If two parties want to communicate over an insecure channel, they typically execute an interactive cryptographic handshake to establish a shared secret, before any application data is sent. In contrast, zero round-trip time (0-RTT) protocols allow a sender to immediately send encrypted application data (0-RTT data) to a receiver without executing an interactive handshake. One of the major challenges when designing 0-RTT protocols is to guarantee forward security for the 0-RTT data. Forward security ensures that compromise of a communicating party does not impact security of past communications. However, the lack of interactivity in 0-RTT protocols renders it difficult to achieve forward security for the 0-RTT data. Only recently, novel techniques to overcome this challenge have been discovered. This thesis investigates design approaches to 0-RTT protocols and proposes new constructions of 0-RTT protocols with forward security for all sent data. This thesis starts with a discussion on the concept of forward security in noninteractive settings. Traditionally, forward security can be achieved if communication partners interactively agree on fresh secrets. However, this view limits the understanding of what forward security should mean in a non-interactive setting. Hence, we propose new terminology for a unified treatment of forward security, capturing both interactive and non-interactive communication settings. The remainder of this thesis can be split into two parts. The first part focuses on the design of 0-RTT key exchange protocols. We investigate how to build 0-RTT key exchange protocols from Bloom filter key encapsulation mechanisms, and describe the first mechanism with constant-size ciphertexts. We then use this scheme to construct the first multi-hop 0-RTT protocol for efficient connection establishment in the context of anonymous communications. The second part of this thesis focuses in 0-RTT session resumption protocols. Session resumption protocols require an already established secret shared between sender and recipient. This secret can then be used to re-establish a secure connection. Despite prior belief, we present the first 0-RTT session resumption protocol that indeed achieves forward security for all messages. In contrast to existing 0-RTT key exchange protocols, our 0-RTT session resumption protocol is highly efficient as it only relies on symmetric primitives. We show that our protocol can be incorporated into the recently standardized TLS 1.3 handshake without modifications to client-side implementations. This means that our protocol is immediately deployable by content providers without requiring changes to the standard.
If two parties want to communicate over an insecure channel, they typically execute an interactive cryptographic handshake to establish a shared secret, before any application data is sent. In contrast, zero round-trip time (0-RTT) protocols allow a sender to immediately send encrypted application data (0-RTT data) to a receiver without executing an interactive handshake. One of the major challenges when designing 0-RTT protocols is to guarantee forward security for the 0-RTT data. Forward security ensures that compromise of a communicating party does not impact security of past communications. However, the lack of interactivity in 0-RTT protocols renders it difficult to achieve forward security for the 0-RTT data. Only recently, novel techniques to overcome this challenge have been discovered. This thesis investigates design approaches to 0-RTT protocols and proposes new constructions of 0-RTT protocols with forward security for all sent data. This thesis starts with a discussion on the concept of forward security in noninteractive settings. Traditionally, forward security can be achieved if communication partners interactively agree on fresh secrets. However, this view limits the understanding of what forward security should mean in a non-interactive setting. Hence, we propose new terminology for a unified treatment of forward security, capturing both interactive and non-interactive communication settings. The remainder of this thesis can be split into two parts. The first part focuses on the design of 0-RTT key exchange protocols. We investigate how to build 0-RTT key exchange protocols from Bloom filter key encapsulation mechanisms, and describe the first mechanism with constant-size ciphertexts. We then use this scheme to construct the first multi-hop 0-RTT protocol for efficient connection establishment in the context of anonymous communications. The second part of this thesis focuses in 0-RTT session resumption protocols. Session resumption protocols require an already established secret shared between sender and recipient. This secret can then be used to re-establish a secure connection. Despite prior belief, we present the first 0-RTT session resumption protocol that indeed achieves forward security for all messages. In contrast to existing 0-RTT key exchange protocols, our 0-RTT session resumption protocol is highly efficient as it only relies on symmetric primitives. We show that our protocol can be incorporated into the recently standardized TLS 1.3 handshake without modifications to client-side implementations. This means that our protocol is immediately deployable by content providers without requiring changes to the standard.
