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Lecture notes in computer science

Quantum Indistinguishability for Public Key Encryption

Tommaso Gagliardoni, Juliane Krämer, Patrick Struck

Published Jan 1, 2021• 15 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_24

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Quantum Indistinguishability for Public Key Encryption

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In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes (PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE, as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable - and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key. Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable.

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In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes (PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE, as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable - and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key. Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable.
In this work, we first design a function encryption scheme by using key encapsulation. We combine public key encryption with symmetric encryption to implement the idea of key encapsulation. In the key encapsulation, we use a key to turn a message (plaintext) into a ciphertext by symmetric encryption, and then we use public key encryption to turn this key into another ciphertext. In the design of function encryption scheme, we use the public key encryption system, symmetric encryption system, noninteractive proof system, indistinguishable obfuscator, and commitment scheme. Finally, we prove the indistinguishable security of our function encryption scheme.
Abstract: Using the Bonsai trees primitive and Gentry’s CPA-secure (chosen-plaintext attack) public-key encryption (PKE) scheme, we propose an efficient chosen-ciphtertext secure PKE scheme over lattice. If the decision variant of the learning with errors (LWE) problem is hard and the one-time signature used in this scheme is strong unforgeable, the proposed PKE scheme is indistinguishable against the adaptive chosen-ciphtertext attack (IND-CCA2). One of the characters for this scheme is that, before any encryption operation, the encryption algorithm uses a new choice rule to fix the public parameter matrixes used in the encryption operation. With the help of this new choice rule, we can achieve the chosen-ciphtertext security with much shorter the public key size in contrast to the lattice-based encryption scheme proposed in STOC’09 by Peikert. Moreover, as a CCA-secure PKE scheme, the message-tociphtertext expanse factor of this scheme which is controlled efficiently is nearly closed to the message-to-ciphtertext expanse factor of Gentry’s scheme which is CPA secure. Due to the quantum intractability of the LWE problem on which the scheme is based, the proposed PKE scheme is secure even in quantum-era.