Recently there has been a huge emphasis on constructing cryptographic protocols that maintain their security guarantees even in the presence of side channel attacks. Such attacks exploit the physical characteristics of a cryptographic device to learn useful information about the internal state of the device. Designing protocols that deliver meaningful security even in the presence of such leakage attacks is a challenging task. The recent work of Garg, Jain, and Sahai formulates a meaningful notion of zero-knowledge in presence of leakage; and provides a construction which satisfies a weaker variant of this notion called (1 + ɛ)-leakage-resilient-zero-knowledge, for every constant ɛ> 0. In this weaker variant, roughly speaking, if the verifier learns ℓ bits of leakage during the interaction, then the simulator is allowed to access (1 + ɛ) · ℓ bits of leakage. The round complexity of their protocol is ⌈ n ɛ ⌉. In this work, we present the first construction of leakage-resilient zero-knowledge satisfying the ideal requirement of ɛ = 0. While our focus is on a feasibility result for ɛ = 0, our construction also enjoys a constant number of rounds. At the heart of our construction is a new “public-coin preamble ” which allows the simulator to recover arbitrary information from a (cheating) verifier in a “straight line. ” We use non-black-box simulation techniques to accomplish this goal. 1
Recently there has been a huge emphasis on constructing cryptographic protocols that maintain their security guarantees even in the presence of side channel attacks. Such attacks exploit the physical characteristics of a cryptographic device to learn useful information about the internal state of the device. Designing protocols that deliver meaningful security even in the presence of such leakage attacks is a challenging task. The recent work of Garg, Jain, and Sahai formulates a meaningful notion of zero-knowledge in presence of leakage; and provides a construction which satisfies a weaker variant of this notion called (1 + ɛ)-leakage-resilient-zero-knowledge, for every constant ɛ> 0. In this weaker variant, roughly speaking, if the verifier learns ℓ bits of leakage during the interaction, then the simulator is allowed to access (1 + ɛ) · ℓ bits of leakage. The round complexity of their protocol is ⌈ n ɛ ⌉. In this work, we present the first construction of leakage-resilient zero-knowledge satisfying the ideal requirement of ɛ = 0. While our focus is on a feasibility result for ɛ = 0, our construction also enjoys a constant number of rounds. At the heart of our construction is a new “public-coin preamble ” which allows the simulator to recover arbitrary information from a (cheating) verifier in a “straight line. ” We use non-black-box simulation techniques to accomplish this goal. 1
Abstract Leakage-resilient cryptography aims to protect cryptographic primitives from so-called “side channel attacks” that exploit their physical implementation to learn their input or secret state. Starting from the works of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner (CRYPTO‘03) and Micali and Reyzin (TCC‘04), most works on leakage-resilient cryptography either focus on protecting general computations, such as circuits or multiparty computation protocols, or on specific non-interactive primitives such as storage, encryption, and signatures. This work focuses on leakage resilience for the middle ground, namely for distributed and interactive cryptographic primitives. Our main technical contribution is designing the first secret sharing scheme that is equivocal, resists adaptive probing of a constant fraction of bits from each share, while incurs only a constant blowup in share size. Equivocation is a strong leakage-resilience guarantee, recently introduced by Hazay et al. (ITC, 2021). Our construction is obtained via a general compiler which we introduce, that transforms any secret sharing scheme into an equivocal scheme against adaptive leakage. An attractive feature of our compiler is that it respects additive reconstruction; namely, if the original scheme has additive reconstruction, then the transformed scheme has linear reconstruction. We extend our compiler to a general paradigm for protecting distributed primitives against leakage and show its applicability to various primitives, including secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, function secret sharing, distributed encryption and signatures, and distributed zero-knowledge proofs. For each of these primitives, our paradigm transforms any construction of the primitive into a scheme that resists adaptive party corruptions, as well as adaptive probing leakage of a constant fraction of bits in each share when the share is stored in memory (but not when it is used in computations). Moreover, the transformation incurs only a constant blowup in the share size and respects additive reconstruction—an important feature for several of these primitives, such as function secret sharing and distributed encryption.