With the advancement in Internet-based technologies, network applications are no longer just limited to one-to-one communication; instead, it has become a publicly accessible resource. Regardless of this growth, such applications bring specific challenges concerning authentication, integrity, and privacy. Cryptography stands as an ideal solution to overcome these issues through an interactive method of secure communication called Key Exchange. Key exchange protocols allow two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret transmitted over a public channel without revealing any information to an eavesdropper.
This thesis contributes to the design and analysis of the variants of key exchange protocols along with their applications. As per the security requirements, the proposed schemes are either designed in an interactive model or a non-interactive model. Each scheme undergoes a series of formal and informal security analysis. The formal analysis provides simulation result using cryptographic models. Whereas, an informal analysis showcases the theoretical proves on known attacks where an adversary controls the network. The performance analysis maps the protocol’s efficiency based on the computation cost and communication size.
The first contribution introduces an interactive two-party authenticated key exchange protocol. We begin by investigating the security flaws in an existing system such as, lack of user anonymity, trace attack, clogging attack, and failure to resist replay attack. Then proposed an authenticated self-certified key exchange protocol that overcomes the addressed issues. Also, it eliminates the requirements of a trusted certificate authority to authorize the entities. The scheme achieves anonymity during session execution, mutual authentication and enables session key agreement.Based on the ideology, an application is designed, forsecure communication between ad-hoc nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network.
The second contribution contributes to the design of an Identity-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol that overcomes the incapability of managing huge
peer-to-peer communication and high computation cost faced by two-party authenticated key exchange protocols. The proposed scheme preserves user privacy by enabling the property of anonymity and ensures non-repudiation. Based on the ideology, an application is designed to establish a secure session key between two users with the help of a trusted server for an electronic payment system.
The third contribution proposes an interactive pairing-free certificateless authenticated group key agreement scheme suitable for a resource constrained mobile network. The scheme allows any user to join or leave the group dynamically. The key agreement protocol devised in this scheme ensures un-deniability property by incorporating the signcryption, and unsigncryption algorithm.
The final contribution presents a non-interactive Identity-based deniable authentication protocol that allows an intended receiver to identify the origin of a given message without being able to prove sender’s identity to a third party.
In this thesis we focus on various aspects of secure message transmission protocols. Such protocols achieve the secure transmission of a message from a sender to a receiver - where the term “secure” encapsulates the notion of privacy and reliability of message transmission. These two parties are connected using an underlying network in which a static computationally unlimited active adversary able to corrupt up to t network nodes is assumed to be present. Such protocols are important to study as they are used extensively in various cryptographic protocols and are of interest to other research areas such as ad-hoc networks, military networks amongst others. Optimal bounds for the number of phases (communication from sender to receiver or vice versa), connectivity requirements (number of node disjoint network paths connecting sender and receiver - denoted by n), communication complexity (complexity of the number of field elements sent - where F is the finite field used and jFj = q) and transmission complexity (proportion of communication complexity to complexity of secrets transmitted) for secure message transmission protocols have been proven in previous work. In the one-phase model it has been shown that n 3t+1 node disjoint paths are required to achieve perfect communication. In the two phase model only n 2t + 1 node disjoint paths are necessary. This connectivity is also the required bound for almost perfectly secure one-phase protocols - protocols which achieve perfect privacy but with a negligible probability may fail to achieve reliability. In such cases the receiver accepts a different message to that transmitted by the sender or does not accept any message. The main focus of recent research in secure message transmission protocols has been to present new protocols which achieve optimal transmission complexity. This has been achieved through the transmission of multiple messages. If a protocol has a communication complexity of O(n3) field elements, to achieve optimal transmission complexity O(n2) secrets will have to be communicated. This has somewhat ignored the simplification and improvement of protocols which securely transmit a single secret. Such improvements include constructing more efficient protocols with regards to communication