Ever since it first appeared in 1935, the famous paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, questioning the completeness of quantum mechanics as a theory, has courted controversy. The initial arguments with Bohr have never been forgotten or gone away; the ideas of Bell have remained; many experiments have been performed purporting to support the stance of Bohr. More recently, however, an experiment performed by a group in Basel has questioned this accepted position and, theoretically, this new perspective has received support from at least two sources. It is the work behind these two sources, especially the second, together with the experimental work at Basel, which form the basis for this examination of the present position as far as this extremely important position for physical science is concerned. Needless to say, considering the views expressed in these two approaches, it is also necessary and appropriate to consider some possible consequences if this new view becomes accepted. Due to the fact that the recent support for the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen argument makes use of results in iso-mathematics, iso-mechanics and iso-chemistry, these possible consequences include the exact representation of nuclear data, the achievement of an attractive force between identical valence electrons with the ensuing exact representation of molecular data, the prediction of new clean energies and the prediction of the possible recycling of nuclear waste via stimulated decay—none of which is allowable utilising traditional quantum mechanics. Hence here, as well as discussing the resolution of the long standing issue provoked by the well-known Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen article, some of these consequences will be discussed with a view to provoking more general, open-minded discussion within the scientific community.
Abstract We argue that there is a temporal analogue of the open systems view expounded by Cuffaro and Hartmann (2024), suggesting that we should not think of the universe as breaking down into autonomous time-slices whose instantaneous evolution is always independent from events at other times. Employing the definitions proposed by Cuffaro and Hartmann, we argue that there are good reasons to think that the temporally open systems view should be regarded as ontically fundamental. We use the failure of narratability in quantum mechanics to demonstrate that generically, quantum histories cannot be decomposed into autonomous temporal slices; we discuss the status of temporal closure 39in several interpretations of quantum mechanics; and finally, we consider the consequences of the temporally open systems view for the question about whether the state of the universe as a whole is pure.