A fundamental question in cryptography deals with understanding the role that randomness plays in cryptographic protocols and to what extent it is necessary. One particular line of works was initiated by Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (STOC 2000) who introduced the notion of resettable zero-knowledge, where the protocol must be zeroknowledge even if a cheating verifier can reset the prover and have several interactions in which the prover uses the same random tape. Soon afterwards, Barak, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Lindell (FOCS 2001) studied the setting where the verifier uses a fixed random tape in multiple interactions. Subsequent to these works, a number of papers studied the notion of resettable protocols in the setting where only one of the participating parties uses a fixed random tape multiple times. The notion of resettable security has been studied in two main models: the plain model and the bare public key model (also introduced in the above paper by Canetti et. al.). In a recent work, Deng, Goyal and Sahai (FOCS 2009) gave the first construction of a simultaneous resettable zero-knowledge protocol where both participants of the protocol can reuse a fixed random tape in any (polynomial) number of executions. Their construction however required O(nɛ) rounds of interaction between the prover and the verifier. Both in the plain as well as the BPK model, this construction remain the only known simultaneous resettable zero-knowledge protocols. In this work, we study the question of round complexity of simultaneous resettable zeroknowledge in the BPK model. We present a constant round protocol in such a setting based on standard cryptographic assumptions. Our techniques are significantly different from the ones used by Deng, Goyal and Sahai. 1
Leakage-resilient cryptography aims to protect cryptographic primitives from so-called "side channel attacks" that exploit their physical implementation to learn their input or secret state. Starting from the works of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner (CRYPTO`03) and Micali and Reyzin (TCC`04), most works on leakage-resilient cryptography either focus on protecting general computations, such as circuits or multiparty computation protocols, or on specific non-interactive primitives such as storage, encryption and signatures. This work focuses on leakage-resilience for the middle ground, namely for distributed and interactive cryptographic primitives. Our main technical contribution is designing the first secret-sharing scheme that is equivocal, resists adaptive probing of a constant fraction of bits from each share, while incurring only a constant blowup in share size. Equivocation is a strong leakage-resilience guarantee, recently introduced by Hazay et al. (ITC`21). Our construction is obtained via a general compiler which we introduce, that transforms any secret-sharing scheme into an equivocal scheme against adaptive leakage. An attractive feature of our compiler is that it respects additive reconstruction, namely, if the original scheme has additive reconstruction, then the transformed scheme has linear reconstruction. We extend our compiler to a general paradigm for protecting distributed primitives against leakage, and show its applicability to various primitives, including secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, function secret sharing, distributed encryption and signatures, and distributed zero-knowledge proofs. For each of these primitives, our paradigm transforms any construction of the primitive into a scheme that resists adaptive party corruptions, as well as adaptive probing leakage of a constant fraction of bits in each share when the share is stored in memory (but not when it is used in computations). Moreover, the transformation incurs only a constant blowup in the share size, and respects additive reconstruction - an important feature for several of these primitives, such as function secret sharing and distributed encryption.
In this work, we show how to use the positive results on succinct argument systems to prove impossibility results on leakage-resilient black-box zero knowledge. This recently proposed notion of zero knowledge deals with an adversary that can make leakage queries on the state of the prover. Our result holds for black-box simulation only and we also give some insights on the non-black-box case. Additionally, we show that, for several functionalities, leakage-resilient multi-party computation is impossible (regardless of the number of players and even if just one player is corrupted). More in details, we achieve the above results by extending a technique of [Nielsen, Venturi, Zottarel – PKC 13] to prove lower bounds for leakage-resilient security. Indeed, we use leakage queries to run an execution of a communication-efficient protocol in the head of the adversary. Moreover, to defeat the black-box simulator we connect the above technique for leakage resilience to security against reset attacks. Our results show that the open problem of [Ananth, Goyal, Pandey – Crypto 14] (i.e., continual leakage-resilient proofs without a common reference string) has a negative answer when security through black-box simulation is desired. Moreover our results close the open problem of [Boyle et al. – STOC 12] for the case of black-box simulation (i.e., the possibility of continual leakage-resilient secure computation without a leak-free interactive preprocessing).
In this work, we consider the long-standing open question of constructing constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols in the plain model. Resolving this question is known to require non-black-box techniques. We consider non-black-box techniques for zero-knowledge based on knowledge assumptions, a line of thinking initiated by the work of Hada and Tanaka (CRYPTO 1998). Prior to our work, it was not known whether knowledge assumptions could be used for achieving security in the concurrent setting, due to a number of significant limitations that we discuss here. Nevertheless, we obtain the following results: 1. We obtain the first constant round concurrent zero-knowledge argument for \textbf{NP} in the plain model based on a new variant of knowledge of exponent assumption. Furthermore, our construction avoids the inefficiency inherent in previous non-black-box techniques such that those of Barak (FOCS 2001); we obtain our result through an efficient protocol compiler. 2. Unlike Hada and Tanaka, we do not require a knowledge assumption to argue the soundness of our protocol. Instead, we use a discrete log like assumption, which we call Diffie-Hellman Logarithm Assumption, to prove the soundness of our protocol. 3. We give evidence that our new variant of knowledge of exponent assumption is in fact plausible. In particular, we show that our assumption holds in the generic group model. 4. Knowledge assumptions are especially delicate assumptions whose plausibility may be hard to gauge. We give a novel framework to express knowledge assumptions in a more flexible way, which may allow for formulation of plausible assumptions and exploration of their impact and application in cryptography.
We propose the first black-box construction of non-malleable commitments according to the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. Our construction additionally only requires a constant number of rounds and is based only on (black-box use of) one-way functions. Prior to our work, no black-box construction of non-malleable commitments was known (except for relaxed notions of security) in any (polynomial) number of rounds based on any cryptographic assumption. This closes the wide gap existent between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitments. Our construction relies on (and can be seen as a generalization of) the recent non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal (STOC 2011). We also show how to get black-box constructions for a host of other cryptographic primitives. We extend our construction to get constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitments, constant-round multi-party coin tossing, and non-malleable statistically hiding commitments (satisfying the notion of non-malleability with respect to opening). All of the mentioned results make only a black-box use of one-way functions. Our primary technical contribution is a novel way of implementing the proof of consistency typically required in the constructions of non-malleable commitments (and other related primitives). We do this by relying on ideas from the ``zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation" paradigm of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). We extend in a novel way this ``computation in the head" paradigm (which can be though of as bringing powerful error-correcting codes into purely computational setting). To construct a non-malleable commitment scheme, we apply our computation in the head techniques to the recent (constant-round) construction of Goyal. Along the way, we also present a simplification of the construction of Goyal where a part of the protocol is implemented in an information theoretic manner. Such a simplification is crucial for getting a black-box construction. This is done by making use of pair wise-independent hash functions and strong randomness extractors. We show that our techniques have multiple applications, as elaborated in the paper. Hence, we believe our techniques might be useful in other settings in future.