complexity, computational complexity and the number of field elements sent throughout the whole protocol. In the thesis we first consider one-phase almost perfectly secure message transmission and present two new protocols which improve on previous work. We present a polynomial time protocol of O(n2) communication complexity which at the time of writing this thesis, is computationally more efficient than any other protocol of similar communication complexity for the almost perfectly secure transmission of a single message. Even though our first almost perfectly secure transmission protocol is of polynomial time, it is important to study other protocols also and improve previous work presented by other researchers. This is the idea behind the second one-phase almost perfectly secure message transmission protocol we present which requires an exponential complexity of field operations but lower (O(n)) communication complexity. This protocol also improves on previous protocols of similar communication complexity, requiring in the order of O(log q) less computation to complete - where q denotes the size of the finite field used. Even though this protocol is of exponential time, for small values of n (e.g. when t = 1, t = 2 or t = 3) it may be beneficial to use this protocol for almost perfectly secure communication as opposed to using the polynomial time protocol. This is because less field elements need to be transmitted over the whole network which connects a sender and a receiver. Furthermore, an optimal almost perfectly secure transmission protocol will be one with O(n) communication complexity and with polynomial computational complexity. We hope that in the future, other researchers will be inspired by our proposed protocol, improve on our work and ideally achieve these optimal results. We also consider multi-phase protocols. By combining various cryptographic schemes, we present a new two-phase perfectly secure single message transmission protocol. At the time of writing this thesis, the protocol is the most efficient protocol when considering communication complexity. Our protocol has a communication complexity of O(n2) compared to O(n3) of previous work thus improving on the communication complexity by an order of O(n) for the perfectly secure message transmission of a single message. This protocol is then extended to a three phase protocol where a multi-recipient broadcast end channel network setting is considered. As opposed to point to point networks where a path from a sender reaches a single receiver, this network model is new in the field of message transmission protocols. In this model each path from a sender reaches multiple receivers, with all receivers receiving the same information from their common network communication channel. We show how the use of this protocol upon such a network can lead to great savings in the transmission and computation carried out by a single sender. We also discuss the importance and relevance of such a multi-recipient setting to practical applications. The first protocols in the field of perfectly secure message transmission with a human receiver are also presented. This is a topic proposed by my supervisor Professor Yvo Desmedt for which I constructed solutions. In such protocols, one of the communicating parties is considered to be a human who does not have access to a computational device. Because of this, solutions for such protocols need to be computationally efficient and computationally simple so that they can be executed by the human party. Experiments with human participants were carried out to assess how easily and accurately human parties used the proposed protocols. The experimental results are presented and these identify how well human participants used the protocols. In addition to the security of messages, we also consider how one can achieve anonymity of message transmission protocols. For such protocols, considering a single-receiver multi-sender scenario, the presence of a t-threshold bounded adversary and the transmission of multiple secrets (as many as the number of sender), once the protocols ends one should not be able to identify the sender of a received message. Considering a passive and active adversary new protocols are presented which achieve the secure and anonymous transmission of messages in the information-theoretic security model. Our proposed solutions can also be applied (with minor alterations) to the dual problem when a single-sender multi-recipient communication setting is considered. The contributions of the thesis are primarily theoretical - thus no implementation of the proposed protocols was carried out. Despite this, we reflect on practical aspects of secure message transmission protocols. We review the feasibility of implementing secure message transmission protocols in general upon various networks - focusing on the Internet which can be considered as the most important communication network at this time. We also describe in theory how concepts of secure message transmission protocols could possibly be used in practical implementations for secure communication on various existing communication networks. Open problems that remain unsolved in the research area of the proposed protocols are also discussed and we hope that these inspire research and future solutions for the design (and implementation) of better and more efficient secure message transmission protocols.
