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Cryptography

On Detecting Relay Attacks on RFID Systems Using Qubits

Aysajan Abidin

Published May 8, 2020• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

As RFID technology is being widely used in access control systems to identify and track both objects and people, relay attacks on RFID systems continue to pose serious threats to security. To mitigate relay attacks, distance bounding protocols can be used. Until recently, all distance bounding protocols were based on classical cryptography and communication techniques. In this paper, we take a closer look at a recently proposed protocol by Jannati and Ardeshir-Larijani [Quantum Information Processing 2016, 18] to detect relay attacks using qubits. We first observe that the protocol has a weakness which allows an adversary to mount a successful attack on the protocol. We then propose a countermeasure to restore security and compare the fixed protocol with the state of the art.

DOI
10.3390/cryptography4020014

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As RFID technology is being widely used in access control systems to identify and track both objects and people, relay attacks on RFID systems continue to pose serious threats to security. To mitigate relay attacks, distance bounding protocols can be used. Until recently, all distance bounding protocols were based on classical cryptography and communication techniques. In this paper, we take a closer look at a recently proposed protocol by Jannati and Ardeshir-Larijani [Quantum Information Processing 2016, 18] to detect relay attacks using qubits. We first observe that the protocol has a weakness which allows an adversary to mount a successful attack on the protocol. We then propose a countermeasure to restore security and compare the fixed protocol with the state of the art.
RFID (radio frequency identification) systems, recently being used in a wide range of areas, are vulnerable to relay attack from malicious attackers. For that reason, Brands, et al. proposed a certification protocol between a certifier and a verifier based on the concept of distance-bounding, and in addition Hancke et al. introduced the concept of RFID. However, the delivery of tag IDs, one of the main RFID features, is not still available, and there are two important demerits: anonymity in the delivery of tag IDs suggested by Kim et al. and inefficiency in finding a tag ID with regard to how to check errors which may occur in the process of data exchange between readers and tags. Therefore, this study proposes a protocol that meets the requirements of tag anonymity and location untraceability, has resistance to errors which may take place in the phase of tag data exchange, and is very efficient in finding tag IDs.
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a prominent technology within the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem, offering efficient and reliable object identification in various domains, including business, healthcare, and manufacturing. The security of RFID systems is of paramount importance, and recent authentication protocols have been developed to address these security concerns. In this survey paper, we explore and evaluate the latest authentication protocols designed to enhance security in RFID communications, primarily concentrating on the interaction between RFID readers and tags. We critically assess contemporary lightweight RFID authentication protocols, considering aspects such as security requirements, computational efficiency, and resilience against potential attacks. However, with the advent of quantum computing, these protocols are under scrutiny for their vulnerability. As a result, we emphasize the need for researchers to shift their focus toward post-quantum cryptography solutions to bolster the security of RFID systems. This paper serves as a comprehensive overview of recent developments in RFID authentication, shedding light on the pressing need for quantum-resistant security measures in this field.
Time-of-flight distance-bounding protocols are potentially useful in RFID and NFC environments and are designed to discourage a number of attacks that take advantage of the inherent assumption that a token and reader that manages to communicate are located in close physical proximity to each other. These protocols are dependent on time measurements made at the physical layer of the communication channel, and thus require special high bandwidth channels with low latency. Executing a distance-bound protocol on a suitable channel in a constrained environment would potentially allow for bit errors during communication. Currently, terrorist fraud is discouraged in distance-bounding protocols by ensuring that a prover collaborating with an the attacker in this fraud has to make his secret key known to the attacker. We discuss the effect of making a protocol resistant to bit errors and show that the approach to design protocols against terrorist fraud is significantly weakened by error resistance, as a prover is potentially able to keep his key secret or hinder an attacker from learning his key.
In our daily lives, people or devices frequently need to learn their location for many reasons as some services depend on the absolute location or the proximity. The outcomes of positioning systems can have critical effects e.g., on military, emergency. Thus, the security of these systems is quite important. In this thesis, we concentrate on many security aspects of position in cryptography. The first part of this thesis focuses on the theory of distance bounding. A distance bounding protocol is a two-party authentication protocol between a prover and a verifier which considers the distance of the prover as a part of his/her credential. It aims to defeat threats by malicious provers who try to convince that they are closer to the verifier or adversaries which seek to impersonate a far-away prover. In this direction, we first study the optimal security bounds that a distance bounding protocol can achieve. We consider the optimal security bounds when we add some random delays in the distance computation and let the prover involve distance computation. Then, we focus on solving the efficiency problem of public-key distance bounding because the public-key cryptography requires much more computations than the symmetric-key cryptography. We construct two generic protocols (one without privacy, one with) which require fewer computations on the prover side compared to the existing protocols while keeping the highest security level. Then, we describe a new security model involving a tamper-resistant hardware. This model is called the secure hardware model (SHM). We define an all-in-one security model which covers all the threats of distance bounding and an appropriate privacy notion for SHM. The second part of this thesis is to fill the gap between the distance bounding and its real-world applications. We first consider contactless access control. We define an integrated security and privacy model for access control using distance bounding (DB) to defeat relay attacks. We show how a secure DB protocol can be converted to a secure contactless access control protocol. Regarding privacy (i.e., keeping anonymity in a strong sense to an active adversary), we show that the conversion does not always preserve privacy, but it is possible to study it on a case by case basis. Then, we consider contactless payment systems. We design an adversarial model and define formally the contactless payment security against malicious cards and malicious terminals. Accordingly, we design a contactless payment protocol and show its security in our security model. The last part of this thesis focuses on positioning. We consider two problems related to positioning systems: localization and proof of location. In localization, a user aims to find its position by using a wireless network. In proof of location, a user wants to prove his/her position e.g., to have access to a system or authorize itself. We first formally define the problem of localization and construct a formal security model. We describe algorithms and protocols for localization which are secure in our model. Proof of location has been considered formally by Chandran et al. in CRYPTO 2009 and it was proved that achieving security is not possible in the vanilla model. By integrating the localization and the secure hardware model, we obtain a model where we can achieve proof of location.
We present a distance bounding (DB) protocol that employs quantum-bits (qubits) in the implementation of the rapid-bit exchange (a.k.a., challenge-response) phase, instead of classical bits. This is not the first attempt at using qubits in a DB protocol, as Abidin et al. proposed a way to implement DB protocols using qubits in RFIDSec 2016 [1]. We improve upon Abidin et al.'s protocol and make it resistant to photon number splitting attacks. In addition, our new protocol eliminates the need for communication from the prover to the verifier in the last authentication phase, which is necessary in the protocol by Abidin et al.