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QBism: Subjective Probabilistic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Published Jul 22, 2020• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter is devoted to quantum Bayesianism (QBism), the subjective probability interpretation of QM. Creation of such an interpretation is an important step towards unification of applications of the mathematical formalism of QM to physical and to cognitive and sociopolitical systems. QBism can serve to couple the general theory of decision making based on subjective probability with quantum formalism. On the other hand, our quantum-like modeling of sociopolitical processes does not depend on interpretations of QM. Therefore, the reader need not read this chapter, which has a merely foundational value.

DOI
10.1201/9780367817206-11

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This chapter is devoted to quantum Bayesianism (QBism), the subjective probability interpretation of QM. Creation of such an interpretation is an important step towards unification of applications of the mathematical formalism of QM to physical and to cognitive and sociopolitical systems. QBism can serve to couple the general theory of decision making based on subjective probability with quantum formalism. On the other hand, our quantum-like modeling of sociopolitical processes does not depend on interpretations of QM. Therefore, the reader need not read this chapter, which has a merely foundational value.
We discuss the subjective probability interpretation of the quantum-like approach to decision making and more generally to cognition. Our aim is to adopt the subjective probability interpretation of quantum mechanics, quantum Bayesianism (QBism), to serve quantum-like modelling and applications of quantum probability outside of physics. We analyse the classical and quantum probabilistic schemes of probability update, learning and decision-making and emphasize the role of Jeffrey conditioning and its quantum generalizations. Classically, this type of conditioning and corresponding probability update is based on the formula of total probability-one the basic laws of classical probability theory.
The purpose of this book is to explain Quantum Bayesianism ('QBism') to "people without easy access to mathematical formulas and equations" (4-5). Qbism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that "doesn't meddle with the technical aspects of the theory [but instead] reinterprets the fundamental terms of the theory and gives them new meaning" (3). The most important motivation for QBism, enthusiastically stated on the book's cover, is that QBism provides "a way past quantum theory's paradoxes and puzzles" such that much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory "dissolves under the lens of QBism". Could a non-technical book that almost fits in your pocket really succeed in resolving the notorious paradoxes of quantum theory? I believe the answer is: not in this case. There are three primary reasons. Firstly, the argument that QBism solves quantum paradoxes is not convincing. Secondly, it proves difficult to pin down exactly what QBism says. Thirdly, as a scientific theory QBism seems explanatorily inert, which is maybe why the topic of scientific explanation is not broached. Sections 2-4 below discuss each of these problems in turn. However, there is still a wealth of insights that make this book a worthwhile read, and I shall begin with those.
Measured by the accuracy of its predictions and the scope of its technological applications, quantum mechanics is one of the most successful theories in science—as well as one of the most misunderstood. The deeper meaning of quantum mechanics remains controversial almost a century after its invention. Providing a way past quantum theory’s paradoxes and puzzles, QBism offers a strikingly new interpretation that opens up for the nonspecialist reader the profound implications of quantum mechanics for how we understand and interact with the world. Short for Quantum Bayesianism, QBism adapts many of the conventional features of quantum mechanics in light of a revised understanding of probability. Bayesian probability, unlike the standard “frequentist probability,” is defined as a numerical measure of the degree of an observer’s belief that a future event will occur or that a particular proposition is true. Bayesianism’s advantages over frequentist probability are that it is applicable to singular events, its probability estimates can be updated based on acquisition of new information, and it can effortlessly include frequentist results. But perhaps most important, much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory—the idea that an atom can be in two places at once, or that signals can travel faster than the speed of light, or that Schrödinger’s cat can be simultaneously dead and alive—dissolves under the lens of QBism. Using straightforward language without equations, Hans Christian von Baeyer clarifies the meaning of quantum mechanics in a commonsense way that suggests a new approach to physics in general.
Fuchs and Peres (2000) claimed that standard Quantum Mechanics needs no interpretation. In this essay, I show the flaws of the arguments presented in support to this thesis. Specifically, it will be claimed that the authors conflate QM with Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) - the most prominent subjective formulation of quantum theory; thus, they endorse a specific interpretation of the quantum formalism. Secondly, I will explain the main reasons for which QBism should not be considered a physical theory, being it concerned exclusively with agents' beliefs and silent about the physics of the quantum regime. Consequently, the solutions to the quantum puzzles provided by this approach cannot be satisfactory from a physical perspective. In the third place, I evaluate Fuchs and Peres arguments contra the non-standard interpretations of QM, showing again the fragility of their claims. Finally, it will be stressed the importance of the interpretational work in the context of quantum theory.
QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.