A group key exchange (GKE) protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a common secret session key over a public network. In this thesis, we focus on designing efficient GKE protocols using public key techniques and appropriately revising security models for GKE protocols. For the purpose of modelling and analysing the security of GKE protocols we apply the widely accepted computational complexity approach. The contributions of the thesis to the area of GKE protocols are manifold. We propose the first GKE protocol that requires only one round of communication and is proven secure in the standard model. Our protocol is generically constructed from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We also suggest an efficient KEM from the literature, which satisfies the underlying security notion, to instantiate the generic protocol. We then concentrate on enhancing the security of one-round GKE protocols. A new model of security for forward secure GKE protocols is introduced and a generic one-round GKE protocol with forward security is then presented. The security of this protocol is also proven in the standard model. We also propose an efficient forward secure encryption scheme that can be used to instantiate the generic GKE protocol. Our next contributions are to the security models of GKE protocols. We observe that the analysis of GKE protocols has not been as extensive as that of two-party key exchange protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for GKE protocols. We model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure against KCI attacks. A new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol is given under the revised model assuming random oracles. Subsequently, we treat the security of GKE protocols in the universal composability (UC) framework. We present a new UC ideal functionality for GKE protocols capturing the security attribute of contributiveness. An existing protocol with minor revisions is then shown to realize our functionality in the random oracle model. Finally, we explore the possibility of constructing GKE protocols in the attribute-based setting. We introduce the concept of attribute-based group key exchange (AB-GKE). A security model for AB-GKE and a one-round AB-GKE protocol satisfying our security notion are presented. The protocol is generically constructed from a new cryptographic primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based KEM (EP-AB-KEM), which we introduce in this thesis. We also present a new EP-AB-KEM with a proof of security assuming generic groups and random oracles. The EP-AB-KEM can be used to instantiate our generic AB-GKE protocol.
Secure communication has become an essential ingredient of our daily life. Mostly unnoticed, cryptography is protecting our interactions today when we read emails or do banking over the Internet, withdraw cash at an ATM, or chat with friends on our smartphone. Security in such communication is enabled through two components. First, two parties that wish to communicate securely engage in a key exchange protocol in order to establish a shared secret key known only to them. The established key is then used in a follow-up secure channel protocol in order to protect the actual data communicated against eavesdropping or malicious modification on the way. In modern cryptography, security is formalized through abstract mathematical security models which describe the considered class of attacks a cryptographic system is supposed to withstand. Such models enable formal reasoning that no attacker can, in reasonable time, break the security of a system assuming the security of its underlying building blocks or that certain mathematical problems are hard to solve. Given that the assumptions made are valid, security proofs in that sense hence rule out a certain class of attackers with well-defined capabilities. In order for such results to be meaningful for the actually deployed cryptographic systems, it is of utmost importance that security models capture the system's behavior and threats faced in that 'real world' as accurately as possible, yet not be overly demanding in order to still allow for efficient constructions. If a security model fails to capture a realistic attack in practice, such an attack remains viable on a cryptographic system despite a proof of security in that model, at worst voiding the system's overall practical security. In this thesis, we reconsider the established security models for key exchange and secure channel protocols. To this end, we study novel and advanced security aspects that have been introduced in recent designs of some of the most important security protocols deployed, or that escaped a formal treatment so far. We introduce enhanced security models in order to capture these advanced aspects and apply them to analyze the security of major practical key exchange and secure channel protocols, either directly or through comparatively close generic protocol designs. Key exchange protocols have so far always been understood as establishing a single secret key, and then terminating their operation. This changed in recent practical designs, specifically of Google's QUIC ("Quick UDP Internet Connections") protocol and the upcoming version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, the latter being the de-facto standard for security protocols. Both protocols derive multiple keys in what we formalize in this thesis as a multi-stage key exchange (MSKE) protocol, with the derived keys potentially depending on each other and differing in cryptographic strength. Our MSKE security model allows us to capture such dependencies and differences between all keys established in a single framework. In this thesis, we