Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is an important class of public key encryption but the existing schemes are secure only under the premise that the decryption key (or private key) and master secret key are absolutely secret. In fact, a lot of side channel attacks and cold boot attacks can leak secret information of a cryptographic system. In this case, the security of the cryptographic system is destroyed, so a new model called leakage-resilient (LR) cryptography is introduced to solve this problem. While some traditional public key encryption and identity-based encryption with resilient-leakage schemes have been constructed, as far as we know, there is no leakage-resilient scheme in certificate-based cryptosystems. This paper puts forward the first certificate-based encryption scheme which can resist not only the decryption key leakage but also the master secret key leakage. Based on composite order bilinear group assumption, the security of the scheme is proved by using dual system encryption. The relative leakage rate of key is close to 1/3.
Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is an important class of public key encryption but the existing schemes are secure only under the premise that the decryption key (or private key) and master secret key are absolutely secret. In fact, a lot of side channel attacks and cold boot attacks can leak secret information of a cryptographic system. In this case, the security of the cryptographic system is destroyed, so a new model called leakage-resilient (LR) cryptography is introduced to solve this problem. While some traditional public key encryption and identity-based encryption with resilient-leakage schemes have been constructed, as far as we know, there is no leakage-resilient scheme in certificate-based cryptosystems. This paper puts forward the first certificate-based encryption scheme which can resist not only the decryption key leakage but also the master secret key leakage. Based on composite order bilinear group assumption, the security of the scheme is proved by using dual system encryption. The relative leakage rate of key is close to 1/3.
Certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC) removes the problem of certificate management in traditional public key systems and avoids the key escrow problem in identity-based public key systems. In the past, many authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols based on CB-PKC systems, called CB-AKE, were proposed to be applied to secure communications between two remote participants. However, these existing CB-AKE protocols become insecure since attackers could compute and obtain the whole secret key from some partial leaked information of the secret key by side channel attacks. In this paper, our goal is to propose thefirstCB-AKE protocol with the property to resist side channel attacks, called leakage-resilient CB-AKE (LR-CB-AKE). The proposed LR-CB-AKE protocol is formally proven to be secure in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model under the discrete logarithm (DL) and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumptions.
Hierarchical identity-based encryption can be used to protect the sensitive data in cloud system. However, as the traditional security model does not capture side-channel attacks, many hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes do not resist this kind of attack, which can exploit various forms of unintended information leakage. Inspired by these, leakage-resilience cryptography formalises some models of side-channel attacks. In this paper, we consider the memory leakage resilience in anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes. By applying Lewko et al.'s tools, we construct a master key leakage-resilient anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme based on dual system encryption techniques. As an interesting application of our scheme, we consider security for public-key encryption with multi-keyword ranked search (PEMKRS) in the presence of secret key leakage in the trapdoor generation algorithm, and provide a generic construction of leakage-resilient secure PEMKRS from a master key leakage-resilient anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side-channel attacks. Leakage-resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA-secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage-resilient IBE scheme in the bounded-leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al. 's leakage-resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage-resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent ( |q| -TABDHE) assumption.
Abstract In the actual applications, an adversary can break the security of cryptography scheme through various leakage attacks (e.g. side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.), even the continuous leakage attacks. That is, a practical cryptography scheme must maintain its claimed security in the continuous leakage setting. However, the previous constructions on the leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme could tolerate a leakage that is bounded, and cannot resist the continuous leakage attacks. In order to further achieve the better security, a novel method to build the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme with tight security is presented in this paper, and the scheme’s security is proved, in the standard model, based on a stronger security assumption that depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. In addition, our proposal has several advantages over previous such constructions, e.g. shorter public parameters, higher communication efficiency, tight security, etc.
With the purpose of taking physical attacks into account in security proofs, leakage-resilient cryptography has been initiated. Recently, many leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed. In this paper, we put forward the first leakage-resilient wicked identity-based encryption (wicked IBE) scheme. To achieve this goal, we first present a new wicked IBE scheme in the composite order groups. The security proof of this scheme is achieved via the dual system encryption technique. In contrast with existing wicked IBE schemes, the new proposal can be proved fully secure in the standard model, even when the maximum hierarchy depth is a polynomial in the security parameter. Moreover, its security is based on some standard assumptions in the composite groups, which are independent of the hierarchy depth of the scheme. Based on this newly proposed scheme, we then put forward a fully secure leakage-resilient wicked IBE scheme in the bounded memory-leakage model. The leakage here is not only allowed on the user's secret key, but also on the master secret key. Its security is proved in the standard model by a hybrid argument in a sequence of computationally indistinguishable games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first wicked IBE scheme in the context of leakage resilience.
In public-key cryptography (PKC), a signcryption (SC) scheme is a significant primitive by combining both signature and encryption functionalities in one scheme while reducing computing time. Most SC schemes are based on single PKC setting, such as public-key infrastructure PKC (PKI-PKC), identity-based PKC (ID-PKC), certificate-based PKC (CB-PKC), and certificateless PKC (CL-PKC). For providing practical usage, numerous hybrid SC (HSC) schemes were also presented to suit for the sense that a sender and a recipient belong to different PKC settings (i.e., heterogeneous PKC settings). Recently, side-channel attacks have been realized to endanger the existing SC and HSC schemes. Indeed, the research of leakage-resilient cryptography resistant to side-channel attacks have attracted the attention of researchers. Indeed, several SC schemes with leakage resilience (SC-LR) based on single PKC setting have been proposed. However, little research focuses on HSC scheme with leakage-resilience (HSC-LR). Therefore, this paper aims to design the first HSC-LR from senders under a CB-PKC setting to recipients under a PKI-PKC setting, called as the HSC-LR-CBPKI scheme. We formally define a new framework and two security games of the HSC-LR-CBPKI scheme. Two security theorems are proved that the HSC-LR-CBPKI scheme possesses both signature and encryption functionalities (including unforgeability and confidentiality) under side-channel attacks. Finally, the proposed scheme is very efficient by performance analysis.