.
Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptographic conferencing (MDI-QCC) protocol puts MDI quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) forwards to multi-party applications, and suggests a significant framework for practical multi-party quantum communication. In order to mitigate the experimental complexity of MDI-QCC and remove the key assumption (the sources are trusted) in MDI-QCC, we extend the framework of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source to MDI-QCC and give the rigorous security analysis of MDI-QCC with an untrusted source. What is more, in the security analysis we clearly provide a rigorous analytical method for parameters’ estimation, which with simple modifications can be applied to not only MDI-QKD with an untrusted source but also arbitrary multi-party communication protocol with an untrusted source. The simulation results show that at reasonable distances the asymptotic key rates for the two cases (with trusted and untrusted sources) almost overlap, which indicates the feasibility of our protocol.
Oblivious transfer (OT) and bit commitment (BC) are two-party cryptographic protocols which play crucial roles in the construction of various cryptographic protocols. We propose three practical quantum cryptographic protocols in this paper. We first construct a practical quantum random oblivious transfer (R-OT) protocol based on the fact that non-orthogonal states cannot be reliably distinguished. Then, we construct a fault-tolerant one-out-of-two oblivious transfer ( O T 1 2 ) protocol based on the quantum R-OT protocol. Afterwards, we propose a quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol which executes the fault-tolerant O T 1 2 several times. Mayers, Lo and Chau (MLC) no-go theorem proves that QBC protocol cannot be unconditionally secure. However, we find that computing the unitary transformation of no-go theorem attack needs so many resources that it is not realistically implementable. We give a definition of physical security for QBC protocols and prove that the practical QBC we proposed is physically secure and can be implemented in the real world.
Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond quantum key distribution. One domain is two-party cryptography, whose goal is to allow two parties who may not trust each other to solve joint tasks. Another interesting application is position-based cryptography whose goal is to use the geographical location of an entity as its only identifying credential. Unfortunately, security of these protocols is not possible against an all powerful adversary. However, if we impose some realistic physical constraints on the adversary, there exist protocols for which security can be proven, but these so far relied on the knowledge of the quantum operations performed during the protocols. In this work we improve the device-independent security proofs of Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)] for two-party cryptography (with memoryless devices) and we add a security proof for device-independent position verification (also memoryless devices) under different physical constraints on the adversary. We assess the quality of the devices by observing a Bell violation, and, as for Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)], security can be attained for any violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne inequality.