Abstract. In this paper we give the minimal connectivity required in a synchronous directed network, which is under the influence of a computationally unbounded Byzantine adversary that can corrupt a subset of nodes, so that Secure Message Transmission is possible between sender S and receiver R. We also show that secure communication between a pair of nodes in a given synchronous directed network is possible in both directions if and only if reliable communication is possible between them. We assume that in a network, every node is capable of computation and we model the network along the lines of [14].
Abstract. In this paper we give the minimal connectivity required in a synchronous directed network, which is under the influence of a computationally unbounded Byzantine adversary that can corrupt a subset of nodes, so that Secure Message Transmission is possible between sender S and receiver R. We also show that secure communication between a pair of nodes in a given synchronous directed network is possible in both directions if and only if reliable communication is possible between them. We assume that in a network, every node is capable of computation and we model the network along the lines of [14].
In this paper, we re-visit the problem of unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) from a sender S to a receiver R, who are part of a distributed synchronous network, modeled as an arbitrary directed graph. Some of the intermediate nodes between S and R can be under the control of an adversary having unbounded computing power. Desmedt and Wang [4] have given the characterization of USMT in directed networks. However, in their model, the underlying network is abstracted as directed node disjoint paths (also called as wires/channels) between S and R, where the intermediate nodes are oblivious, message passing nodes and perform no other computation. In this work, we first show that the characterization of USMT given by Desmedt et.al [4] does not hold good for arbitrary directed networks, where the intermediate nodes can perform some computation, beside acting as message forwarding nodes. We then give the characterization of USMT in arbitrary directed networks, considering the entire network as a whole. As far our knowledge is concerned, this is the first ever characterization of USMT in arbitrary directed networks.
We study the interplay of network connectivity and the issues related to the 'possibility', 'feasibility' and 'optimality' for unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) and unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) in an undirected synchronous network, under the influence of an adaptive mixed adversary having unbounded computing power, who can corrupt some of the nodes in the network in Byzantine, omission, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively. We consider two types of adversary, namely threshold and non-threshold. One of the important conclusions we arrive at from our study is that allowing a negligible error probability significantly helps in the 'possibility', 'feasibility' and 'optimality' of both reliable and secure message transmission protocols. To design our protocols, we propose several new techniques which are of independent interest.
Consider the following problem: a sender S and a receiver R are part of a directed synchronous network and connected through intermediate nodes. Specifically, there exists n node disjoint paths, also called as wires, which are directed from S to R and u wires, which are directed from R to S. Moreover, the wires from S to R are disjoint from the wires directed from R to S. There exists a centralized, static adversary A static , who has unbounded computing power and who can control at most t wires between S and R in Byzantine fashion. S has a message m S , which we wants to send to R. The challenge is to design a protocol, such that after interacting in phases 5 as per the protocol, R should correctly output m R = m S , except with error probability 2 −(κ) , where κ is the error parameter. This problem is called as statistically reliable message transmission (SRMT). The problem of statistically secure message transmission (SSMT) has an additional requirement that at the end of the protocol, m S should be information theoretically secure from A static . Desmedt et.al [14, 55] have given the necessary and sufficientcondition for the existence of SRMT and SSMT protocols in the above settings. They also presented an SSMT protocol, satisfying their characterization. The authors in [14, 55] claimed that their protocol is efficientand has polynomial computational and communication complexity. However, we show that it is not so. That is, we specify an adversary strategy, which may cause the protocol to have exponential computational and communication complexity 6 . We then present
We study the problem of perfectly reliable message transmission (PRMT) and perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) in an undirected synchronous network tolerating an all powerful threshold mobile Byzantine adversary. Specifically, we show that the mobility of the threshold adversary does not affect the possibility and optimality of PRMT and PSMT protocols. We also characterise PSMT in directed networks tolerating mobile adversary. All existing PRMT and PSMT protocols abstract the paths between the sender and the receiver as wires, neglecting the intermediate nodes in the paths, thus causing significant over estimation in the communication and round complexity of protocols. Here, we consider the underlying paths as a whole instead of abstracting them as wires and derive a tight bound on the number of rounds required to achieve reliable communication tolerating a threshold mobile adversary with arbitrary roaming speed. Finally, we briefly study PRMT and PSMT protocols in the presence of non-threshold mobile Byzantine adversary. Even though the characterisation for PRMT/PSMT is shown to be same against both threshold static and threshold mobile adversary (in this article), we show that the characterisation for PRMT/PSMT against non-threshold static and non-threshold mobile adversary are not same.
