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IEEE Internet of Things Journal

Comments on “Toward Secure and Provable Authentication for Internet of Things: Realizing Industry 4.0”

Muhammad Arslan Akram, Khalid Mahmood, Saru Kumari, Hu Xiong

Published Mar 4, 2020• 17 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Internet of Things (IoT) is the next era of communication networks. The concept of IoT is that everything within the global communication network is interconnected and accessible. Since IoT has various applications, including Industry 4.0. Therefore, upcoming and existing IoT applications are highly auspicious to enhance the level of automation, efficiency, and comfort for the users. However, to a certain extent, there are numerous challenges while deploying IoT devices in the Industry 4.0, like IoT devices are assumed to have inadequate resources to support security solutions. Therefore, in order to protect the communication environment, an efficient and lightweight security solution is needed. Recently, on the basis of a hierarchical approach, Garget al.presented a lightweight, robust key agreement, and provably secure authentication protocol for the IoT environment. Their introduced protocol relies on lightweight operations, including XOR operation, concatenation, hash function, physically unclonable function (PUF), and elliptic curve cryptography. However, in this comment, we point out the security loopholes of Garget al.’s protocol and show that it is vulnerable to the IoT-node impersonation attack. Moreover, it has irrelevant generation and usage of some parameters. Therefore, we put forward some valuable suggestions for attack resilience.

