Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security

Secret Key Generation from a Two Component Compound Source with Rate Constrained One Way Communication: Perfect Secrecy

Sebastian Baur, Ning Cai, Moritz Wiese, Holger Boche

Published Dec 1, 2019• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Secret key generation at two terminals is considered. Each terminal observes one of the outputs of a two component source. The two source outputs are correlated. Additionally one terminal can send a message to the second terminal via a noiseless public channel. It is assumed that this message is rate constrained. An eavesdropper with access to the public communication should be kept ignorant of the secret key. The maximum secret key rate that can be achieved such that the key is uniformly distributed and meets the perfect secrecy requirement is determined. This result is established for a compound source model.

DOI
10.1109/wifs47025.2019.9035091

Related papers

On Multiterminal Secrecy Capacities

Imre Csiszár, Prakash Narayan

Shannon-theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for source models in which the distinct components of a multiple source observed separately by multiple terminals, and for channel models in which a secure noisy channel with one input terminal and multiple output terminals, and, additionally in both cases, a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity, are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a set A of terminals, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. We show that for source models in which secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint from A, secrecy capacity can be achieved with noninteractive communication, the key being generated by any chosen terminal in the secret key-seeking set A of terminals obliviously of the public communication. For models in which the eavesdropper also possesses side information that is not available to any of the terminals cooperating in secrecy generation, an upper bound for the secrecy capacity and a sufficient condition for its tightness are given. The latter partially fills a gap in the authors' previous work [6].

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2007•0 citations

Secrecy Generation for Multiaccess Channel Models

Imre Csiszár, Prakash Narayan

Shannon theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with multiple input and output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a setAof terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter lower and upper bounds for secrecy capacities are obtained when secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint fromA. These bounds coincide in special cases, but not in general. We also consider models in which different sets of terminals share multiple keys, one for the terminals in each set with secrecy required from the eavesdropper as well as from the terminals not in this set. Partial results include showing links among the associated secrecy capacity region for multiple keys, the transmission capacity region of the multiple access channel defined by the secure noisy channel, and achievable rates for a single secret key for all the terminals.

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Aug 29, 2012•22 citations

Secrecy generation for multiple input multiple output channel models

Imre Csiszár, Prakash Narayan

Shannon theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with multiple input and output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a set A of terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter lower and upper bounds for secrecy capacities are obtained when secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint from A. These bounds coincide in special cases, and the lower bounds are not tight in general. We also consider models in which different sets of terminals share multiple keys, one for terminals in each set with secrecy required from the eavesdropper as well as the remaining terminals in the other sets. Partial results include showing links among the associated secrecy capacity region for multiple keys, the transmission capacity region of the multiple access channel defined by the secure noisy channel, and achievable rates for a single secret key for all the terminals.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2009•13 citations

Secrecy Capacities for Multiterminal Channel Models

Imre Csiszár, Prakash Narayan

Shannon-theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with one input terminal and multiple output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a set$A$of terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter characterizations of secrecy capacities are obtained for models in which secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint from$A$. These capacities are shown to be achievable with noninteractive public communication, the channel input terminal sending no public message and each output terminal sending at most one public message, not using randomization. Moreover, when the input terminal belongs to the set$A$, it can generate the secret key at the outset and transmit it over the noisy channel, suitably encoded, whereupon the output terminals in$A$securely recover this key using public communication as above. For models in which the eavesdropper also possesses side information that is not available to any of the terminals cooperating in secrecy generation, an upper bound for the secrecy capacity and a sufficient condition for its tightness are given.

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•May 29, 2008•150 citations

Secret-Key capacity of compound source models with one-way public communication

Nima Tavangaran, Holger Boche, Rafael F. Schaefer

In the classical Secret-Key generation model, Common Randomness is generated by two terminals based on the observation of correlated components of a common source, while keeping it secret from a non-legitimate observer. It is assumed that the statistics of the source are known to all participants. In this work, the Secret-Key generation model based on a compound source is studied where the source realization is unknown. The protocol should guarantee the security and reliability of the generated Secret-Key, simultaneously for all possible realizations of the compound source. A single-letter lower-bound of the Secret-Key capacity is derived for the case where the public communication rate is limited. Furthermore, a multi-letter capacity formula is computed for the case where the public communication is unconstrained.

IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)•Oct 1, 2015•4 citations

Capacity of a shared secret key

Imre Csiszár, Prakash Narayan

Shannon theoretic shared secret key generation by multiple terminals is considered for a source model in which the components of a discrete memoryless multiple source and a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. A shared secret key is generated for distinct coalitions of terminals, with all the terminals cooperating in this task through their public communication. A communication from a terminal can be a function of its observed source component and of all previous communication. Member terminals of a coalition unite in recovering the key. Secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes the public interterminal communication. A single-letter characterization of the shared secret key capacity is obtained. When the key must be concealed additionally from subsets of coalition members, we provide an upper bound for the strict shared secret key capacity.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2010•12 citations
Secret key generation at two terminals is considered. Each terminal observes one of the outputs of a two component source. The two source outputs are correlated. Additionally one terminal can send a message to the second terminal via a noiseless public channel. It is assumed that this message is rate constrained. An eavesdropper with access to the public communication should be kept ignorant of the secret key. The maximum secret key rate that can be achieved such that the key is uniformly distributed and meets the perfect secrecy requirement is determined. This result is established for a compound source model.
Shannon-theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for source models in which the distinct components of a multiple source observed separately by multiple terminals, and for channel models in which a secure noisy channel with one input terminal and multiple output terminals, and, additionally in both cases, a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity, are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a set A of terminals, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. We show that for source models in which secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint from A, secrecy capacity can be achieved with noninteractive communication, the key being generated by any chosen terminal in the secret key-seeking set A of terminals obliviously of the public communication. For models in which the eavesdropper also possesses side information that is not available to any of the terminals cooperating in secrecy generation, an upper bound for the secrecy capacity and a sufficient condition for its tightness are given. The latter partially fills a gap in the authors' previous work [6].
Shannon theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with multiple input and output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a setAof terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter lower and upper bounds for secrecy capacities are obtained when secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint fromA. These bounds coincide in special cases, but not in general. We also consider models in which different sets of terminals share multiple keys, one for the terminals in each set with secrecy required from the eavesdropper as well as from the terminals not in this set. Partial results include showing links among the associated secrecy capacity region for multiple keys, the transmission capacity region of the multiple access channel defined by the secure noisy channel, and achievable rates for a single secret key for all the terminals.
Shannon theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with multiple input and output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a set A of terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter lower and upper bounds for secrecy capacities are obtained when secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint from A. These bounds coincide in special cases, and the lower bounds are not tight in general. We also consider models in which different sets of terminals share multiple keys, one for terminals in each set with secrecy required from the eavesdropper as well as the remaining terminals in the other sets. Partial results include showing links among the associated secrecy capacity region for multiple keys, the transmission capacity region of the multiple access channel defined by the secure noisy channel, and achievable rates for a single secret key for all the terminals.
Shannon-theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with one input terminal and multiple output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a setAAAof terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter characterizations of secrecy capacities are obtained for models in which secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint fromAAA. These capacities are shown to be achievable with noninteractive public communication, the channel input terminal sending no public message and each output terminal sending at most one public message, not using randomization. Moreover, when the input terminal belongs to the setAAA, it can generate the secret key at the outset and transmit it over the noisy channel, suitably encoded, whereupon the output terminals inAAAsecurely recover this key using public communication as above. For models in which the eavesdropper also possesses side information that is not available to any of the terminals cooperating in secrecy generation, an upper bound for the secrecy capacity and a sufficient condition for its tightness are given.
In the classical Secret-Key generation model, Common Randomness is generated by two terminals based on the observation of correlated components of a common source, while keeping it secret from a non-legitimate observer. It is assumed that the statistics of the source are known to all participants. In this work, the Secret-Key generation model based on a compound source is studied where the source realization is unknown. The protocol should guarantee the security and reliability of the generated Secret-Key, simultaneously for all possible realizations of the compound source. A single-letter lower-bound of the Secret-Key capacity is derived for the case where the public communication rate is limited. Furthermore, a multi-letter capacity formula is computed for the case where the public communication is unconstrained.
Shannon theoretic shared secret key generation by multiple terminals is considered for a source model in which the components of a discrete memoryless multiple source and a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. A shared secret key is generated for distinct coalitions of terminals, with all the terminals cooperating in this task through their public communication. A communication from a terminal can be a function of its observed source component and of all previous communication. Member terminals of a coalition unite in recovering the key. Secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes the public interterminal communication. A single-letter characterization of the shared secret key capacity is obtained. When the key must be concealed additionally from subsets of coalition members, we provide an upper bound for the strict shared secret key capacity.