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INFORMACIONNYE TEHNOLOGII

Post-Quantum Protocol for No-Key Encryption

D.Yu. Guryanov, Костина Анна Александровна, Nikolay Andreevich Moldovyan

Published Apr 22, 2020• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.17587/it.26.207-213

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Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility•Mar 22, 2021•13 citations
We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE) protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum computer, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure against a quantum adversary with several ion-trap quantum computers. We present a password encrypted no-key protocol to resist middle-man attack, and prove that it is also with the post-quantum security. The analysis presented here is probably of general meaning for the security evaluation of various hybrid cryptosystems.
The advent of quantum computers has raised the risk of eavesdropping and made it essential to apply post-quantum security to most communication services. Encryption processing is not a single function as it includes key exchange functions (e.g., PQC and QKD) and encryption protocols (e.g., IPsec, MACsec, and L1 encryption), and it is necessary to combine these functions to suit the requirements of each service. However, the encryption protocols of existing optical & packet transport equipment are vertically integrated and cannot be altered easily. In this paper, we propose a disaggregation architecture of post-quantum security for optical and packet transport equipment. By separating key management functions from their implementation, the architecture enables more secure encrypted communication by using more secure key exchange methods and implemented encryption protocols. In addition, we also propose a key splitting method that eliminates the impact on communication in the event of a failure due to the functional separation provided by the method; it supports various encryption ciphers. By using this method, key update can be continued even after a communication break interrupts key exchange. We show that 96 Gbps traffic can be encrypted without error.
The demand on MACsec in Ethernet is increasing substantially since MACsec fits well for industrial applications which require strong security as well as efficiency. To provide a long-term security, the MACsec protocol should be resistant to future attacks including quantum attacks. In this paper, MACsec is analysed under a quantum attack scenario. To achieve 128-bit quantum security, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithms defined in MACsec should mandate to use 256-bit keys. On the other hand, classical public-key cryptosystems in MKA are not secure at all against quantum attacks so that they need to be replaced by post-quantum crypto schemes in a quantum world. We propose an authenticated post-quantum key establishment protocol which is suitable for long-term secure MACsec. The proposed protocol is used in the hybrid mode, an ephemeral key exchange, and an end-to-end encryption. We verified by experiments that the proposed protocol can be deployed in existing a MACsec-enabled Ethernet network.