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IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Treating Interference as Noise Is Optimal for Covert Communication Over Interference Channels

Kang-Hee Cho, Si-Hyeon Lee

Published Jul 30, 2020• 44 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We study the covert communication over K-user-pair discrete memoryless interference channels (DM-ICs) with a warden. It is assumed that the warden's channel output distribution induced by K “off” input symbols, which are sent when no communication occurs, is not a convex combination of those induced by any other combination of input symbols (otherwise, the square-root law does not hold). We derive the exact covert capacity region and show that a simple point-to-point based scheme with treating interference as noise is optimal. In addition, we analyze the secret key length required for the reliable and covert communication with the desired rates, and present a channel condition where a secret key between each user pair is unnecessary. The results are extended to the Gaussian case and the case with multiple wardens.

DOI
10.1109/tifs.2020.3013213

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IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)•Aug 1, 2019•17 citations
We study the covert communication over K-user-pair discrete memoryless interference channels (DM-ICs) with a warden. It is assumed that the warden's channel output distribution induced by K “off” input symbols, which are sent when no communication occurs, is not a convex combination of those induced by any other combination of input symbols (otherwise, the square-root law does not hold). We derive the exact covert capacity region and show that a simple point-to-point based scheme with treating interference as noise is optimal. In addition, we analyze the secret key length required for the reliable and covert communication with the desired rates, and present a channel condition where a secret key between each user pair is unnecessary. The results are extended to the Gaussian case and the case with multiple wardens.
In this paper, the covert communication scenario over K-user-pair discrete memoryless interference channels with a warden is studied. We assume that the wardens channel output distribution induced by K "off input symbols, which are sent when no communication occurs, is not a convex combination of those induced by any other combination of input symbols (otherwise, the square-root law does not hold). We derive the exact covert capacity region and show that a simple point-topoint based scheme with treating interference as noise is optimal. In addition, we analyze the secret key length required for the reliable and covert communication with the desired rates, and present a channel condition where the secret key between each user pair is unnecessary.
We consider a covert communication scenario where a transmitter wishes to communicate simultaneously to two legitimate receivers while ensuring that the communication is not detected by an adversary, the warden. The legitimate receivers and the adversary observe the transmission from the transmitter via a three-user discrete or Gaussian memoryless broadcast channel. We focus on the case where the “no-input” symbol is not redundant, i.e., the output distribution at the warden induced by the no-input symbol is not a mixture of the output distributions induced by other input symbols, so that the covert communication is governed by the square root law, i.e., at most Θ(√n) bits can be transmitted over n channel uses. We show that for such a setting, a simple time-division strategy achieves the optimal throughputs for a non-trivial class of broadcast channels; this is not true for communicating over broadcast channels without the covert communication constraint. Our result implies that a code that uses two separate optimal point-to-point codes each designed for the constituent channels and each used for a fraction of the time is optimal in the sense that it achieves the best constants of the √n-scaling for the throughputs. Our proof strategy combines several elements in the network information theory literature, including concave envelope representations of the capacity regions of broadcast channels and El Gamal's outer bound for more capable broadcast channels.
We consider the problem of covert communication when Channel State Information (CSI) is available non-causally, causally, and strictly causally at both transmitter and receiver, as well as the case when channel state information is only available at the transmitter. Covert communication with respect to an adversary referred to as the "warden", is one in which the distribution induced during communication at the channel output observed by the warden is identical to the output distribution conditioned on an innocent channel-input symbol. In contrast to previous work, we do not assume the availability of a shared key at the transmitter and legitimate receiver; instead shared randomness is extracted from the channel state, in a manner that keeps it secret from the warden despite the influence of the channel state on the warden's output. When CSI is available at both transmitter and receiver, we derive the covert capacity region; when CSI is only available at the transmitter, we derive inner and outer bounds on the covert capacity. We also derive the covert capacity when the warden's channel is less noisy with respect to the legitimate receiver. We provide examples for which covert capacity is zero without channel state information, but is positive in the presence of channel state information.
We consider a scenario in which K transmitters attempt to communicate covert messages reliably to a legitimate receiver over a discrete memoryless multiple-access channel (MAC) while simultaneously escaping detection from an adversary who observes their communication through another discrete memoryless MAC. We assume that each transmitter may use a secret key that is shared only between itself and the legitimate receiver. We show that each of the K transmitters can transmit on the order of √n reliable and covert bits per n channel uses, exceeding which, the warden will be able to detect the communication. We identify the optimal pre-constants of the scaling, which leads to a complete characterization of the covert capacity region of the K-user binary-input MAC. We show that, asymptotically, all sum-rate constraints are inactive unlike the traditional MAC capacity region. We also characterize the channel conditions that have to be satisfied for the transmitters to operate without a secret key.
We consider the problem of covert communication over a state-dependent channel when the Channel State Information (CSI) is available either non-causally, causally, or strictly causally, either at the transmitter alone, or at both transmitter and receiver. Covert communication with respect to an adversary, called “warden,” is one in which, despite communication over the channel, the warden’s observation remains indistinguishable from an output induced by innocent channel-input symbols. Covert communication involves fooling an adversary in part by a proliferation of codebooks; for reliable decoding at the legitimate receiver, the codebook uncertainty is typically removed via a shared secret key that is unavailable to the warden. In contrast to previous work, we do not assume the availability of a large shared key at the transmitter and legitimate receiver. Instead, we only require a secret key with negligible rate to bootstrap the communication and our scheme extracts shared randomness from the CSI in a manner that keeps it secret from the warden, despite the influence of the CSI on the warden’s output. When CSI is available at the transmitter and receiver, we derive the covert capacity region. When CSI is only available at the transmitter, we derive inner and outer bounds on the covert capacity. We also provide examples for which the covert capacity is positive with knowledge of CSI but is zero without it.
We consider the problem of covert communication over a state-dependent channel, for which the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have non-causal access to the channel state information. Covert communication with respect to an adversary, referred to as the “warden,” is one in which the distribution induced during communication at the channel output observed by the warden is identical to the output distribution conditioned on an inactive channel-input symbol. Covert communication involves fooling an adversary in part by a proliferation of codebooks; for reliable decoding at the legitimate receiver the codebook uncertainty is removed via a shared secret key that is unavailable to the warden. Unlike earlier work in state-dependent covert communication, we do not assume the availability of a shared key at the transmitter and legitimate receiver. Rather, a shared randomness is extracted at the transmitter and the receiver from the channel state, in a manner that keeps the shared randomness secret from the warden despite the influence of the channel state on the warden's output. An inner bound on the covert capacity, in the absence of an externally provided secret key, is derived.