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a Lorentz Invariant, Microphysical Theory of Wave - Collapse

Edward J. Gillis

Published Jan 1, 1990• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

On Substantive Lorentz Invariance and Quantum Theory

Ward Struyve

Lorentz invariance is considered a fundamental property of relativistic quantum theory. However, in standard quantum theory this invariance is only partially realized: while relativistic wave equations like the Dirac equation are Lorentz invariant, the collapse postulate is not. In the non-relativistic domain, alternative theories have been formulated, like Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories, which dispense with the problematic collapse postulate. Extending these theories to the relativistic domain appears challenging, particularly with respect to implementing Lorentz invariance, mainly due to the unavoidable non-locality implied by Bell’s theorem. However, space-time theories can also trivially be formulated in a Lorentz-invariant way. If Lorentz invariance is to impose a genuine constraint on the content of a physical theory, one should aim for what can be called substantive Lorentz invariance. However, articulating a precise definition of this notion is notoriously difficult. This paper investigates two candidate criteria: Anderson’s criterion based on the identification of absolute objects, and a relativity principle for isolated subsystems. These criteria are applied to evaluate several Lorentz-invariant Bohmian models, a spontaneous collapse model, and a version of the Many-Worlds theory. With the exception of two Bohmian approaches, these models satisfy both criteria. Nevertheless, some Bohmian models that meet these conditions still do not appear to be substantively Lorentz-invariant, suggesting that the proposed criteria may not fully capture the intended concept. Nevertheless, they help clarify what aspects of relativity theory may need to be given up in passing from classical to quantum theory.

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Points of View

Tim Maudlin

This chapter contains section titled: Galilean Transformations and Galilean Invariants A Brief Preliminary: Why Worry? Lorentz Invariance: Collapse Theories Lorentz Invariance: Hyperplane Dependence Lorentz Invariance: Non-collapse Theories Choose Your Poison

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Wave Mechanics and Relativity

Georges Lochak, Regis Dutheil

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1992•2 citations

The Quantum Wave Theory of Relativity

Jason cole

•Feb 1, 2016•0 citations

Points of View

Tim Maudlin

This chapter contains sections titled: Galilean Transformations and Galilean Invariants A Brief Preliminary: Why Worry? Lorentz Invariance: Collapse Theories Lorentz Invariance: Hyperplane Dependence Lorentz Invariance: Non-Collapse Theories Choose Your Poison

Wiley eBooks•Apr 8, 2011•0 citations
Lorentz invariance is considered a fundamental property of relativistic quantum theory. However, in standard quantum theory this invariance is only partially realized: while relativistic wave equations like the Dirac equation are Lorentz invariant, the collapse postulate is not. In the non-relativistic domain, alternative theories have been formulated, like Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories, which dispense with the problematic collapse postulate. Extending these theories to the relativistic domain appears challenging, particularly with respect to implementing Lorentz invariance, mainly due to the unavoidable non-locality implied by Bell’s theorem. However, space-time theories can also trivially be formulated in a Lorentz-invariant way. If Lorentz invariance is to impose a genuine constraint on the content of a physical theory, one should aim for what can be called substantive Lorentz invariance. However, articulating a precise definition of this notion is notoriously difficult. This paper investigates two candidate criteria: Anderson’s criterion based on the identification of absolute objects, and a relativity principle for isolated subsystems. These criteria are applied to evaluate several Lorentz-invariant Bohmian models, a spontaneous collapse model, and a version of the Many-Worlds theory. With the exception of two Bohmian approaches, these models satisfy both criteria. Nevertheless, some Bohmian models that meet these conditions still do not appear to be substantively Lorentz-invariant, suggesting that the proposed criteria may not fully capture the intended concept. Nevertheless, they help clarify what aspects of relativity theory may need to be given up in passing from classical to quantum theory.