apply our model to assess the security of both the QUIC and the TLS 1.3 key exchange design. For QUIC, we are able to confirm the intended overall security but at the same time highlight an undesirable dependency between the two keys QUIC derives. For TLS 1.3, we begin by analyzing the main key exchange mode as well as a reduced resumption mode. Our analysis attests that TLS 1.3 achieves strong security for all keys derived without undesired dependencies, in particular confirming several of this new TLS version's design goals. We then also compare the QUIC and TLS 1.3 designs with respect to a novel 'zero round-trip time' key exchange mode establishing an initial key with minimal latency, studying how differences in these designs affect the achievable key exchange security. As this thesis' last contribution in the realm of key exchange, we formalize the notion of key confirmation which ensures one party in a key exchange execution that the other party indeed holds the same key. Despite being frequently mentioned in practical protocol specifications, key confirmation was never comprehensively treated so far. In particular, our formalization exposes an inherent, slight difference in the confirmation guarantees both communication partners can obtain and enables us to analyze the key confirmation properties of TLS 1.3. Secure channels have so far been modeled as protecting a sequence of distinct messages using a single secret key. Our first contribution in the realm of channels originates from the observation that, in practice, secure channel protocols like TLS actually do not allow an application to transmit distinct, or atomic, messages. Instead, they provide applications with a streaming interface to transmit a stream of bits without any inherent demarcation of individual messages. Necessarily, the security guarantees of such an interface differ significantly from those considered in cryptographic models so far. In particular, messages may be fragmented in transport, and the recipient may obtain the sent stream in a different fragmentation, which has in the past led to confusion and practical attacks on major application protocol implementations. In this thesis, we formalize such stream-based channels and introduce corresponding security notions of confidentiality and integrity capturing the inherently increased complexity. We then present a generic construction of a stream-based channel based on authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) that achieves the strongest security notions in our model and serves as validation of the similar TLS channel design. We also study the security of such applications whose messages are inherently atomic and which need to safely transport these messages over a streaming, i.e., possibly fragmenting, channel. Formalizing the desired security properties in terms of confidentiality and integrity in such a setting, we investigate and confirm the security of the widely adopted approach to encode the application's messages into the continuous data stream. Finally, we study a novel paradigm employed in the TLS 1.3 channel design, namely to update the keys used to secure a channel during that channel's lifetime in order to strengthen its security. We propose and formalize the notion of multi-key channels deploying such sequences of keys and capture their advanced security properties in a hierarchical framework of confidentiality and integrity notions. We show that our hierarchy of notions naturally connects to the established notions for single-key channels and instantiate its strongest security notions with a generic AEAD-based construction. Being comparatively close to the TLS 1.3 channel protocol, our construction furthermore enables a comparative design discussion.
Key exchange protocols, first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976, are one of the most widely-deployed cryptographic protocols. They allow two parties, that have never interacted before, to establish shared secrets. These shared cryptographic keys may subsequently be used to establish a secure communication channel. Use cases include the classic client-server setting that is for example at play when browsing the internet, but also chats via end-to-end-encrypted instant messaging applications. Security-wise, we generally demand of key exchange protocols to achieve key secrecy and authentication. While, informally, authentication ensures that the communicating parties have confidence in the identity of their peers, key secrecy ensures that any shared cryptographic key that is established via the key exchange protocol is only known to the participants in the protocol and can be used securely in cryptographic protocols, i.e., is sufficiently random. In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway gave a first formalization of key exchange protocol security that captures these properties with respect to powerful adversaries with full control over the network. Their model constitutes the basis of the many subsequent treatments of authenticated key exchange security, including the models presented in this thesis. The common methodological approach underlying all of these formalizations is the provable security paradigm, which has become a standard tool in assessing the security of cryptographic protocols and primitives. So-called security models specify the expected security guarantees of the scheme in question with regards to a well-defined class of adversaries. Proofs that validate these security claims do so by reducing the security of the overall scheme to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. However, advances in computational power and more sophisticated cryptanalytic capabilities often render exactly these