Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Stronger Security Model of Group Key Agreement.

Jianjie Zhao, Dawu Gu, M. Choudary Gorantla

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract. In PKC 2009, Gorantla, Boyd and González Nieto presented a nice result on modelling security for group key agreement (GKA) protocols. They proposed a novel security model (GBG model) that better supports the adversaries ’ queries than previous models for GKA protocols by considering KCI resilience. However, ephemeral key leakage attack resistance has been left outside the scope of the GBG model. In this paper, we demonstrate an ephemeral key leakage on an existing GKA protocol which has been shown secure in the GBG model. We then extend the GBG model by allowing the adversary greater attack powers of leaking ephemeral keys in GKA protocol session. We also apply the well known NAXOS trick to propose an improvement to an existing GKA protocol, which can resist the ephemeral key leakage attack. The security of the improved protocol has been argued under the our new model.

Related papers

Stronger security model of group key agreement

Jianjie Zhao, Dawu Gu, M. Choudary Gorantla

In PKC 2009, Gorantla, Boyd and González Nieto presented a nice result on modelling security for group key agreement (GKA) protocols. They proposed a novel security model (GBG model) that better supports the adversaries' queries than previous models for GKA protocols by considering KCI resilience. However, ephemeral key leakage attack resistance has been left outside the scope of the GBG model. In this paper, we demonstrate an ephemeral key leakage on an existing GKA protocol which has been shown secure in the GBG model. We then extend the GBG model by allowing the adversary greater attack powers of leaking ephemeral keys in GKA protocol session. We also apply the well known NAX-OS trick to propose an improvement to an existing GKA protocol, which can resist the ephemeral key leakage attack. The security of the improved protocol has been argued under the our new model.

ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)•Mar 22, 2011•18 citations

A Two-Round Group Key Agreement Protocol from RLWE in the Extended GBG Model

Ziqing Wang, Fagen Li

Group key agreement (GKA) is an widely used cryptographic tool that allows a group to share a common session key and establish a secure channel within their group. To resist quantum attacks, some GKA protocols are constructed based on lattice problem. However, the known lattice-based GKA protocols doesn't consider the ephemeral key leakage attack. If a user leaks his ephemeral key that used to establish a session key, adversaries may break the security of this session. In this work, we proposed a two-round GKA protocol based on RLWE that achieves the resistance of quantum attack. The proposed GKA protocol also achieves authenticated key exchange (AKE) security under the extended GBG model, which means that it is still secure if the ephemeral keys of users are revealed.

International Conference on Computer and Communication Systems (ICCCS)•Apr 18, 2025•0 citations

Session-state Reveal is stronger than Ephemeral Key Reveal: Attacking the NAXOS Authenticated Key Exchange protocol.

Cas J. F. Cremers

Abstract. In the paper “Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Ex-change ” [1,2], a new security model for authenticated key exchange pro-tocols (eCK) is proposed. The new model is suggested to be at least as strong as previous models for key exchange protocols. The model in-cludes a new notion of an Ephemeral Key Reveal adversary query, which is claimed in e. g. [2–4] to be at least as strong as the Session-state Reveal query. We show that Session-state Reveal is stronger than Ephemeral Key Reveal, implying that the eCK security model is incomparable to the CK model [5, 6]. In particular we show that the proposed NAXOS protocol from [1, 2] does not meet its security requirements if the Session-state Reveal query is allowed in the eCK model. We discuss the implications of our result for some related protocols proven correct in the eCK model, and discuss the interaction between Session-state Reveal and protocol transformations.

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

Modelling After-the-fact Leakage for Key Exchange (full version)

Janaka Alawatugoda, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after the session key is established. We introduce a generic key exchange security model, which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem.

•Jan 1, 2014•2 citations

Modelling after-the-fact leakage for key exchange

Janaka Alawatugoda, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after the session key is established. We introduce a generic key exchange security model, which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem.

ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)•May 30, 2014•45 citations

Forward Secure ID-Based Group Key Agreement Protocol with Anonymity

Hyewon Park, Zeen Kim, Kwangjo Kim

ID-based group key agreement (GKA) has been increasingly researched with the advantage of simple public key management. However, identities of group members can be exposed in the ID-based GKA protocol, so eavesdroppers can easily learn who belongs to the specific group. Recently, Wan et al. proposed a solution for this problem, an anonymous ID-based GKA protocol, which can keep group memberspsila anonymity to outside eavesdroppers; nevertheless, the protocol has some security flaws. This paper shows that Wan et al.psilas GKA is insecure against colluding attack and their joining/leaving protocols do not guarantee forward and backward secrecy. We also propose a new forward secure ID-based GKA with anonymity from enhancing Wan et al.psilas joining/leaving protocols. Our scheme provides forward and backward secrecy and is essentially just efficient as Wan et al.psilas scheme.

International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies•Jan 1, 2009•5 citations
Abstract. In PKC 2009, Gorantla, Boyd and González Nieto presented a nice result on modelling security for group key agreement (GKA) protocols. They proposed a novel security model (GBG model) that better supports the adversaries ’ queries than previous models for GKA protocols by considering KCI resilience. However, ephemeral key leakage attack resistance has been left outside the scope of the GBG model. In this paper, we demonstrate an ephemeral key leakage on an existing GKA protocol which has been shown secure in the GBG model. We then extend the GBG model by allowing the adversary greater attack powers of leaking ephemeral keys in GKA protocol session. We also apply the well known NAXOS trick to propose an improvement to an existing GKA protocol, which can resist the ephemeral key leakage attack. The security of the improved protocol has been argued under the our new model.
In PKC 2009, Gorantla, Boyd and González Nieto presented a nice result on modelling security for group key agreement (GKA) protocols. They proposed a novel security model (GBG model) that better supports the adversaries' queries than previous models for GKA protocols by considering KCI resilience. However, ephemeral key leakage attack resistance has been left outside the scope of the GBG model. In this paper, we demonstrate an ephemeral key leakage on an existing GKA protocol which has been shown secure in the GBG model. We then extend the GBG model by allowing the adversary greater attack powers of leaking ephemeral keys in GKA protocol session. We also apply the well known NAX-OS trick to propose an improvement to an existing GKA protocol, which can resist the ephemeral key leakage attack. The security of the improved protocol has been argued under the our new model.
Group key agreement (GKA) is an widely used cryptographic tool that allows a group to share a common session key and establish a secure channel within their group. To resist quantum attacks, some GKA protocols are constructed based on lattice problem. However, the known lattice-based GKA protocols doesn't consider the ephemeral key leakage attack. If a user leaks his ephemeral key that used to establish a session key, adversaries may break the security of this session. In this work, we proposed a two-round GKA protocol based on RLWE that achieves the resistance of quantum attack. The proposed GKA protocol also achieves authenticated key exchange (AKE) security under the extended GBG model, which means that it is still secure if the ephemeral keys of users are revealed.
Abstract. In the paper “Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Ex-change ” [1,2], a new security model for authenticated key exchange pro-tocols (eCK) is proposed. The new model is suggested to be at least as strong as previous models for key exchange protocols. The model in-cludes a new notion of an Ephemeral Key Reveal adversary query, which is claimed in e. g. [2–4] to be at least as strong as the Session-state Reveal query. We show that Session-state Reveal is stronger than Ephemeral Key Reveal, implying that the eCK security model is incomparable to the CK model [5, 6]. In particular we show that the proposed NAXOS protocol from [1, 2] does not meet its security requirements if the Session-state Reveal query is allowed in the eCK model. We discuss the implications of our result for some related protocols proven correct in the eCK model, and discuss the interaction between Session-state Reveal and protocol transformations.
Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after the session key is established. We introduce a generic key exchange security model, which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem.
Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after the session key is established. We introduce a generic key exchange security model, which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem.
ID-based group key agreement (GKA) has been increasingly researched with the advantage of simple public key management. However, identities of group members can be exposed in the ID-based GKA protocol, so eavesdroppers can easily learn who belongs to the specific group. Recently, Wan et al. proposed a solution for this problem, an anonymous ID-based GKA protocol, which can keep group memberspsila anonymity to outside eavesdroppers; nevertheless, the protocol has some security flaws. This paper shows that Wan et al.psilas GKA is insecure against colluding attack and their joining/leaving protocols do not guarantee forward and backward secrecy. We also propose a new forward secure ID-based GKA with anonymity from enhancing Wan et al.psilas joining/leaving protocols. Our scheme provides forward and backward secrecy and is essentially just efficient as Wan et al.psilas scheme.