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Semantically Secure Functional Encryption, Revisited.

Manuel Barbosa, Pooya Farshim

Published Jan 1, 2012• 1 citation
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Abstract. Functional encryption (FE) is a powerful cryptographic primitive that generalizes many asymmetric encryption systems proposed in recent years. Syntax and security definitions for general FE were recently proposed by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters (BSW) (TCC 2011) and independently by O’Neill (ePrint 2010/556). In this paper we revisit these definitions, identify several shortcomings in them, and propose a new definitional approach that overcomes these limitations. Our definitions display good compositionality properties and allow us to obtain new feasibility and impossibility results for adaptive token-extraction attack scenarios that shed further light on the potential reach of general FE for practical applications. The main contributions of the paper are the following: – We show that the BSW definition of semantic security fails to reject intuitively insecure FE schemes where a ciphertext leaks more about an encrypted message than that which can be recovered from an image under the supported functionality. Our definition (as O’Neill’s) does not suffer from this problem. – We introduce an orthogonal notion of setup security that rejects all FE schemes where the master secret key may give unwanted power to the TA, allowing the recovery of extra information from images under the supported functionality. We prove FE schemes supporting all-or-nothing functionalities are intrinsically setup-secure and further show that many well-known functionalities are all-or-nothing.

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Revocation functionality is necessary and crucial to identity-based cryptosystems. Revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) has attracted a lot of attention in recent years, many RIBE schemes have been proposed in the literature but shown to be either insecure or inefficient. In this paper, we propose a new scalable RIBE scheme with decryption key exposure resilience by combining Lewko and Waters' identity-based encryption scheme and complete subtree method, and prove our RIBE scheme to be semantically secure using dual system encryption methodology. Compared to existing scalable and semantically secure RIBE schemes, our proposed RIBE scheme is more efficient in term of ciphertext size, public parameters size and decryption cost at price of a little looser security reduction. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first construction of scalable and semantically secure RIBE scheme with constant size public system parameters.