components insecure. Especially the advent of quantum computers will have a devastating effect on much of today's public key cryptography. This is especially true for key exchange protocols since they rely crucially on public-key algorithms. In this thesis, our focus in future-proofing key exchange protocols is two-fold. First, we focus on extending security models for key exchange protocols to capture the (un)expected break of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. The aim is to gain assurances with respect to future adversaries and to investigate the effects of primitive failures on key exchange protocols. More specifically, we explore how key exchange protocols can be safely transitioned to new, post-quantum secure algorithms with hybrid techniques. Hybrids combine classical and post-quantum algorithms such that the overall key agreement scheme remains secure as long as one of the two base schemes remains secure. For this, we introduce security notions for key encapsulation mechanisms that account for adversaries with varying levels of quantum capabilities and present three new constructions for hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms. Our hybrid designs are practice-inspired and for example capture draft proposals for hybrid modes in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which is one of the most widely-deployed cryptographic protocols that enables key agreement. Furthermore, our notion of breakdown resilience for key exchange protocols allows to gauge the security of past session keys in the event of a failure of a cryptographic component in the key exchange. We exercise our model on variants of the post-quantum secure key exchange protocol NewHope by Alkim et al. Thereby, we confirm the intuition that, in order to guard against adversaries that only have access to quantum computing power in the (more distant) future, it is sufficient to use classically-secure authentication mechanisms alongside post-quantum key agreement to achieve authenticated key exchange. As with any mathematical statement, theorems in the provable security paradigm are only as valid as the underlying assumptions. A careful consideration of any newly made assumption is thus essential to ensure the meaningfulness of the statement itself and make the assumption a viable tool for future analyses. Thus, secondly, we systematically classify the PRF-ODH assumption, a complexity-theoretic hardness assumption that has been used in key exchange security analyses of such prominent protocols as TLS, Signal, and Wireguard. In particular, we give a unified, parametrized definition of the assumption encompassing different variants that are present in the literature. We relate the resulting parametrized notions in terms of their strength and show where these assumptions fit in the collection of well-understood related hardness assumptions. We finally sketch our result on the impossibility of instantiating this assumption in the standard model, thereby disposing of the uncertainty in the community whether PRF-ODH is in fact a standard model assumption, i.e., removes the usage of some idealized assumptions in key exchange protocol proofs.
Authenticated key exchange protocols are ubiquitous in modern-day life. They are used to secure numerous types of data exchange, ranging from online banking to instant messaging conversations. In this thesis, we extend the state of the art for authenticated key exchange security, following the three themes of realistic, strong and provable. First, we tackle the theme of provable security. We develop generic techniques, applicable to a wide range of security models, to assist in proofs of security of cryptographic schemes. Specifically, a "game hopping" proof is a powerful technique to prove strong statements about the security of a protocol. However, the proof technique often involves esoteric and repetitive steps. We demystify the methodology and prove generic theorems to reduce the length and complexity of a wide class of game hopping proofs. Next, we use this new framework to analyse strong and previously unstudied formal security guarantees of authenticated key exchange protocols. These protocols are able to achieve strong security guarantees because they share and update state across sessions. Using our framework, we are able to push the state of the art by defying the folklore of what was previously thought provable of authenticated key exchange protocols. Specifically, it was previously thought that no protocol can achieve a security guarantee about communication with a peer if the peer was already fully compromised. We show that this is not true by formally defining a new concept, which we name post-compromise security. We capture an intuitive "self-healing" property of protocols. We then construct and formally prove protocols can achieve this strong security notion. Finally, we leverage all of this work to analyse realistic protocols. Signal, which is used to encrypt messages in WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and Google Allo amongst others, is one such protocol we consider. Despite being used by billions of people, Signal was completely unstudied in the academic literature prior to this work. Two reasons for this were that Signal had no documentation at the time and it did not fit into existing models: it shares state across sessions and has over ten different types of key, most of which continually update. Despite its complexity, we are able to use the other work in this thesis to give the first ever analysis and proof of security of Signal. Overall, this thesis aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice in the current state of the art of authenticated key exchange protocols.