We study the problem of Perfectly Reliable Message Transmission (PRMT) and Perfectly Secure Message Transmission (PSMT) between two nodes S and R in an undirected synchronous network, a part of which is under the influence of an all powerful mobile Byzantine adversary. In ACISP’2007 Srinathan et. al. has proved that the connectivity requirement for PSMT protocols is same for both static and mobile adversary thus showing that mobility of the adversary has no effect on the possibility of PSMT (also PRMT) protocols. Similarly in CRYPTO 2004, Srinathan et. al. has shown that the lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase PSMT protocol is same for static and mobile adversary. The authors have also designed a O(t) phase1 protocol satisfying this bound where t is the maximum number of nodes corrupted by the Byzantine adversary. In this work, we design a three phase bit optimal PSMT protocol using a novel technique, whose communication complexity matches the lower bound proved in CRYPTO 2004 and thus significantly reducing the number of phases from O(t) to three. Further using our novel technique, we design a three phase bit optimal PRMT protocol which achieves
In the Secure Message Transmission (SMT) problem two nodes in a network want to communicate securely (both privately and reliably), given that some of the nodes in the network are corrupted by an adaptive byzantine adversary with unlimited computational power. A SMT protocol uses multiple paths between the sender S and a receiver R to guarantee privacy and reliability of the message transmission. Privacy means that the adversary learns no information about the transmitted secret, whereas reliability means that the receiver always receives the message sent by the sender. S and R are connected by n disjoint paths where a subset of which (at most t in case of a threshold adversary) can be corrupted by an adversary. Efficiency parameters of a SMT protocol are the number of rounds (number of interactions between S and R ), communication complexity, and computational complexity. An (e, δ)-SMT protocol bounds the adversary's success probability of breaking privacy and reliability to e and δ, respectively. A SMT protocol for a given number of rounds is optimal if its transmission rate (amount of communication per one bit of message) matches the lower bound for that number of rounds. Optimal protocols have been constructed for a restricted set of parameters. It has been proved that secure SMT is possible if and only if n ≥ 2t + 1, where t is the number of paths corrupted by the adversary.
This thesis describes a number of contributions to the study of SMT problem. First, we improve the system parameter of a previously introduced wire virtualization method for constructing optimal protocols using two component protocols. Using the improved wire virtualization method we present the first optimal 1-round (0, δ)-SMT protocol for higher connectivity.
Then we introduce a modular approach for constructing SMT protocols using two or more modules. Using this approach we design an optimal 1-round (0, δ)-SMT protocol for the minimum connectivity, which has higher reliability than any comparable protocol. We also design a similar protocol for higher connectivity improving the reliability of the protocol presented in the first part of this thesis.
Constructing secure and efficient (in communication) SMT protocols against a threshold adversary has been extensively researched. However less is known about SMT problem for a generalized adversary who can corrupt one out of a set of possible subsets. In this part of the thesis, we focus on 1-round (0, δ)-SMT protocols against a generalized adversary. These protocols are especially attractive because of their possible practical applications.
Finally, we introduce a new security definition by presenting an alternative privacy definition, which is based on guessing advantage of the adversary, to construct more efficient (in communication) protocols. Our motivation is that if the received message is long enough and has sufficient entropy, then it can be used as a secret key. We give the relationship between the new security definition and the known one, and revisit bounds on connectivity and transmission rates of SMT protocols under the new definition. We also give constructions for a 1-round and a 3-round protocol, secure under the new definition, that are optimal.
The contributions made in this thesis add to the research on the secure message transmission problem and show new directions for future research.