The industrial demand on MACsec in Ethernet networks is increasing substantially, in particular for 5G networks, mainly due to its efficiency paired with strong security. MKA (MACsec Key Agreement) is a companion protocol of MACsec that provides methods of authentication and cryptographic key establishment. In this paper, the MACsec and MKA protocol are analysed under a quantum attack scenario. Even though the threat of quantum computers should not be overstated, it is necessary to provide a new countermeasure that is robust against this potential, yet critical risk. Symmetric-key crypto algorithms defined in MACsec and MKA can achieve 128-bit quantum security if 256-bit keys are mandated. However, classical public-key crypto schemes are known to be vulnerable to quantum attacks so that MKA protocol needs to support post-quantum public-key crypto schemes. We implemented a McEliece-based key establishment which is the most conservative post-quantum public-key cryptosystem with a large size of key, yet feasible for MKA. For entity authentication, we implemented a XMSS hash-based signature scheme that is standardised in IETF. We verified by experiments that selected schemes fit well for a MACsec-enabled Ethernet network.
The industrial demand on MACsec in Ethernet networks is increasing substantially, in particular for 5G networks, mainly due to its efficiency paired with strong security. MKA (MACsec Key Agreement) is a companion protocol of MACsec that provides methods of authentication and cryptographic key establishment. In this paper, the MACsec and MKA protocol are analysed under a quantum attack scenario. Even though the threat of quantum computers should not be overstated, it is necessary to provide a new countermeasure that is robust against this potential, yet critical risk. Symmetric-key crypto algorithms defined in MACsec and MKA can achieve 128-bit quantum security if 256-bit keys are mandated. However, classical public-key crypto schemes are known to be vulnerable to quantum attacks so that MKA protocol needs to support post-quantum public-key crypto schemes. We implemented a McEliece-based key establishment which is the most conservative post-quantum public-key cryptosystem with a large size of key, yet feasible for MKA. For entity authentication, we implemented a XMSS hash-based signature scheme that is standardised in IETF. We verified by experiments that selected schemes fit well for a MACsec-enabled Ethernet network.
The demand on MACsec in Ethernet is increasing substantially since MACsec fits well for industrial applications which require strong security as well as efficiency. To provide a long-term security, the MACsec protocol should be resistant to future attacks including quantum attacks. In this paper, MACsec is analysed under a quantum attack scenario. To achieve 128-bit quantum security, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithms defined in MACsec should mandate to use 256-bit keys. On the other hand, classical public-key cryptosystems in MKA are not secure at all against quantum attacks so that they need to be replaced by post-quantum crypto schemes in a quantum world. We propose an authenticated post-quantum key establishment protocol which is suitable for long-term secure MACsec. The proposed protocol is used in the hybrid mode, an ephemeral key exchange, and an end-to-end encryption. We verified by experiments that the proposed protocol can be deployed in existing a MACsec-enabled Ethernet network.
Security is crucial for wireless communication networks, especially as quantum computing advances rapidly. It won’t be long before quantum attacks become feasible, potentially crippling large wireless networks within minutes. Current methods for securing connections and transactions—such as keys, certificates, and data—could be compromised by quantum computers. One concern is the use of fake base stations with stronger signal strengths to lure users into connecting with them in wireless communication network. A quantum-powered attacker could easily break traditional encryption algorithms and launch various attacks almost instantly. An example of this is the "bidding down" attack, where an attacker convinces both the user and network entities that security features are not upheld, despite their actual presence. This type of attack exploits the security weaknesses of older mobile networks. This paper explores security advancements and challenges related to contemporary public key cryptography, including RSA algorithms based on factorization and discrete logarithm problems with Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC). While these methods provide adequate protection today, quantum computers could potentially break these algorithms or weaken cryptographic keys and hashes within minutes. Quantum cryptography, or quantum-resistant cryptography, objectives to develop algorithms and protocols resilient to quantum computing threats. This paper examines security vulnerabilities in wireless communication networks, focusing on key confirmation and authentication mechanisms. We propose a robust authentication and key agreement protocol for 5G networks using quantum-resistant cryptography. Our proposed protocol, verified with a verification tool, enhances the security of the authentication and key agreement procedures in wireless communication networks.
Abstract Media access control security (MACsec) is an IEEE 802.1AE standard for secure communication on Ethernet links. MACsec ensures the confidentiality, integrity and origin authenticity of Ethernet frames. The secrecy of MACsec stems from a root key that is either configured as a pre‐shared key or derived from a mutual authentication protocol. However, both methods are not ideal because such a root key may be disclosed due to human errors or broken by quantum attacks. Here, the authors investigate the quantum key distribution (QKD) as an alternative source of trust for MACsec. QKD can be used as either a root key provider or a session key generator. The authors develop a new key exchange protocol based on QKD for Ethernet networks. Furthermore, it is verified by the experiment that QKD could be well integrated into MACsec without performance degradation.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
Advancements in quantum computing pose a significant threat to most of the cryptography currently deployed in our communication networks. Fortunately, cryptographic building blocks to mitigate this threat are already available; mostly based on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), but also on symmetric cryptography techniques. Notably, those building blocks must be deployed as soon as possible in communication networks due to the “harvest-now decrypt-later” attack scenario, which is already challenging our sensitive and encrypted data today. Following an agile and defense-in-depth approach, Hybrid Authenticated Key-Exchange (HAKE) protocols have recently been gaining significant attention. Such protocols have the benefit of modularly combining classical (symmetric) cryptography, PQC, and QKD to achieve strong confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity guarantees for network channels. Unfortunately, only a few protocols have yet been proposed (mainly Muckle and Muckle+) with different flexibility guarantees. Looking at available standards in the network domain – especially at the Media Access Control Security (MACsec) standard – we believe that HAKE protocols could already bring strong security benefits to MACsec today. MACsec is a standard designed to secure communication at the data link layer in Ethernet networks by providing confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity for all traffic between trusted nodes. In addition, it establishes secure channels within a Local Area Network (LAN), ensuring that data remain protected from eavesdropping, tampering, and unauthorized access, while operating transparently to higher layer protocols. Currently, MACsec does not offer enough protection against the aforementioned threats. In this work, we tackle the challenge and propose a new versatile HAKE protocol, dubbed VMuckle, which is sufficiently flexible for use in MACsec. The use of VMuckle in MACsec provides LAN participants with quantum-safe hybrid key material to ensure secure communication even in the event of cryptographically relevant quantum computers.
Public-key cryptography (PKC) provides confidentiality, data integrity, and user authentication. Particularly, nonrepudiation, authentication and integrity of transmitted messages are assured by public-key (PK) signature schemes. Since the presence of a large scale quantum computer would be a real threat to break currently used PK cryptographic algorithms, all security protocols based on the PK cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to quantum-computer attacks. It needs to investigate possible alternatives, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), believed to be resistant to attacks from both classical and quantum computers. All the traditional PKC should be replaced with PQC for secure communications in post-quantum era. In this work, we evaluate the post-quantum signature schemes in terms of various metrics, performance, signature/key sizes, energy consumption, resistance to implementation attacks and adaptability to Internet protocols. We then investigate their suitability for Internet of Things based on these metrics.