Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Witness Indistinguishability for Any Single-Round Argument with Applications to Access Control

Zvika Brakerski, Yael Tauman Kalai

Published Jan 1, 2020• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_4

Related papers

One-Round Witness Indistinguishability from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Qihua Niu, Hongda Li, Guifang Huang +2 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2015•4 citations

One-Round Witness Indistinguishability from Indistinguishability Obfuscation.

Qihua Niu, Hongda Li, Bei Liang +1 more

•Jan 1, 2014•1 citation

Statistical Witness Indistinguishability (and more) in Two Messages

Yael Tauman Kalai, Dakshita Khurana, Amit Sahai

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2018•34 citations

Two-Round Secure MPC from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2014•184 citations

Constant-Round Concurrent NMWI and its relation to NMZK

Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Persiano, Ivan Visconti

One of the central questions in Cryptography is to design round-efficient protocols that are secure under man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper we introduce and study the notion of non-malleable witness indistinguishability (NMWI) and examine its relation with the classic notion of non-malleable zero knowledge (NMZK). Indeed, despite tremendous applicability of witness indistinguishability, while a lot of attention has been given to NMZK, very little attention has been given to witness indistinguishability in case of man-in-the-middle attacks. We initiate this study, with several (perhaps somewhat surprising) results: • We give the first definition of NMWI proof systems. Just like every NMZK proof is a zero-knowledge proof which aims to attain a very strong proof independence property, we require (and formalize) the notion that every NMWI proof is a witness indistinguishable proof system which enjoys a very strong witness independence property against any man-in-the-middle attack. • We show the existence of a constant-round NMWI argument system for NP in the standard model (i.e. without any trusted or any other setup assumptions).

•Jan 1, 2006•7 citations

How to Rewind with Minimal Interaction

Dakshita Khurana

The notion of simulation is central to cryptography: often, to demonstrate that an adversary did not recover any information about private inputs of other participants, we exhibit the existence of a simulator that generates the adversary's view without access to inputs of honest participants. The primary method used to build simulators is rewinding, where a simulator resets the adversary to a previous point in the protocol and tries to complete the protocol tree multiple times until it achieves a favorable outcome.First introduced in the context of zero-knowledge proof systems and secure computation, today the rewinding technique is synonymous with protocol security and polynomial simulation. Prior to this work, all known rewinding techniques in the plain model required multiple rounds of back-and-forth interaction between participants.In this thesis, we demonstrate the first rewinding techniques that require only a single message from each participant. Using these techniques, we overcome several barriers from literature to construct for the first time, based on standard sub-exponential cryptographic assumptions, the following core protocols, and several subsequent applications:- Two message commitments satisfying non-malleability (with respect to commitment).- Two-message delayed-input weak zero-knowledge arguments for NP. These imply arguments for NP satisfying witness hiding and strong witness indistinguishability.

•Jan 1, 2018•0 citations
One of the central questions in Cryptography is to design round-efficient protocols that are secure under man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper we introduce and study the notion of non-malleable witness indistinguishability (NMWI) and examine its relation with the classic notion of non-malleable zero knowledge (NMZK). Indeed, despite tremendous applicability of witness indistinguishability, while a lot of attention has been given to NMZK, very little attention has been given to witness indistinguishability in case of man-in-the-middle attacks. We initiate this study, with several (perhaps somewhat surprising) results: • We give the first definition of NMWI proof systems. Just like every NMZK proof is a zero-knowledge proof which aims to attain a very strong proof independence property, we require (and formalize) the notion that every NMWI proof is a witness indistinguishable proof system which enjoys a very strong witness independence property against any man-in-the-middle attack. • We show the existence of a constant-round NMWI argument system for NP in the standard model (i.e. without any trusted or any other setup assumptions).
The notion of simulation is central to cryptography: often, to demonstrate that an adversary did not recover any information about private inputs of other participants, we exhibit the existence of a simulator that generates the adversary's view without access to inputs of honest participants. The primary method used to build simulators is rewinding, where a simulator resets the adversary to a previous point in the protocol and tries to complete the protocol tree multiple times until it achieves a favorable outcome.First introduced in the context of zero-knowledge proof systems and secure computation, today the rewinding technique is synonymous with protocol security and polynomial simulation. Prior to this work, all known rewinding techniques in the plain model required multiple rounds of back-and-forth interaction between participants.In this thesis, we demonstrate the first rewinding techniques that require only a single message from each participant. Using these techniques, we overcome several barriers from literature to construct for the first time, based on standard sub-exponential cryptographic assumptions, the following core protocols, and several subsequent applications:- Two message commitments satisfying non-malleability (with respect to commitment).- Two-message delayed-input weak zero-knowledge arguments for NP. These imply arguments for NP satisfying witness hiding and strong witness indistinguishability.