Abstract Elay Shech and John Earman have recently argued that the common topological interpretation of the Aharonov–Bohm (AB) effect is unsatisfactory because it fails to justify idealizations that it presupposes. In particular, they argue that an adequate account of the AB effect must address the role of boundary conditions in certain ideal cases of the effect. In this paper I defend the topological interpretation against their criticisms. I consider three types of idealization that might arise in treatments of the effect. First, Shech takes the AB effect to involve an idealization in the form of a singular limit, analogous to the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics. But, I argue, the AB effect itself features no singular limits, so it doesn’t involve idealizations in this sense. Second, I argue that Shech and Earman’s emphasis on the role of boundary conditions in the AB effect is misplaced. The idealizations that are useful in connecting the theoretical description of the AB effect to experiment do interact with facts about boundary conditions, but none of these idealizations are presupposed by the topological interpretation of the effect. Indeed, the boundary conditions for which Shech and demands justification are incompatible with some instances of the AB effect, so the topological interpretation ought not justify them. Finally, I address the role of the non-relativistic approximation usually presumed in discussions of the AB effect. This approximation is essential if—as the topological interpretation supposes—the AB effect constrains and justifies a relativistic theory of the electromagnetic interaction. In this case the ends justify the means. So the topological view presupposes no unjustified idealizations.
Abstract Elay Shech and John Earman have recently argued that the common topological interpretation of the Aharonov–Bohm (AB) effect is unsatisfactory because it fails to justify idealizations that it presupposes. In particular, they argue that an adequate account of the AB effect must address the role of boundary conditions in certain ideal cases of the effect. In this paper I defend the topological interpretation against their criticisms. I consider three types of idealization that might arise in treatments of the effect. First, Shech takes the AB effect to involve an idealization in the form of a singular limit, analogous to the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics. But, I argue, the AB effect itself features no singular limits, so it doesn’t involve idealizations in this sense. Second, I argue that Shech and Earman’s emphasis on the role of boundary conditions in the AB effect is misplaced. The idealizations that are useful in connecting the theoretical description of the AB effect to experiment do interact with facts about boundary conditions, but none of these idealizations are presupposed by the topological interpretation of the effect. Indeed, the boundary conditions for which Shech and demands justification are incompatible with some instances of the AB effect, so the topological interpretation ought not justify them. Finally, I address the role of the non-relativistic approximation usually presumed in discussions of the AB effect. This approximation is essential if—as the topological interpretation supposes—the AB effect constrains and justifies a relativistic theory of the electromagnetic interaction. In this case the ends justify the means. So the topological view presupposes no unjustified idealizations.
In this article, we start our discussion on the Aharonov-Bohm effect then raise a plausible interpretation within the quantum electrodynamics (QED) framework. We provide a quantum treatment of the source of the electromagnetic potential and argue that the underlying mechanism in AB effect can be viewed as interactions between electrons described by QED theory where the interactions are mediated by virtue photons. On further analysis, we claim that the framework of one particle quantum mechanics (OPQM) can be shown, in general, as a mathematically approximated model which can be reformulated from QED theory. In addition, the classical Maxwell equations are derived from QED scattering process while both classical electromagnetic fields and potentials serve as mathematical tools that are constructed to approximate the interactions among elementary particles described by QED physics, i.e. neither classical fields nor potentials represent any real entities of nature. At the conclusion of this article, we make a few remarks on the hypnosis of the existence of magnetic monopoles.
Aharonov–Bohm effect is a quantum mechanical phenomenon that attracted the attention of many physicists and mathematicians since the publication of the seminal paper of Aharonov and Bohm [1] in 1959. We consider different types of Aharonov–Bohm effects such as the magnetic AB effect, electric AB effect, combined electromagnetic AB effect, AB effect for the Schrödinger equations with Yang–Mills potentials, and the gravitational analog of AB effect. We shall describe different approaches to prove the AB effect based on the inverse scattering problems, the inverse boundary value problems in the presence of obstacles, spectral asymptotics, and the direct proofs of the AB effect.
Abstract: I address the view that the classical electromagnetic potentials are shown by the Aharonov–Bohm effect to be physically real (which I dub: ‘the potentials view’). I give a historico-philosophical presentation of this view and assess its prospects, more precisely than has so far been done in the literature. Taking the potential as physically real runs prima facie into ‘gauge-underdetermination’: different gauge choices represent different physical states of affairs and hence different theories. This fact is usually not acknowledged in the literature (or in classrooms), neither by proponents nor by opponents of the potentials view. I then illustrate this theme by what I take to be the basic insight of the AB effect for the potentials view, namely that the gauge equivalence class that directly corresponds to the electric and magnetic fields (which I call the Wide Equivalence Class) is too wide, i.e., the Narrow Equivalence Class encodes additional physical degrees of freedom: these only play a distinct role in a multiply-connected space. There is a trade-off between explanatory power and gauge symmetries. On the one hand, this narrower equivalence class gives a local explanation of the AB effect in the sense that the phase is incrementally picked up along the path of the electron. On the other hand, locality is not satisfied in the sense of signal locality, viz. the finite speed of propagation exhibited by electric and magnetic fields. It is therefore intellectually mandatory to seek desiderata that will distinguish even within these narrower equivalence classes, i.e. will prefer some elements of such an equivalence class over others. I consider various formulations of locality, such as Bell locality, local interaction Hamiltonians, and signal locality. I show that Bell locality can only be evaluated if one fixes the gauge freedom completely. Yet, an explanation in terms of signal locality can be accommodated by the Lorenz gauge: the potentials propagate in waves at finite speed. I therefore suggest the Lorenz gauge potentials theory—an even narrower gauge equivalence relation—as the ontology of electrodynamics.