DOI
10.1109/jiot.2020.2977475

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Internet of Things (IoT) is the next era of communication networks. The concept of IoT is that everything within the global communication network is interconnected and accessible. Since IoT has various applications, including Industry 4.0. Therefore, upcoming and existing IoT applications are highly auspicious to enhance the level of automation, efficiency, and comfort for the users. However, to a certain extent, there are numerous challenges while deploying IoT devices in the Industry 4.0, like IoT devices are assumed to have inadequate resources to support security solutions. Therefore, in order to protect the communication environment, an efficient and lightweight security solution is needed. Recently, on the basis of a hierarchical approach, Garget al.presented a lightweight, robust key agreement, and provably secure authentication protocol for the IoT environment. Their introduced protocol relies on lightweight operations, including XOR operation, concatenation, hash function, physically unclonable function (PUF), and elliptic curve cryptography. However, in this comment, we point out the security loopholes of Garget al.’s protocol and show that it is vulnerable to the IoT-node impersonation attack. Moreover, it has irrelevant generation and usage of some parameters. Therefore, we put forward some valuable suggestions for attack resilience.
The Internet of Things (IoT) has become an important technology which permits different devices and machines to interconnect with each other using heterogeneous networks. The integration of numerous techniques is expected to offer extraordinary growth in future and current promising applications of IoT. In these days, the secure communication among interconnected IoT components has become an important issue of concern. Therefore, it has become a foremost need to design such authentication protocol which can make the secure communication among IoT components. In this article, we proposed an identity-based authentication and key agreement protocol for the IoT environment in order to offer the secure communication between various IoT entities. The devised protocol utilizes the physically unclonable function which helps to robustly resist the physical attack on IoT components. We analyze the proposed protocol informally which clearly shows that the proposed protocol offers the perfect forward secrecy, device anonymity and untraceability and also resists the desynchronization, IoT node impersonation and server impersonation attacks. The security features of proposed protocol are also analyzed formally using well known Random Oracle Model (ROM). Moreover, the performance of the devised protocol has also been determined in terms of communication and computational overhead. The performance and security analysis shows the supremacy of the devised protocol over the various related protocols.
Device authentication and key exchange are essential issues for Internet of Things (IoT) which plays an indispensable role in modern life. Many sensor devices in IoT, with limited resources and poor self-protection capabilities, are deployed in the unattended and open places, making them vulnerable to physical attacks while facing traditional security threats. Despite several researches have been conducted by using the physical unclonable function (PUF) to immune the communication between IoT devices from the security threats above, as per the knowledge of the authors, current solutions rely on the participation of the server to distribute the key parameters, which requires high message overhead and markedly influences the efficiency. To fill this gap, this article proposes an end-to-end mutual authentication and key exchange protocol for IoT by combining PUF with certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) on elliptic curve, which only needs “three handshakes” without the real-time participation of the server. The security analysis shows that the proposed protocol can not only secure the IoT devices from various attacks, but also provide perfect forward secrecy. Moreover, the experimental validation and performance analysis show the proposed protocol outperforms existing related protocols in terms of security features, protocol rounds and communication cost.
The advent of Internet of Things (IoT) ushers in a significant potential to integrate individuals, devices, and data, leading to a profound change in our professional and social environments. The small, resource-constrained IoT devices are usually deployed to collect various types of critical data in remote or unmonitored locations. Due to extensive interconnectivity, limited resources, and inadequate security design, IoT systems are vulnerable to communication-specific cyber threats, which aim to disrupt operations, steal sensitive information, or cause damage. To resolve the security concerns in IoT communications, many recent efforts have been devoted to designing authenticated key agreement protocols for IoT systems. However, not only most of the existing solutions fail to adopt cost-effective techniques for resource-limited IoT devices, but also they ignore the differentiation among various data types in the established session keys. A few approaches use traditional physical unclonable functions (PUFs) to address resource concerns, yet they introduce new security issues into IoT systems. Once the PUF cryptographic information is compromised by machine learning attacks, the entire authentication framework collapses. Therefore, in this paper we propose an authenticated key agreement protocol for device-to-gateway communication in IoT systems based on Chebyshev polynomial and probability-based PUF. We examine the proposed protocol’s security features through formal security validation. We also conduct performance evaluation through a simulation-oriented study, and the results clearly prove that the proposed protocol offers superior security and privacy, while maintaining low computational overhead.
The immense potential of the Internet of Things (IoT) is challenged by grave security vulnerabilities that are easily exploitable in resource-constrained environments. We propose a lightweight Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol to derive a shared session key for each communicating node in amutually communicating cluster of IoT nodes. Each IoT device is embedded with a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), and a Fuzzy Extractor (FE) is deployed to correct and reproduce the private key and public helper data pair from the possibly erroneous PUF response. This secret raw PUF response is not stored explicitly in the server. A forward-secure authenticated key agreement is achieved by incorporating Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDH) protocol. The security of the proposed scheme has been formally verified while considering both active and passive attackers using the Verifpal tool. A prototype implementation with the Arbiter PUF circuit, FE, and associated software has successfully demonstrated the efficacy of our scheme.
The Internet of Things (IoT) has become an integral part of modern life, with the number of connected devices increasing exponentially. Ensuring secure authentication among millions of such interconnected devices, along with the efficient distribution and management of secret keys, poses significant research challenges. Traditional one-to-one authentication schemes often overlook the stringent resource constraints of IoT devices and fail to address the scalability requirements of massive networks. In contrast, group authentication schemes (GASs) have emerged as promising solutions for many-to-many authentication, enabling simultaneous verification of multiple resource-constrained devices. However, most existing GASs remain energy-inefficient and lack the robustness required for large-scale deployment. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a novel, lightweight, and scalable group authentication scheme leveraging Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to achieve enhanced security and efficiency in IoT environments. The security analysis using AVISPA and comparison with existing schemes reveal that the proposed protocol is secure and suitable for IoT networks.
The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) has worsened the challenge of maintaining data and user privacy. IoT end devices, often deployed in unsupervised environments and connected to open networks, are susceptible to physical tampering and various other security attacks. Thus, robust, efficient authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols are essential to protect data privacy during exchanges between end devices and servers. The previous work in "Provably Secure ECC-Based Anonymous Authentication and Key Agreement for IoT" proposed a novel AKA scheme for secure IoT environments. They claimed their protocol offers comprehensive security features, guarding against numerous potential flaws while achieving session key security. However, this paper demonstrates through logical and mathematical analyses that the previous work is vulnerable to various attacks. We conducted a security analysis using the extended Canetti and Krawczyk (eCK) model, which is widely employed in security evaluations. This model considers scenarios where an attacker has complete control over the network, including the ability to intercept, modify, and delete messages, while also accounting for the potential exposure of ephemeral private keys. Furthermore, we show that their scheme fails to meet critical security requirements and relies on flawed security assumptions. We prove our findings using the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications, a widely recognized formal verification tool. To strengthen attack resilience, we propose several recommendations for the advancement of more robust and efficient AKA protocols specifically designed for IoT environments.